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Introduction 
In FOTON module 2 the national research teams conducted case studies of 
the local innovation capabilities of firms which have been subjected to 
foreign takeovers. Two case studies of selected firms and their surrounding 
innovation systems have been carried out in each country, one within the 
pharmaceutical industry and one within the software industry. For practical 
reasons, the software industry is taken to include ICT companies producing 
software as part of a wider service or product range.  
The main aim of the case studies has been to assess whether there has been a 
competence drain or competence gain as a consequence of the takeovers. In 
this context we have studied whether and how the foreign takeovers have 
affected R&D activities, the knowledge base and the general learning and 
innovation processes in the firms acquired and whether these in-firm 
processes have had an impact upon the knowledge base and innovation 
activities of the actors surrounding the acquired firm. 
There are several reasons why the pharmaceutical and software industries 
were selected as case study industries. One reason is that they are both so-
called high-tech industries with a high level of R&D and innovation in 
general, and thereby represent dynamic forces for innovation in the 
innovation systems in which they function.  
The pharmaceutical and software industries are furthermore growth 
industries and adequately represented in the various Nordic countries, which 
allow for comparisons across the region. The pharmaceutical industry is 
characterized by many rather large companies, and the selected case studies 
reflect this fact. As regards the software industry, the cases selected tend to 
represent small and medium sized companies rather than large firms.   
Firstly, the project aimed at uncovering what happens with existing R&D 
and other innovation activities in firms acquired by multinational enterprises 
(MNEs). Important questions in relation to the case companies were:  
 Is there a tendency for R&D functions (and innovation capabilities more 
generally) to be relocated or centralized to the MNE headquarters, or do 
such activities remain in the acquired firm?  
 What are the reasons for the strategic choices of the MNE?  
 Are innovation capabilities regarded an embedded part of the local firm?  
 What innovation enhancing knowledge and resources may be transferred 
from the MNE to the firm in question?  
 Is this dissemination a result of technology transfer or the transfer of 
other resources from the MNE to the host economy?  
 How are the MNE’s knowledge and resources taken up and utilized by 
the acquired firm to enhance innovation? 
 
Secondly, the case studies were to give an understanding of positive and 
negative effects outside the specific firm acquired by a foreign based 
company. Central questions in this respect were: 
 What kind of impacts does the transfer of ownership have on the 
innovation system surrounding the acquired firm?  
How does the takeover affect the local knowledge base?   
 How do MNE strategies affect the local innovation system
firm is part of?  
Take-overs & FDI in statistics 
CIS analysis: 
Impacts of ownership on innovation 
Module 2
take-over/merger cases within
pharmaceutical and software sectors
Policy responses & status of FDI
in national policies 
 the acquired 
hese questions were covered in interviews with company representatives. 
In some cases, some of the most important stakeholders of the acquired 
aware that two case studies per country 
cannot shed light upon all the potential aspects included in foreign 
e of a 
her 
Figure 1 Focus of FOTON module 2 
 
The CIS analysis is presented in report No. 3, the policy analysis in report No. 1. See 
www.step.no/foton
 
T
firms were interviewed as well.     
The FOTON research team is well 
takeovers. This should, however, not be a major problem if we take into 
account that the module 2 report is not meant to be a stand-alone typ
document. Rather, the report and the case studies should be read and 
understood within the broader context of the FOTON project, i.e. the 
company cases serve to illuminate perspectives not captured by the ot
modules in the project. 
•  
 
The selection of company cases was left to the respective national research 
teams. The main criteria for the case selection were: 
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 1. There should be one case from each of the chosen industries, software and 
pharmaceuticals (broadly defined in this study). 
2. The takeover should have taken place no later than the year 1990. 
3. The takeover should not have been too recent, in order for the impacts to be 
addressed.  
 
On the basis of these criteria, the following company cases were chosen by 
the national teams: 
Table 1 Company cases 
Country Acquired Acquirer Sector Takeover year
DK DAK-Laboratoriet Nycomed, Norway 
Amersham, UK 
A group of investors  
pharma 1991 
1997 
1999 
DK Datacentralen CSC, US software 1996 
FIN Iobox Terra Mobile S.A of 
Teléfonica Group, Spain 
software 2000 
FIN Oy Star Ab Santen Ltd., Japan pharma 1997 
IS Computer Knowledge Inc Eastman Kodak, US software 2000 
IS deCODE genetics, Inc1 An Icelandic company 
with sites in the US 
pharma 1996 (founded) 
NO Nycomed/Axis 
Diagnostics 
Axis Shield Plc, UK pharma 1999 
NO Zoomit Kelkoo, France software 2000 
SE Astra Zeneca, UK pharma 1999 
SE Internet AB2 Deutchnet GmbH, 
Germany 
software 1999 
 
The Swedish software case is dealt with anonymously - the company in 
question was taken over by a German enterprise but later on the whole 
concern was liquidated. In this situation the name of the enterprise cannot be 
mentioned because is impossible to obtain a permission.  
The company case studies are based on available public documents (e.g. 
annual reports and media coverage of firms) and semi-structured interviews 
with company representatives as well as stakeholders (suppliers, customers, 
competitors, collaborating firms, competitors, local or regional R&D 
                                                 
1 deCODE genetics Inc has not been a target of a takeover, but is a multinational company which has 
itself acquired companies both in Iceland in the United States. 
2 The names of the Swedish software case company and the acquiring German company have been 
changed - or anonymized - by the FOTON team. 
organisations etc.). In some cases the researchers have also had the 
opportunity to use internal company documents as background material. 
The general guideline for the interviews is supplemented as appendix 1 at 
the end of this report.   
The report is organised into three sections. The first section provides an 
overview of literature on impacts of foreign takeovers as well as a 
discussion on the methodological approach - the case study methodology - 
and its strengths and weaknesses.  
The second section consists of chapters summarising the findings from the 
case studies. We discuss reasons for the sales and acquisitions, before 
proceeding to the firm level effects of the takeovers and mergers. Then 
focus shifts to the effects on the local and national innovation systems.  
The original case descriptions are presented in the third section of the report.  
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 Impacts of foreign takeovers - some findings from the 
literature 
By Hans de Geer, Tommy Borglund and Magnus Frostenson 
Mergers and acquisitions (takeovers) 
Mergers and acquisitions are often categorised together and seen as 
common phenomena. In the research literature the distinction between these 
two concepts is not always emphasised. However, much confusion is 
avoided if an explanation of the differences between the two phenomena is 
given and an account of what the consequences of these differences actually 
are is provided. 
In a purely technical sense the two concepts sometimes converge. A merger 
of equals, for example, can be technically designed as an acquisition 
although the decisive influence on the firm is shared equally between the 
two merging parties.  
A helpful conceptual tool for singling out the distinction would for this 
reason be the concept of controlling interest (Calori et al. 1994, Chatterjee 
et al. 1992). Reserving this criterion for acquisitions is adequate. If a 
financial transaction is undertaken resulting in one party getting a 
controlling interest with regards to another firm, an acquisition (or takeover) 
has taken place.  
In general such a controlling interest can be said to exist when a firm gets 
hold of more than fifty per cent of the voting power in an acquired firm. 
Sometimes, but not always, this equals fifty per cent of the stock in the 
acquired firm. In most cases the two parties involved remain separate units. 
A merger, on the other hand, is usually understood as a merger of equals. 
This does not necessarily imply identical financial positions before the 
merger. Rather, the concept of equality in this case refers to the power 
relations and the degree of voluntary participation in the merger. A 
reasonable point of departure is that a merger of equals takes place as a 
result of a financial transaction implying that two firms voluntarily and with 
relatively equal strength join together in order to carry out all its future 
business activities within a common structure under a common name.  
Why mergers and acquisitions occur is under debate. Copeland et al. (2000) 
argue that mergers and takeovers are important means of reallocating 
resources in the global economy as well as tools for executing corporate 
strategies. Different motives are identified but a common idea seems to be 
that involved actors strive towards increasing shareholder value, obtaining 
legitimacy for the organisation, and handling the pressure for structural 
change in the business. Another important psychological motive is often 
attributed to the management of the firms involved. Its situation might 
improve if it initiates and effectuates mergers and takeovers.  
In classifying takeovers it is common to use a categorisation developed by 
the US Federal Trade Commission (Cartwright & Cooper 1990, Kitching 
1967, Napier 1989): 
 Horizontal takeovers refer to acquisitions within one and the same 
industry where two similar organisations are involved.  
 Vertical takeovers refer to the combination of two organisations from 
successive processes within the same industry. 
 Conglomerates are created when the acquired organisation is in a 
completely unrelated field of business activity 
 Concentric takeovers, finally, are the ones that occur when the acquiring 
firm wants to expand its business to an unfamiliar but related field.  
 
Horizontal takeovers can be said to have attracted most interest in the 
research literature. These transactions involve firms operating in the same 
line of business, which implies former competitors joining forces within a 
new structure. This can in part be explained by an interest in the supposedly 
laborious task of strategic and organisational integration that befalls the 
acquiring firm in a takeover situation or both firms in a merger of equals. 
Out of the ten case studies within the FOTON project eight can be classified 
as acquisitions or takeovers in a literal sense. One firm (deCODE genetics 
Inc) has not been taken over at all, but is investigated with regards to its 
expansion abroad. Another one (AstraZeneca) is an example of a huge 
merger of equals. The majority of the cases, however, could reasonably 
enough be classified as takeovers of the horizontal kind. 
The cases are examples of cross-border mergers and acquisitions. This may 
imply special legal and cultural considerations. Most of the firms under 
investigation have remained separate business units after the takeover. But a 
special issue concerning mergers is the fact that despite the joint structure, a 
merged firm must have a legal domicile that is nationally bound. In the case 
of AstraZeneca, its home country domicile became the United Kingdom. 
Consequences of mergers and acquisitions (takeovers) 
When studying the consequences of mergers and acquisitions an external as 
well as an internal focus is possible. An external focus may for example 
entail a study of the consequences for the surrounding environment. An 
internal focus could shed light on the organisational consequences of 
mergers and acquisitions from a financial, cultural or some other 
perspective.  
A stakeholder analysis may be useful for illustration purposes (Freeman 
1984, O’Higgins 2002). The merged or acquired firms have different 
stakeholders with different interests. Out of these some are external (e.g. 
suppliers and customers) and others internal (employees). Depending on the 
purpose the relevant stakeholder category is identified and the outcome for 
this group examined. Some scholars focus on the general impact of mergers 
and acquisitions for an entire sector or country while others choose to study 
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 individual firms as case studies. Macro and micro perspectives emerge. For 
natural reasons historical data tend to be used when doing quantitative 
research and retrospection when qualitative studies based on interviews are 
made. Studies on the macro as well as on the micro level are often carried 
out from an outcome perspective. Performance of some kind is measured or 
estimated.  
In general, much attention has been paid to stakeholders, such as owners 
and employees. From an owner perspective the financial performance of 
merged firms is of great interest. Often - but not always - financial studies 
deliver findings that indicate that merged firms underperform financially 
after mergers.  
Sirower (1997) claims that most takeovers fail from a financial point of 
view - thereby disagreeing with Jensen & Ruback (1983) who claim that 
strong positive effects can be seen for the shareholders in the target firms 
and moderately positive effects for the owners of the acquiring firm. 
Trautwein (1990) stands in between when asserting that the net gainers from 
takeovers would be the shareholders of the target firms. In these studies 
parameters such as shareholder value or net profits are used.  
Other studies refer to what happens to for example innovation, development 
and learning in merged or acquired organisations. An outcome perspective 
is applied and problems and strengths identified. Examples can include 
Berggren (2003) who suggests that an important problem for merged firms 
is that too much energy is devoted to adjusting and integrating different 
technologies into common product platforms. Harmonising activities take 
too much time at the expense of development.  
In a study by Capron (1999) the recurrent synergy argument is 
problematised. Rationalisations such as cost-cutting, asset divestiture and 
streamlining production are given priority without attention to revenue-
enhancing activities that must complement the picture in order to get a 
successful result.  
A central idea in micro level studies is strategical versus organisational fit 
(see for example Haspeslagh & Jemison 1991, Löwstedt et al. 2003). 
Although a firm fits into the overall business context of the acquiring firm, 
organisational issues may become overriding when it comes to practically 
uniting two different companies into one efficient organisation. The need for 
a satisfactory organisational fit has turned attention to the issue of 
integration. How to integrate a newly acquired firm or business unit has 
become a central topic for many scholars in the field. 
Integration seems to contain in its very essence the notion of one superior 
party making arrangements to make sure that an inferior (purchased) party is 
smoothly brought into a wider structure. For this reason many researchers 
have treated mergers and acquisitions from a strategical point of view, 
indicating a managerial, often normative, perspective. A strategically related 
prescription can for example be that management should coordinate 
activities to attain the overall targets of the combined firms (Shirastava 
1986). According to this view mergers and acquisitions are essentially 
planned processes. 
One important strand of the literature focuses explicitly on the human side 
of mergers and acquisitions (Buono & Bowdich 1989). Several accounts 
have been given about how employees react to the sometimes dramatical 
changes that a merger or takeover may bring. Many accounts paint a dark 
picture. In many instances employees tend to lose their identity, job 
satisfaction and relative power positions (Schweiger et al. 1987, Schweiger 
& DeNisi 1991).  
Culture becomes a central concept. Views about how to define culture 
differ. It is common to treat culture as systems of norms, values and beliefs 
shared by the members of the organisation (see for example Nahavandi & 
Malekzadeh 1988), which implies that different cultural systems collide in 
mergers and acquisitions. Cultural clashes may result in different outcomes. 
Larsson (1991) and Nahavandi & Malekzadeh (1988) build on Berry’s 
(1980) model of acculturation. When firms merge their respective cultures 
clash and influence each other. The result may be integration, assimilation, 
separation or deculturation, all depending on to what degree the two 
involved parties keep their respective cultures.  
Mergers and acquisitions can also be studied on a meta-level. Discourse 
analysis has been used to investigate argumentation for and against 
international mergers and acquisitions. For instance have media accounts of 
mergers and acquisitions been studied in order to pinpoint how a nationally 
biased discourse is constructed (Risberg et al. 2003, Vaara & Tienari 2002). 
What happens to merged and acquired firms can also be studied from inside 
by using a gender perspective (Tienari 2000) or studying national discourse 
metaphorically within the firms (Vaara et al. 2003). In general, a 
rationalistic discourse is used by management to justify the merger or 
acquisition while other ways of expression, for example nationalistic ones, 
can be found in the media and among non-executives. 
Specific consequences of cross-border mergers and acquisitions 
It is reasonable to ask for the difference between international mergers and 
acquisitions on the one hand and national ones on the other. A standard 
explanation found in the literature is that the difference should be 
understood in terms of culture (Larsson 1991, Larsson & Risberg 1997, Olie 
1994). The concept of culture is fundamental to researchers within cross-
cultural studies, although this field is widely defined and understood. 
International cross-culture management is the field where cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions receive special attention (Boyacigiller et al. 2003). 
Within this field three strands of research can be found. Within cross-
national comparisons culture on a national level is the relevant unit of 
analysis. Here culture is often regarded as a set of norms, values and beliefs 
common to a certain (national) group of people, and is a variable that is 
supposed to differ more between nationals and foreigners than between 
nationals of one and the same country. This common assumption builds on 
8 
 an idea of culture as a coherent system that can be attributed to nationality 
(see for example Hofstede 1980, Zander 1997).  
Joining different nationalities and country specific systems within the same 
structure may be troublesome, according to this assumption, since the lack 
of similarity between people and systems is likely to be greater than in a 
national merger or acquisition. Within the field of cross-national 
comparison this issue is a central topic of investigation. A managerial 
perspective is often used. Examples of comparisons between leadership 
styles can be found (see for example Calori et al. 1994, Lubatkin et al. 
1998). 
Some findings question the idea that increased cultural distance generates 
more conflicts than similarities. Larsson (1991) points out that the 
awareness of potential dissimilarities is often more developed in a cross-
border context, which means that there is a better readiness for tackling 
problems associated with culture in these firms.  
The concept of culture is strongly problematised within the fields of 
intercultural interaction and multiple cultures. Individuals in 
internationalised firms are seen as carriers of multiple identities. This 
implies a constructivist view of how the identification process in an 
organisation takes place, which has significance in international mergers or 
acquisitions. National identities are not seen as given in advance. Rather, 
interaction and the joint creation of meaning in a certain context are 
emphasised. What comes out of a cross-border merger or acquisition cannot 
be understood in terms of a clash between two separate systems. Instead, a 
process comes about where the creation of a new system of meaning and 
symbols turns out to be the hallmark. 
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Methodology 
By Hans De Geer, Tommy Borglund and Magnus Frostenson  
The usefulness of case studies 
The FOTON project works with studies using quantitative data on a macro 
level as well as case studies using qualitative data on a micro level. Here we 
will discuss the methodological issues around the case studies. We will 
discuss what case studies can be used for and their limitations.  
For the FOTON project the case studies give an additional understanding 
that goes beyond the results coming from quantitative surveys. In combining 
these methods you can attain both some general explanations about the 
object under study as well as an in-depth understanding of the processes 
around mergers and acquisitions when it comes to innovation and 
knowledge transfer. Qualitative case studies can be used when studying 
phenomena where the researcher has a need to gain a deeper understanding 
of a complex and contradictory phenomenon that might not be easy to 
measure or to study by using quantitative methods such as surveys of a 
larger universe.  
In the FOTON project research questions are of that type. It is not easy to 
grasp the meaning of findings around subjects like “competence gain or 
competence drain” without making extensive qualitative case studies that 
bring life and humanistic understanding to the complex change processes of 
organisations. 
Case studies can be said to be particularistic, descriptive, heuristic and 
inductive (Merriam 1994). A particularistic study focuses on a certain 
situation, event, phenomenon or person. It brings up the unique feature and 
gives you a possibility to study something in depth. It can be used to give 
detailed information about every day consequences of a major trend or 
development.  
The case study is descriptive in the sense that it gives a thorough and 
extensive illustration of the things you are studying. It gives the researcher a 
possibility to make a ”thick” description, a complete and detailed 
description (Guba & Lincoln 1981).   
A heuristic case study improves the readers’ understanding of the 
phenomena under study. It can bring new meanings, give you new 
experiences and confirm or not confirm your earlier understanding. It is 
inductive in the way that it can be founded on inductive reasoning. New 
concepts and hypotheses can arise from the information building on the 
context of the study. The discovery of new meanings, relations or 
knowledge is typical of qualitative case studies, rather then investigating 
and testing hypotheses. 
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 Results from case studies are not to be generalised to a larger universe than 
the case investigated. Case studies can oversimplify and put too much 
emphasis on certain factors. The reader can believe that what he is reading 
is the “reality” when it only is a version of reality as it is turning out in the 
case study (Guba & Lincoln 1981). Case study researchers are sometimes 
criticised for not using to the full content of the gathered information (Potter 
& Wetherell 1987, Alvesson & Sköldberg 1994).     
Moreover, there is a risk of exaggerating the connection between narratives 
and the actual situation where consistencies are lifted up and non-
consistencies are downplayed. This can lead to a selective interpretation 
where a potential variety of meanings are suppressed in favour of a main 
pre-supposed meaning. 
A case study does however give you a chance to make generalisations to 
theory. You can do that through analytical generalisation as a contrast to 
statistical generalisation (Yin 1994). A previously developed theory is used 
as a template with which it is possible to compare the empirical results. 
Using analytical generalisation you can discuss and compare findings from 
a case study with theory. It can help you answer questions of “how” and 
“why” coming from quantitative surveys or from general theories.  
Case studies are useful for research aiming to bring new or better 
understanding of existing theories. They are also useful for explorative 
studies giving suggestions to new theories which can be developed through 
quantitative studies. A case study shows the possible. When a phenomenon 
has been observed in a case study it is proven that this phenomenon actually 
can occur in situations like these. A case study can reveal the unique and 
display things not thought of before, which can bring new understanding to 
researchers and readers. 
The researcher as an interpreter  
Qualitative case studies can be made from a hermeneutical perspective and 
hermeneutics as such is characterised by interpretation and an emphasis on 
understanding. Positivistic and hermeneutic standpoints are often described 
as two opposites on ontological and epistemological scales (Morgan & 
Smircich 1980). Hermeneutics has more of a subjective approach to social 
science while positivism has a more objective approach. On the ontological 
scale reality is seen as a social construction in hermeneutics while positivists 
see reality as a concrete structure.  
The basic epistemological stance for hermeneutics is understanding and 
insight. Interpretations are developed from the pre-understanding of the 
researcher. As the research goes on, the researcher develops a deeper 
understanding of the pheonoma at hand, which is - again - a new pre-
understanding that can be challenged through discussion and research. This 
tradition often criticise positivism for oversimplifying the role of the 
researcher, as the interpretation and the relation between the subject and the 
object is rarely problematised within such studies. 
Qualitative case studies made from a hermeneutical perspective can give 
you a holistic understanding of the phenomena but do not provide you with 
an answer as regards some form of objective reality. The question whether 
an interpretation is “true” or not is not a question to ask in hermeneutics 
(Alvesson and Sköldberg 1994). In a hermeneutical case study researchers 
are not trying to establish a truth, since other interpretations are possible. 
Positivism embraces quantitative studies making generalisations of an 
objective reality, while hermeneutics embraces processes of individual 
interpretation, presenting the researchers subjective understanding without 
any claims of presenting reality. 
What the qualitative researcher can do is to search for credible and relevant 
interpretations. Adopting a totally relativistic standpoint is perhaps not a 
very fruitful way of working and can be as hard to defend as any statement 
of the existence of an objective true reality (Kristensson Uggla 2002).  If 
you only can come up with an interpretation that is just as good as any other 
interpretation you have not contributed that much. The ambition must be to 
try to make a statement of why readers should find your interpretation 
credible and relevant. From this standpoint you can give some suggestions 
to explanations of the phenomena under study, as a complement to the 
understanding you are giving the reader. In that sense, there is a process of 
dialogue between understanding and explanation (Radnitsky 1970). 
Ways of gathering information 
So, how do we cope with these constraints around the qualitative data in 
case studies? To get to a deeper structure of a case study it is important to 
use a variety of methods for data collection. Multiple sources of information 
reduce the likelihood of misinterpretations and oversimplifications. 
Triangulation of data from several sources gives a deeper understanding 
(Denzin & Lincoln 2000).  In the FOTON project mainly two ways of 
gathering information have been used, interviews and the study of 
documents. To a smaller extent other observations have been included. By 
combining all of these three ways of gathering information you can build 
more credible interpretations. 
When it comes to interviews much can be learned from the social 
constructivist perspective (Berger and Luckmann 1966). Interviews can be 
seen as being constructed by the interviewee and interviewer. The notion of 
reality is not independent from the interview situation, but is partly created 
by it. What is expressed is the interviewee’s view or construction of reality. 
Others can have experienced a situation in other ways and have made 
different interpretations of it. It is important to make clear to the readers 
what part of narrative told can be regarded as something experienced by 
many and what part of the narrative that contains personal views and social 
constructions from one single actor.  
The information coming from written documents must also be read with a 
critical eye, as we know from the field of historical methodology (Jarrick 
and Söderberg 1993). The information has to pass the test of identification 
and authenticity and the researchers must assess the relationship between 
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 the narrator and the object. We must reflect over the credibility of the 
document itself and of the narrator that has written it. 
The use of case studies in FOTON 
To sum up, we can say that the case studies made in the FOTON project 
function as a complement to the more quantitative surveys of the project. 
Provided that readers are aware of the lack of generalisation of the findings, 
the case studies bring understanding and tentative answers to questions of 
“how” and “why”. Suggestions that could be used as hypotheses in further 
quantitative studies or as something that is to be compared with theory in an 
analytical discussion. 
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The pharmaceutical and software industries in the 
Nordic countries 
By Juha Oksanen & Nina Rilla 
Below a short overview of the chosen industries - pharmaceuticals and 
software - is provided before we proceed to the case study findings. The 
case study descriptions include a closer look at the industries in the 
respective Nordic countries.  
From an international perspective the five Nordic countries - Denmark, 
Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden - have a lot in common. The 
countries share a number of common societal characteristics, development 
trends and closely intertwining histories. At the same time, there are wide 
variations in the industrial structures in the Nordic countries, which are 
explained among others by differing natural resources, development 
trajectories and policy decisions of the past.  
Despite of historical divergences the Nordic countries face the same 
international economic and political trends, including an increasing 
interdependency between nation states. Three out of five Nordic countries 
are members of the European Union. Even if they are formally outside the 
EU, Iceland and Norway are also involved in the economic integration 
taking place on the European level (i.e. through the EEA agreement).3
The software industry 
The FOTON partners agreed to make one case study for each country within 
the so-called software industry. It should be noted that the boundaries 
between various types of ICT businesses4 are blurred. The software sector is 
part of the wider ICT sector which contains both information technology 
and telecommunications. Software products are related to both areas but can 
be seen to be more related to information technology (Tyrväinen, Warsta 
and Seppänen 2004: 11). 
The software industries in the Nordic countries are characterised by a large 
number of small companies, with thriving entrepreneurship. This indicates 
that it is relatively easy to set up companies in this sector - or at least easier 
than in the pharmaceutical sector where heavy investments are required 
from the very beginning.  
In the recent past a large number of mergers and acquisitions have taken 
place within e.g. the Danish, Icelandic and Finnish software industries. One 
                                                 
3 The European Economic Area, meaning that they  in most cases are part of the European market and 
adapt and accept EU regulations. 
4 Information and communication technology. ICT and IT (information technology) are often used as 
synonyms by the press. 
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 of the characteristics of mergers and acquisitions in the Nordic countries’ 
ICT industries is the relatively large number of domestic buyers. Recently, 
however, foreign takeovers have become more common within the ICT 
sector. This applies for instance to the Danish and Finish industries. Foreign 
firms find large and well developed Nordic software companies very 
interesting.  
The technology boom at the end of 1990’s had, naturally, an effect on 
national economies and software industries. During the blooming years of 
the ICT industry, the software sector grew rapidly and the need for skilled 
workers was immense. The downturn in the software sector by the turn of 
the century caused venture capitalists to withdraw from this sector in many 
countries. However, signs for recovery can currently be seen. 
In many Nordic countries, at least in Sweden, Norway and Finland, the 
largest area in the ICT sector is data processing services, which include 
software design, production and consulting. A particular feature common to 
all the Nordic countries’ software industries is the clustering of such 
companies. These clusters seem to be located near larger cities.  
Another common characteristic for all the Nordic countries is the high 
penetration of both computer and mobile phone usage. This enhances the 
development of new solutions in mobile as well as in software technology. 
Still, the economic role of the software sector remains relatively small in all 
the Nordic countries.  
The pharmaceutical industry 
Like the software industries, the national pharmaceutical industries in the 
Nordic countries do not significantly differ from each other. The most 
striking characteristic over the past years in the pharmaceutical sector has 
been consolidation; large multinational pharmaceutical companies have 
strengthened their market position not only in the Nordic countries but all 
over the world.  
Another dominant feature in the Nordic pharmaceutical industries is a series 
of mergers and acquisitions - many companies have been bought and sold, 
not only once but several times during their existence. The small domestic 
pharmaceutical firms have concentrated on niche segments in order to 
survive in a situation of fierce competition.  
The Danish pharmaceutical industry differs from the industries in the other 
Nordic countries in that the Danish companies are owned by foundations. 
Their purpose is to protect companies from takeovers. Hence the number of 
takeovers is smaller in Denmark than in other Nordic countries.  
Iceland does not have as developed and large a pharmaceutical industry as 
the other Nordic countries. A few years ago a small number of 
pharmaceutical firms were in operation. Recently these companies merged 
into one rather large company, Actavis, with operations in 25 countries and 
with over 7.000 employees. The headquarters of Actavis are in Iceland 
where about 400 employees are found.   
Biotechnology is more prominent in Iceland than the pharmaceutical 
industry. There are about 1.500 employees in biotechnology in all sectors 
with a turnover of over € 180 million. 
One feature that has tightened competition among pharmaceutical 
companies is generic substitution which has been introduced in all Nordic 
countries. A generic is a medicinal product containing an active substance 
for which the patent protection has expired. This means that a 
pharmaceutical company must be able to offer the following in order to be 
able to gain a strong market position: competitive prices, a wide product 
range, and fast and reliable delivery.5  
The pharmaceutical industry is one of the most restricted sectors in Europe. 
Development of new medicines requires heavy investment and much time. 
In addition the pharmaceutical industry is highly R&D intensive. New 
products must undergo strict approval and registration procedures, for 
example precise documentation and clinical testing before they are launched 
in the market.6
In Europe the United States is considered to be a far more favourable 
location for pharmaceutical R&D than the European countries. Hence, 
business prospects and innovation incentives are seen to be more favourable 
in North America.7 Moreover, the small size of the national markets is 
driving pharmaceutical companies operating in the Nordic countries to 
expand abroad and to focus on exports.  
                                                 
5 http://www.efpia.org 
6 http://www.efpia.org 
7 http://www.efpia.org 
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 Case findings - Overview 
By Juha Oksanen & Nina Rilla 
General observations on the cases 
The case companies comprise a heterogeneous group differing from each 
other in several respects - by the size of the acquiring and acquired 
companies, the previous ownership structure and the lifespan of the 
companies, just to name few factors.  
Generally, the buyer is a larger firm than the Nordic company which has 
been the target of the takeover or merger. Two takeovers stand out when we 
consider the size of the acquired and acquiring companies. Among the 
software companies studied, the takeover of the Danish Datacentralen by the 
US CSC presents a case where both involved parties were large firms. 
Datacentralen had close to 1.000 employees and CSC 34.000 employees at 
the time of the 1996 takeover (today more than 90.000).  
Among the pharmaceutical companies the merger between the Swedish 
Astra Group and the UK-based Zeneca is in a class of its own when it comes 
to size. Just before the merger in 1998 the Astra Group had 24.958 
employees, of which 8.060 were employed in Sweden.  The other enterprise, 
Zeneca, was not substantially larger than Astra (after the merger the new 
Astra-Zeneca had circa 55.000 employees). 
At the other end we have small software companies, such as the Icelandic 
Computer Knowledge Inc with 5 employees prior to the merger with the US 
based Eastman Kodak Company in 2000. Eastman Kodak and Teléfonica, 
which took over Finland’s Iobox via its affiliate Terra Mobile, represent 
giant multinational groups with activities around the globe. Eastman Kodak 
at the time of the Computer Knowledge takeover employed more than 
78.000 employees globally. The Teléfonica Group had altogether over 
148.000 employees when Terra Mobile acquired the business of Iobox. 
The previous ownership structure of the acquired companies varies 
significantly, which in some instances may have had a bearing on the 
impacts of the takeovers. Datacentralen was until the takeover a publicly 
owned independent company in Denmark. On the other hand, the other 
software case companies can be labelled start-ups owned by founders, 
employees and private venture capital investors (Iobox, Zoomit, Computer 
Knowledge Inc and Internet AB).  
One group is formed by the publicly listed pharmaceutical companies. 
Before the merger with Zeneca Astra’s largest shareholders were Investor 
Ab (the Wallenberg family’s investment group), the Swedish National 
Pension Insurance Fund, Robur mutual funds and SPP. Oy Star Ab was part 
of the Finnish Huhtamäki concern which has been listed on the Helsinki 
Stock Exchange. The Icelandic deCODE Genetics Inc was listed on 
NASDAQ and EASDAQ in 2000. The Danish pharmaceutical case 
company DAK-Laboratoriet represents an exception here since it was 
originally owned by the Danish Pharmaceutical Association (Dansk 
Apotekerforening). 
The pharmaceutical companies studied have a much longer history than the 
software enterprises. Most of the pharmaceuticals were established in the 
early twentieth century or, as in the case of Norwegian Nycomed, as early as 
in 1874. deCODE genetics Inc represents a new wave in the development of 
the pharmaceutical industry which has taken place mainly since the early 
1990s based on the rapid development in genetics and biotechnology.   
The home base of the acquiring MNEs varies widely. In two cases the new 
owners came from the United States or from the United Kingdom. In the 
rest of the cases they came from France, Germany, Japan or Spain. The 
Icelandic deCODE genetics Inc and the Danish DAK-Laboratoriet are 
exceptions in this respect. The deCODE story focuses upon a company 
internationalising its activities and not a takeover per se, whereas the DAK-
Laboratoriet case describes a process spanning over fourteen years including 
mergers, de-mergers and finally a sell-off to a leading Scandinavian private 
equity firm. 
Overall, the process which the ex-DAK-Laboratoriet has gone through is not 
uncommon. It seems that complex and changing company arrangements are 
part and parcel of a dynamic business life. A chain of mergers, acquisitions 
and de-mergers - domestically and/or internationally - is common, 
particularly in the cases representing the “mature” pharmaceutical sector (cf. 
Oy Star Ab, DAK-Laboratoriet and Nycomed Diagnostics).  
Today, this phenomenon is to be found in the software industry as well.  
Zoomit has for instance gone through a number of company alignments 
since its founding in the late 1990s. Before the Norwegian company merged 
with the French Kelkoo in 2000, it was itself an acquirer of a Dutch startup, 
Koopwijzer. Kelkoo in turn was taken over by the US Yahoo! in the spring 
of 2004. 
Reasons for the takeovers 
The first part of this section focuses on the former owners’ reasons to sell 
off business activities to foreign based firms. We then take a look at the new 
owners’ motives for acquiring companies located in the Nordic countries.  
The national economies and markets in the Nordic countries are small, and 
as a consequence, the domestic (financial) resource base for expansion and 
growth is rather restricted. This seems to be an important point in several of 
our case stuides, among them Zoomit, Iobox, and Computer Knowledge Inc. 
Nor should the acquired companies’ wish to take part in international 
business be underestimated. For many companies the fact that they are part 
of a large multinationals gives them access to wider international markets.  
A recently published study on foreign acquisitions of Finnish medical 
technology companies (Kivisaari & Lovio, 2004) concludes in a similar 
fashion that shortage of available resources for company growth is a central 
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 explanatory factor for ownership transfer. This especially holds true for 
new, innovative, small companies which are highly specialised, R&D 
intensive and export oriented. According to the researchers these companies 
“need a steady input of capital for their research and development, access to 
good sales channels in the US and other developed OECD countries, and as 
they grow, also an increased level of managerial competence”. In this 
situation, joining a larger domestic or foreign company has been a common 
solution. 
The takeover of Norwegian Nycomed/Axis Diagnostics by the UK-based 
Axis Shield Plc in a very illuminating way points out the role access to 
financial resources has for decisions to merge with foreign owned 
companies. There was a need to raise new capital for the completion of a 
planned radical product renewal (known as the Afinion programme). The 
interviewed company respondents doubted that the large risk capital 
requirements (around NOK 100 million) could have been met in the 
Norwegian financial market. Instead, a non-targeted equity issuance in the 
London capital market turned out to be possible. In addition, the company’s 
presence in Britain was thought to be a vital means of nurturing the firm’s 
relationship with international investors. 
The sell-off of Datacentralen in Denmark in the early 1990s provides yet 
another reason for the transfer of ownership. The Danish government 
wanted to increase competition within the domestic IT sector and 
particularly the public IT systems by privatising a publicly owned company 
with a dominant market position. This was the major explanatory factor 
behind the sale of the company to new foreign owners.  
Moreover, the Danish pharmaceutical case, the sale of DAK-Laboratoriet to 
Norwegian Nycomed in 1991, was at least partly caused by a specific 
problem. The Danish Pharmaceutical Association was the owner of DAK-
Laboratoriet, and needed to abandon its sensitive double role as a producer 
and retailer of pharmaceuticals in Denmark. 
The acquisition can be induced by changes in international markets causing 
new challenges for the companies and/or the former owners’ strategic 
thinking. The stories of Oy Star Ab and Nycomed Diagnostics are in 
essence based on the latter reasoning - in both cases the former owners 
made a strategic decision to focus on a core-business area and to sell-off 
activities not fitting into the new strategy.  
Astra’s decision to merge with British Zeneca can be seen as a proactive 
reaction to changes taking place in the pharmaceutical industry since the end 
of the 1980s. Globally, several companies had been acquired or had merged 
with others with success. Large companies performed well in the 
pharmaceutical market and size seemed to matter for two major reasons. 
Firstly, launching new pharmaceutical products on the global market 
requires relatively large investments in marketing. Secondly, large 
technology (R&D) investments are needed. In this situation the management 
and owners of Astra felt substantial growth was needed, as a small or 
medium sized company cannot afford such investments. There was also the 
threat of larger companies acquiring Astra.  
Last but not least, the case studies show us that it is not unusual that the 
companies involved have had contacts prior to the takeover. Hence, the eye-
care unit of Finnish Leiras had already been participating in R&D projects 
led by Japanese Santen Ltd. Icelandic Computer Knowledge Inc was very 
dependent on Eastman Kodak’s Health Imaging Division for a  long time 
before the takeover, as Health Imaging had been the exclusive distributor of 
the Icelandic company’s product internationally. Iceland’s pharmaceutical 
case also supports this argument.  
The MNE’s reasons to acquire the Nordic business 
The literature on mergers and acquisitions (M&A) stress that there are four 
main reasons for acquisitions: Acquiring complementary products or 
broadening the product line; access to new markets or distribution channels; 
benefits from additional resources (economies of scale); and new 
technology for complementing or replacing the ones used (De Man & 
Duysters 2004: 2-3; Rusten, Jacobsen and Kvinge 2000). The results of this 
study support the findings of M&A literature: Market-seeking motives seem 
to be the most prevailing in the cases studied. Seeking growth and accessing 
new markets were reasons commonly mentioned as resons for acquiring a 
company.  
Gaining new products, platforms or production lines which complement the 
acquiring firms’ existing assets seem to be a general motive in the cases 
studied, cf. Eastman Kodak and Computer Knowledge Inc, Telefónica’s 
affiliate Terra Mobile and Iobox, Axis Shield Plc and Nycomed 
Diagnostics, Nycomed and DAK-Laboratoriet.  
Gaining complementing assets refers to asset-seeking strategies in the 
literature (Rusten et al. 2000: 5). The case studies show market-seeking 
motives to be more prevailing in the pharmaceutical industry whereas 
acquiring strategic assets is more common in the software sector. In some of 
the cases product portfolios were overlapping but complementing each other 
in terms of geographical markets. Synergy benefits were though more 
common than overlap in business operations.   
Access to new geographical markets was clearly a key argument for 
acquiring a company in most of the cases. For instance, the US-based CSC’s 
presence in the Nordic countries was quite insignificant prior to the takeover 
of the Danish Datacentralen. Having sites/offices in various markets and 
closeness to the local customers is a dimension emphasised in CSC’s 
business strategy. Therefore, after the takeover CSC Denmark became 
responsible for CSC’s activities in the Nordic region.  
Moreover, through the acquisition the buyer often got access to wider 
markets than the Nordic one. In this way the takeover strengthened and 
expanded the buyer’s competitive position. A good example here is 
Japanese Santen Ltd which wished to expand to overseas markets including 
Europe. The ophthalmic unit of Leiras Oy exported to many European 
markets, and had a well-established position in the Russian market. Overall, 
it seems that complementarity in terms of coverage of geographical markets 
is an important factor when deciding on mergers or acquisitions.  
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 Interestingly, acquisitions and mergers are an integral feature of the growth 
strategies of many companies covered in the case studies. Also, one should 
keep in mind that in some instances small companies or new ventures are 
purposefully looking for larger companies to merge with. This kind of 
behaviour seems to be common particularly for the software start-ups 
founded during the ICT-sector’s rapid expansion in the 1990s. The new 
companies established during the booming years eagerly adopted the 
prevailing mantra “to grow or die”.  
Barr, Tessler and William (2002) mention still another potential reason for 
mergers and acquisitions within the software industry. According to them in 
liquidation through an acquisition is “the only practical way for 
entrepreneurs and investors to see any return from their investment at all 
before the appeal of the company’s value proposition declines in the 
marketplace”.  
Finnish Iobox, Norwegian Kelkoo and Swedish Internet Ab were all 
founded in the years of upsurge in communication and information 
technologies. The firms were text book examples of "Born global 
companies" targeting from early on larger international markets and aiming 
to become leading international actors in their own business areas.  
In the cases of Iobox and Kelkoo, private venture capital investments gave 
the companies the chance to grow organically and at the same time to 
acquire other companies complementing their businesses. This route to 
growth was however deemed as too slow. A merger with a larger 
international company was seen as an opportunity to ensure rapid growth 
and access to finance. Overall, acquisitions and mergers as part of company 
strategies can explain both sell-off and acquisition of business units.  
The case of AstraZeneca shows that market structure in many cases is the 
driving force behind acquisitions and mergers. The pharmaceutical industry 
is characterised by large companies, a structure that forces companies to 
grow in order to be competitive.   
Gaining relevant complementary competencies and strategic fit between the 
involved companies in a takeover situation is without doubt an important 
initial reason for decisions concerning merger and acquisition. It is also a 
major explanatory factor for the evolvement of the acquired company and 
its position within the new corporate structure after the takeover. 
Acquisitions may be motivated by the wish to eliminate a future, if not 
actual, competitor. However, this was not found to be a major reason in any 
of the company cases studied in the FOTON project. 
The principal reasons for selling-off as well as acquiring the case companies 
are presented in figure 2 below. 
 
 
Figure 2 Reasons to sell and acquire the case companies 
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The position of the affiliate within the MNE 
According to the literature the position of an affiliate within the MNE varies 
according to the characteristics of the acquiring firm. The home country of 
the MNE has, for instance, been found to relate to differences in firm 
structures and strategic behaviour (see e.g. Lam 2003).  
Based on existing literature Herstad (2004) concludes that “the 
internationalisation strategies of MNEs reflect incentives and constraints in 
their respective home business and innovation systems, and that the very 
same systems causes them to govern subsidiaries in accordance to 
experiences and routines developed within them - i.e. as the MNEs would 
do domestically”. For more details on this issue, see the textbox below. 
Textbox: Business system effects and corporate governance of MNE 
(Herstad 2004). 
The perhaps most analytically clear-cut model of “national systems of 
corporate governance” is found in Porter (red) (1992). Porter argued that 
characteristics of the external capital market in which a firm is embedded 
exert strong influence on the internal capital allocation and monitoring 
system of that same firm, including its strategic objectives and 
organisational principles. In Porters framework a main emphasis was put on 
the different logics of communication and co-ordination, both internally and 
towards owners and creditors, following from differences in external 
ownership structure. 
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 This highlights a fundamental aspect of the multinational company, as the 
definitional characteristic of business system variety contained within a 
common ownership structure indicate a vast potential for information gaps 
(Tylecote 1994) to be created within it. A fundamental difference in this 
respect is between what has later been labelled insider or outsider systems 
of ownership and corporate control and the different degrees of strategic 
integration that follows (latter point refers to what extent strategic decision 
makers are integrated into, and hence have first-hand knowledge of, the 
learning and innovation processes their allocation decisions are influencing).  
In the insider systems ownership is concentrated and strategy contingent on 
the knowledge and preferences of large owners in inside positions within the 
firm, where they hence have first-hand information about what is going on, 
in turn enabling the industry and firm specific knowledge accumulation that 
characterises industrial capital. According to Porter (1992) a main point in 
this is that short-term market valuation of the firm does not affect buy-sell 
choices of main owners, and consequently not management behaviour. Such 
"tight" insider systems are found in Continental Europe and Japan, with the 
German system often portrayed as the archetypical one. Also the Swedish 
case are seen to present insider system by its dominance of business groups 
centred on the "Wallenberg sphere" and Handelsbanken AB (Collin 1998). 
Co-ordination of information, knowledge and technology within the MNE 
tend here to be based on investments in socialisation (Bartlett and Ghoshal 
1998) of key personnel and thus a technology and knowledge transfer policy 
backed by '...coherence in vision, goals and strategies' (Grandstrand and 
Sjölander 1994). 
As the opposite end we find the outsider systems of the Anglo-Saxon 
economies (Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000). These are first and foremost 
characterised by a highly fragmented and stock-exchange driven system of 
corporate control, where primacy is given to the interests of minor non-
committed investors and their short-term desire for company reporting 
initiated value appreciation on their holdings. Important in this is the lacking 
willingness and ability of these same fragmented owners to exert direct 
strategic control through insider positions (inside positions inhibit 
anonymous entry-exit in the stock). This consequently limits the role of 
company and industry specific in-depth knowledge in strategic decision 
making and is complemented by a structure of inefficient company boards 
representing mainly judicial and generic competencies (Porter 1992, Fukao 
1992, Owens 2001, Goergen and Renneboog 2001).  
This in turn create a strong focus on generic financial indicators as measures 
of company success and consequent stock market pricing of the firm, as a 
basis for buy/sell decisions (owners/investors) and thus as the main strategic 
driver (management, normally with stock option plans as important 
incentives). Further those same outside owners are often merely 
representatives ('institutional agents') of other owners (private investors), 
hence creating a stratified ownership structure where ownership itself is 
'dissolved' highly anonymous and highly driven by buy-sell decisions based 
on 'valuation by proxies'.  
From our point of view it is particularly important to note that these 
systems, through their internal capital monitoring and evaluation system 
reflections, reinforce the mentioned information gap inherent in the 
relationship owners/MNE/subsidiary, thus, by co-ordinating mainly through 
centralisation or formalisation (Ghoshal and Bartlett 1998) possibly creating 
a distinct logic of internal communication by generic performance (results) 
or expectancy (R&D, rate of patenting etc) indicators.  
Hence these systems, and MNEs acting as agent for them, contain certain 
distinct incentives and constraints that translate into different investment 
behaviour and organisational set-ups, and thus competitive strengths and 
weaknesses. According to both Porter (1992) and Soskice (1998) the insider 
model has a distinct strength in its ability to support those complex sets of 
complementary investments in machinery, skills and R&D that support 
continuous incremental process and product innovations in industries such 
as e.g. car production or machine tool production . The outsider model, on 
the other hand, tend to be biased against such investments while favouring 
“...stand, alone investment strategies” that represent a “...clear 
technological discontinuity” and thus generates leaps in position vis a vis 
competitors (e.g. the so-called ‘new economy’) (Porter 1992) (cf. the Axis 
Shield case).  
The bias against has to do with the lacking transparency of those complex 
investment, skill-building and R&D programmes needed to continuously 
build capabilities in these industries, while the bias in favour of has to do 
with the highly transparent prospect of large leaps in stock market prizing 
and dividend payments that follow from radical research aimed at patentable 
product innovations. It is also possible to argue that outsider system, by way 
of the investor portfolio diversification that characterise these systems, is 
superior in dealing with the fundamental uncertainty that is inherent in 
radical technological change.  
The applicability of the insider-outside distinction presented in the textbox, 
and its potential effects on corporate governance practices of MNEs are well 
demonstrated in some of the cases studied.  
In the case of the Norwegian Nycomed Diagnostics unit transfer of 
ownership to British Axis-Shield meant a direct linkage to the UK equity 
market, which in turn made financially possible a new large-scale product 
development project aiming for radical product line renewal. At the same 
time, the new ownership structure and raising new financial resources 
through equity issuance in the UK market exposed the company directly to 
market expectations. For instance, the announcement by Axis-Shield in 
2002 that they expected a delay in the product development project 
immediately triggered a substantial decline in the company’s share price. 
Another example of the applicability of the insider-outsider distinction for 
analysis is provided by the Icelandic pharmaceutical case study. deCODE 
genetics Inc was from its establishment closely linked to the US financial 
market. The founding of the company in 1996 was enabled by venture 
capital from US investors. In 2000 deCODE shares entered into secondary 
equity markets when the company was listed on NASDAQ and EASDAQ. 
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 Overall, the company’s market value developed favourably in tandem with 
brisk growth: In the five years up to early 2001 the number of employees 
increased from 20 to 500. However, in the following year deCODE was 
forced to make major rearrangements and to lay off a third of its employees 
after its share value fell considerably. Reverberations were felt even in the 
Icelandic labour market and in the total amount of R&D expenditure in 
Iceland because of the central position of deCODE in its field.  
Based on existing research Herstad (2004) has developed a table in which 
the “archetypical” characteristics of distinct business systems and mature 
MNEs of the US, Germany and Japan are presented (see below). The 
categories and descriptions are inevitably stylised proxies from which actual 
firms may vary quite a lot.  
Table 2 Business system effects and the MNE (Herstad 2004). 
 US MNEs German MNEs Japaneese MNEs 
    
Home-base 
corporate 
governance 
and 
internationalis
ation of 
finance 
Short-term 
shareholder value, 
highly constrained 
by capital markets, 
financially centred 
strategies. Only 
group displaying 
genuine ‘global’ 
sourcing of finance 
Managerial 
autonomy except 
during crises, little 
takeover risk, 
conservative and 
long-term strategies 
Tightly linked to 
domestic owners and 
key creditors 
Stable shareholders, 
network-constrained 
management, and 
aggressive long-term 
market share 
oriented strategies. 
Tightly linked to 
domestic owners and 
key creditors 
Defined 
legitimate 
stakeholders 
Judicial primacy to 
shareholders, 
thorough minority 
protection. No 
employee 
representation rights 
at company boards 
Inside owners, 
creditors, suppliers 
and employees.  
Inside owners, 
creditors, suppliers 
and employees. 
Principle for 
subsidiary 
control and co-
ordination 
 
Formalisation or 
centralisation. Tight 
individual subsidiary 
financial control. 
Threat of sell-out. 
Socialisation. Fairly 
decentralised 
administrative 
control, technology 
and market share 
oriented.  
Centralisation and 
socialisation. Tight 
subsidiary 
administrative 
control.  
Competence 
structures 
expected by 
corporate 
routines 
 
Individual experts at 
higher hierarchical 
levels, professional 
communities  
enabling strong 
linkages to external 
research 
Distributed 
throughout distinct 
hierarchical levels 
Distributed and 
collective. Internally 
integrated 
organisational 
communities with 
few, selective 
external linkages. 
Home-base 
industrial 
relations  
‘Variable cost 
approach’ to labour. 
Harsh industrial 
relations, limited 
overall role of labour 
in organisational 
learning.  
‘Semi-fixed cost 
approach’ to labour. 
Thorough 
employment 
protection, 
significant role of 
labour in 
organisational 
learning. 
‘Fixed cost 
approach’ to labour. 
Long-term, 
bordering on 
lifetime, 
commitment of 
company to 
employees given full 
employee 
commitment to 
company 
MNE inter-
nationalisation 
and acquisition 
strategy 
Rapid entry and exit 
based on perceived 
individual company 
potential, high 
turnover of 
subsidiaries, 
aggressive 
internationalisation 
strategy enabled by 
weak linkages to 
home-base 
Entry and exit based 
on long-term 
implications for 
company or division 
activity portfolio 
Selective and 
reluctant inter-
nationalisation 
strategies, based on 
long-term 
implications for 
company activity 
portfolio. Preference 
for greenfield 
investments to build 
new organisations in 
“own image”. 
    
 
Herstad’s analysis of the UK-based Axis-Shield’s takeover of Norwegian 
Nycomed Diagnostics in this report offers an elegant application of the 
above described approach in a case study context. Besides the Norwegian 
case this perspective is however not applied in detail here. The number and 
diversity of the case studies carried out in the FOTON project do not allow 
us to make any broader conclusions concerning potential home country 
effects in takeover or merger situations. For a more thorough presentation of 
the approach discussed above, please see Appendix 2 in this report.  
It would be misleading to maintain that the position of the acquired unit in a 
takeover process would be unilaterally determined by the new owner. For 
instance, we could argue that the existing resources of the new affiliate have 
an effect on its future position within the MNE. Affiliates with specialised 
know-how could negotiate/gain a better position than companies with less 
specialised knowledge. In some of the cases, the parties involved in the 
takeover or merger differed from each other in terms of corporate strengths 
and primary focus. There is no basis for far-reaching generalisation, but in 
light of the FOTON cases the Nordic companies’ strengths seem often to be 
found within R&D and product development.  
The above argument is demonstrated well by the acquisition of the 
Norwegian software company Zoomit by the French company Kelkoo in 
2000. The strengths of the two firms were distributed differently and 
according to the case study, this was reflected in the role Zoomit was given 
in the French company’s organisation after the acquisition. Expertise in 
product development was a major strength in Zoomit whereas Kelkoo had 
clearly focused on business development and had a good track record in this 
area. 
A somewhat similar case is offered by the merger between Swedish Astra 
and the UK-based Zeneca. After the merger the headquarters for research 
and development were located in Sweden and the two highest global 
research managers came from Astra whereas the global managers for 
marketing and finance were originally from Zeneca. In a similar vein, 
Finnish Iobox got the responsibility for R&D in the new organisation after 
the takeover by Spanish Terra Mobile. 
The case studies from the pharmaceutical industry show that many of the 
acquired units have managed to gain a strong position within the MNE. 
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 Hence Santen now coordinates the European activities of the multinational. 
Norwegian Nycomed continued as a specialised point-of-care unit within 
Axis-Shield plc. Icelandic Encode remains an independent entity after the 
takeover.  
On the other hand, DAK-Laboratoriet found it harder to define its role in its 
various new organisational contexts. It is now a development unit. In Astra 
Zeneca the former Astra takes care of R&D and the British Zeneca unit 
engages in administrative duties. 
The ICT cases show that many of the acquired companies have found their 
position as development centres after the takeover. Zoomit serves as centre 
of excellence for product development and is semi-autonomous within 
Kelkoo. Notwithstanding terminological ambiguousness, a “centre of 
excellence” can be regarded as a strategically important unit in an MNE 
organisation.  
The Danish Datacentralen became responsible for CSC’s  Nordic business 
activities. In the Swedish ICT case not much attention was given to the local 
unit’s role after the takeover, and the staff felt that the unit was considered 
insignificant by its new owner. Iobox Terra Mobile operated as an 
independent marketing and sales unit, while the technology unit of Iobox 
took care of the platform development until it was transferred to its new 
owners. The marketing and sales unit was closed down even before the 
technology unit. Icelandic Computer Knowledge Inc has maintained its 
independence as was agreed on during the merger.  
From both sectors we can find examples of affiliates that have a well 
developed knowledge base and a stong position within the MNE. All the 
case companies in the pharmaceutical industry play important roles, as their 
continuous existence indicates. We cannot say the same for the ICT sector 
cases, where two of the companies no longer exist. Still, the other ICT 
affiliates seem to have found their place in the new organisations. 
The transfer period and staff commitment 
It is a common observation that new owners bring a breath of fresh air into 
the acquired firms and increase the commitment of key personnel. With the 
exception of the Swedish ICT case, none of our case companies lost key 
personnel after the takeover. On the contrary many of the central managers 
have maintained their positions and obtained a place in the new companies’ 
boards. In some cases - especially within the ICT industry (Iobox and 
Internet AB) - lock-in prevented key personnel from leaving the company 
immediately after the takeover.  
One reason for key personnel staying, was that while the acquired units had 
held a peripheral position in the old organisations (Oy Star Ab, Nycomed 
Diagnostics, ex-DAK-Laboratoriet in the early years after the first takeover 
by Nycomed), their activities were put at the very centre after the takeover. 
This made employees curious to see how things would develop.   
In the Danish Datacentralen case the prior evaluation of the merger was 
done very carefully. One of the underlying reasons for finding a “perfect 
partner” was the takeover’s impact on society.  
In some cases there was uncertainty about the future of the acquired unit 
immediately after the takeover (Santen Oy, Datacentralen, DAK-
Laboratoriet). At the time Oy Star Ab was acquired, Santen Ltd did not have 
in place a ready-made model for reorganising the total MNE activity. 
However, this gave the Finnish unit an opportunity to contribute to the 
development of new corporate practices. 
The transfer period is rarely, if ever, easy. Several cases - including Santen 
Oy, Iobox and Zoomit - show that the lack of a common language may 
cause misunderstandings and complicate the unification process. In all these 
cases, the lack of a common language was mentioned as an impediment in 
the creation of a common organisational culture.  
Moreover, the Computer Knowledge Inc case indicates some differences in 
corporate governance between Anglo-Saxon and Nordic cultures. These 
have, however, not created insuperable problems.   
The role of internal R&D activities before and after the 
takeover 
The R&D activities of the ICT case firms consisted more in development 
than research in the strictest sense. In our software firms, the main activities 
were originally product and technology platform development (the latter 
holds true for Zoomit and Iobox) or providing consultation and solutions to 
customers (Internet Ab). In Zoomit and Iobox, the development activites 
were defined more clearly after the takeover. The acquired units 
concentrated on what they knew best.  
For some of the case companies, the volume of R&D increased after the 
takeover. The level of R&D in Nycomed’s in vitro diagnostics unit was 
minor before the merger with Axis-Shield Plc., but subsequently increased 
substantially.  
In the pharmaceutical case companies - which are more research oriented 
than the software firms - we can observe rearrangements in the location of 
R&D activities. When DAK-Laboratoriet was part of Nycomed, the R&D 
function was centralised in Austria. This hindered the Danish unit’s 
participation in R&D activities. After the de-merger, the R&D activities 
were centralised in Denmark.  
In the case of Santen Oy, basic research was placed in Japan where the 
MNE had a research centre. According to Lam (2003) this is typical for 
Japanese MNEs. However, Santen Oy was given more responsibilities in the 
field of clinical testing since Finland offers good resources for conducting 
this type of activity. Overall, centralisation of R&D activities in certain 
locations is typical for pharmaceutical companies. 
Icelandic deCODE Genetics Inc and its domestic subsidiary Encode Ltd as 
well as Swedish Astra represent companies in which research and 
30 
 development activities have had a key position in the company business 
strategies both prior to and after the changes in ownership. In the Norwegian 
pharmaceutical case, Nycomed Diagnostics, R&D activities were 
strengthened considerably after the transfer of ownership.  
Inter-firm interaction and knowledge transfer 
The opening up of internal corporate knowledge bases for the acquired 
companies has been identified as a major gain in the foreign takeover 
literature. Ylä-Anttila, Ali-Yrkkö and Nyberg (2004) in this context speak 
of firm specific assets and advantages which are transferable within 
multinational firms. According to them, “firm-specific assets can be 
transferred with low cost within - but not between - MNEs”.  
Knowledge transfer and inter-firm interaction within the MNE structure 
does not, however, take place automatically but requires both technical 
solutions for communication and a social embedding of interaction within 
the corporate structure. MNEs also differ from each other when it comes to 
strategies employed to reap the fruits from knowledge and skills residing in 
various parts of the organisation. Herstad (2004) points out that what is 
important here is “to what extent the MNE focuses on, and invests in, 
building internal learning interfaces and hence on establishing a 'corporate 
industrial system' where the knowledge may be shared and technological 
synergies harnessed”. 
In the studied cases the staff of the different units normally stay in contact 
with each other by means of e-mail and phone because of the geographical 
distance. Regular visits between the different units and the headquarters of 
the MNE are also common - at least at the management level.  
The case companies have developed specific arrangements to ensure 
continuous interaction between their geograpically dispersed business units. 
Santen Ltd has for instance established so called "Global Project Teams" 
comprising staff members from the major company sites in Japan, the US 
and Finland. Santen’s Global Project Teams are an organisational vehicle 
introduced to ensure that different regional conditions and requirements are 
taken into account in development projects. At the same time these teams 
bring together employees from Santen’s sites in different countries. 
In some cases, the acquired company - or part of it - has been turned into a 
competence/development centre or centre of excellence within the global 
MNE structure. CSC has established competence centres which gather  
intra-firm experts in certain key areas. For instance, CSC Denmark has a 
competence centre for health care. CSC’s Danish affiliate is also a leading 
in-house unit in the development of tax-systems and digital government. 
Other examples are the positions of Norwegian Zoomit within the Kelkoo 
group and Icelandic Computer Knowledge Inc within Eastman Kodak. In 
the case of Axis-Shield, corporate R&D functions as an umbrella bridging 
the various company units together.  
In a number of the acquired companies, systematic and thorough 
documentation practices were introduced in the wake of the takeover. This 
holds true for example for Axis-Shield, Santen Oy and Computer 
Knowledge Inc. This development can largely be explained by the parent 
company’s need to keep track of its affiliates’ activities. The physical 
distance between the headquarters and affiliates increases the need to put in 
place standardised information gathering systems in order to make the 
activities of distant units more transparent for the corporate management.  
After having bought Swedish Internet Ab, the German parent company 
harmonised the business information systems used within the group. The 
SAP-system which was used by Deutschnet GmbH was introduced in the 
Swedish company as well. The system, which was essentially developed for 
large companies, placed new demands on the planning and administration of 
projects. The system also made it possible to measure productivity and 
control the time used in a more thorough way than the previous practices 
within the Swedish affiliate has allowed for. 
Some of the parent companies have designed various arrangements to 
ensure that knowledge residing in the acquired company is spread to other 
parts of corporate structure. These kinds of arrangements may reduce the 
buyer’s risk of becoming negatively affected if the acquired company runs 
into difficulties. A good example here is Eastman Kodak which has put in 
place procedures to transfer the knowledge residing in its Icelandic 
development centre, in Computer Knowledge Inc, to other development 
centres.  
Another interesting example is provided by the Iobox case. A year after the 
takeover, the acquiring firm Terra Mobile and its parent group Teléfonica 
launched a technology transfer project in order to transfer platform 
development know-how residing in Iobox’ R&D unit in Helsinki to its 
Spanish counterparts, more specifically to Telefónica’s R&D unit. The 
negative changes in the ICT market presumably triggered this move. The 
technology transfer project was the last project of Iobox’s R&D operations 
before the shut-down of Iobox activities. 
A somewhat surprising finding from the case studies is the relative 
infrequency of career moves within the MNEs in the wake of the mergers or 
acquisitions. As pointed out by Rusten et al (2000), career moves between 
different units is a common arrangement for the transfer of competence and 
knowledge within multinational enterprises.  
Interaction with surrounding innovation systems 
In the previous chapters, the main focus has been on intra-firm impacts of 
foreign takeovers or mergers. In this chapter, focus shifts to the effects 
takeovers and mergers have on the innovation systems surrounding the 
acquired firms.  
The cases covered in the FOTON project do not provide an unambiguous 
picture of how foreign takeovers affect the acquired firms’ interaction with 
local or national actors. In some of the company cases, there seems to be a 
tendency for the links to local and/or national R&D actors and professional 
communities to have become weaker after the takeover. This could be 
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 explained partly by the affiliate’s access to intra-firm knowledge sources 
and the MNE’s contacts with R&D organisations abroad. Becoming part of 
a large foreign-owned corporation may open up new, alternative knowledge 
sources for the units taken over. Links to surrounding local actors may 
moreover be weakened as a result of overall secrecy considerations in the 
MNE. 
Still, it would be too simple to conclude that a foreign takeover necessarily 
means less contact between the acquired firm and local actors in the host 
country. External contacts may have been non-existent or lost before the 
takeover. For instance, the Norwegian Nycomed Diagnostics had few links 
to the surrounding innovation environment and local R&D actors prior to 
the Axis-Shield takeover. This was for a large part due to the wide 
knowledge and competence base that existed within the old Nycomed 
organisation. While the takeover by Axis-Shield broke the connections with 
the other Nycomed units, it made available “complementary knowledge and 
functions from the Norwegian Axis unit”. 
Moreover, the corporate practices of the parent companies may differ 
significantly when it comes to co-operation with external actors, such as 
R&D institutes or higher educational institutions. Corporate practices of 
parent companies have evolved over time in different national business 
system and are step by step embedded into established customs guiding 
activities. Lam (2003) has for instance noted that collaboration between 
firms and universities traditionally has been rare in Japan. Instead, Japanese 
firms have tended to build their own R&D centres and collaborate with 
other companies. This explanation seems to fit well with experiences from 
the Santen Oy case.  
It should also be pointed out, that the surrounding innovation environment 
may be far from insignificant for the decision to acquire or merge with a 
specific firm. Local and national conditions, such as the education system 
and the supply of qualified workers, may play an important role when 
decisions about takeovers are made (cf. DAK-Laboratoriet’s experience and 
Computer Knowledge Inc). Mergers and acquisitions may also be motivated 
by the wish to access more intangible assets, like a country’s international 
reputation as a leading high tech region (cf. the Iobox case).  
It is furthermore interesting to note, that in some of the cases national or 
international policy measures had played a central role in the establishment 
of the companies involved. The Norwegian software case company Zoomit 
was established with support from a “public policy scheme aimed at 
stimulating the commercialisation of research based business ideas”. The 
company which acquired Zoomit, Kelkoo, had its roots in an EU project. 
Icelandic Computer Knowledge Inc to a large degree grew out of a research 
and development programme launched by the Nordic Council of Ministers 
in the early 1980s. According to the case study “one of the main objectives 
in the programme was that companies were to be founded based on the new 
products that research teams in the Nordic countries developed”.  
The degree of interaction between an MNE affiliate and surrounding actors 
in the host economy may also depend on the kind of business activities the 
affiliate is involved in. For instance, Rusten et al (2000) maintains that 
companies “merely engaged in sales, will produce less regional effects than 
firms engaged in manufacturing or advanced services”. This is explained by 
the nature and position of trade in the value chain: In trade, a large part of 
“the needed supplies have been obtained during an earlier stage of 
productions, involving units within the company or from elsewhere”.  
An interesting perspective on innovation system level effects in the host 
country is provided if we look more closely at how the MNE transmits 
embedded operational models from its country of origin to the new 
environment. Based on this view, table 4 presents a stylised summary of 
innovation system level effects of MNEs originating from the US, Germany 
and Japan. 
Table 3 The innovation system effect and the MNE (Herstad 2004). 
  US MNEs German MNEs Japanese MNEs 
    
Home-base 
national 
innovation 
system 
Originating in 
mission-oriented 
policy environment, 
strong linkages to 
higher education, 
focus on science-
intensive high-tech 
industries 
Diffusion-oriented, 
strong inter-industry 
linkages, national 
focus on specialized 
suppliers and scale-
intensive medium 
tech industries 
(‘diversified quality 
production’) 
Strong inter-industry 
linkages, weak 
linkages between 
industry and ‘outside 
industry’ R&D 
    
MNE 
organisational 
set-up 
From financial 
system driven 
unfocused risk 
diversification to 
financial system 
driven focus on ‘lean 
structures’. Low 
degrees of inter-
subsidiary 
integration 
Varying degrees of 
focus, but 
divisionalised 
according to 
technology/product 
market 
considerations, 
integrated within 
divisions 
Focused and 
integrated  
    
MNE 
preferred 
supplier 
relations 
Arms-length, 
contractual and 
short-term  
Stable, selective and 
long-term 
Stable, extremely 
selective and long-
term 
    
 
An interesting finding regarding regional and local effects of foreign owned 
companies and FDI has been made in a recent Finnish study. Based on rich 
statistical data, Maliranta and Nurmi (2004) have analysed effects of 
foreign-owned companies on entrepreneurial survival in the business sector 
in Finland. According to their empirical findings, the penetration of foreign 
owned-companies increases competitive pressures among domestic 
entrepreneurs. In this sense, FDI can be seen as a catalyst for “creative 
destruction,” a factor inducing selection of efficient entrepreneurs from 
inefficient ones. Maliranta and Nurmi further conclude that foreign-owned 
companies may, besides their potential role in technology diffusion, 
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 “contribute to the productivity in industries and regions by turning the 
economic environment more competitive in a dynamic sense.”  
Conclusions 
All in all, the cases covered represent successful takeovers/mergers. Only 
two of the case companies, the Finnish and Swedish software companies, 
ceased to exist soon after the takeover. In the case of the pharmaceutical 
companies, all of them got a central position in the new organisation. The 
takeovers/mergers have had a positive impact on the resources available in 
the acquired firms, and the number of employees has also increased in many 
cases.  
Our case companies have done fairly well after the mergers/takeovers. Even 
in the case of Iobox, which was down-sized after the takeover, the impacts 
were not only negative. The takeover made fortunes for the previous 
owners, the staff involved got valuable experience from internationalising 
businesses and some of them established new companies afterwards.  
The degree of autonomy vis-á-vis the rest of the MNE varies among the 
companies we have studied. Some of them seem to have quite an 
autonomous status, and some MNEs rely on a hands-off approach which 
rests mainly on agreed financial targets and transparency of activities. 
However, an autonomous position should not be understood too literally in 
this context. A general trend among the FOTON case companies is that the 
demand for reporting on business performance has grown after the takeover. 
In certain cases headquarters are closely following activities that require 
investments. This in turn has set new standards for justifying and getting 
approval for local plans.  
In general, the new owner’s demand and ambition level seems to have had 
an up-grading impact on the affiliate’s activities - provided that there is a 
strategic fit between the acquired unit and the acquiring company, and the 
targets are well communicated within the new company structure. 
In conclusion, it should be noted that in assessing the effects of foreign take-
overs, we inevitably face the methodological problem of accounting for the 
counterfactual position. It is difficult, not to say impossible, to assess what 
would have happened with companies if they had not been taken over.  
Emerging questions 
We are well aware that ten company cases representing two industrial 
sectors in five different Nordic countries do not alone provide any basis for 
further generalisations regarding the impacts of foreign takeovers and 
mergers. Therefore, drawing general policy conclusions from the case study 
findings is not in place here. However, from the company cases there 
emerge issues and questions which provide policy insights when combined 
with findings from two other FOTON modules (1 and 3). 
Below, we have gathered some issues and questions arising from the 
material: 
• By providing access to the MNE resource base and to international 
financial markets, foreign takeovers may contribute to a stronger 
financial position and improved access to resources in the acquired 
firm. Consequently, the acquired company may become more 
independent from domestic financial markets and public policy 
measures.  
• The MNE’s production plants, offices and networks in various 
localities may form an important channel for production output and 
function as a competence source. In many of the FOTON cases, 
however, inter-firm linkages do not seem to be very strong. From a 
host country perspective, it can be asked if foreign owned firm’s links 
to innovation systems in other countries are used as a source for 
inflows of resources. 
• When discussing foreign takeovers it should be kept in mind that 
domestic mergers and acquisitions have been - and still are - far more 
common. Is there a basis for being concerned about foreign takeovers 
per se? If yes, then in which sense? Or should we rather try to attract 
more foreign direct investments as most of the OECD countries 
nowadays do? Are foreign takeovers just a form of continuously 
evolving ownership arrangements? 
• When focusing exclusively on takeovers we easily fail to take into 
account impacts of other ownership arrangements. What is the role of 
financial capital and investment companies? How about primary and 
secondary markets for shares? A recent Finnish report (Puttonen, 
2004) which studies ownership issues argues that “foreign ownership 
is not a problem for the national economy, but scarcity of domestic 
ownership is.” National incentives and institutional structures may 
induce or deter both domestic and international companies/investors 
to invest in a given economy. 
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 Company cases Denmark 
By Martin Tølle & Jørgen Lindgaard Pedersen 
The Danish software case: CSC’s acquisition of 
Datacentralen 
The software industry in Denmark 
The Danish IT sector has experienced a turnover growth of 60% from 1995 
to 2002. In 2002 the sector had a turnover of 189 billion DKK of which 51 
billions are exported. The sector employs 92.480 full time positions in 
20028.  
Currently the industry is undergoing a consolidation process9. A recent 
survey by Deloitte shows that 51% of the best performing IT-companies 
plan takeovers in 2004 and around 21% of the slowest growing IT-
companies plan to sell their business or part hereof10. 
Within the last years there have been a lot of acquisitions within the Danish 
Information- and Communication Technology (ICT) sector. The following 
table outlines some of the most recent takeovers that have received the most 
attention in the media.  
Table 4 Takeovers within the Danish ICT sector 
Company Acquirer # Employees in acq. comp Date Short description 
Mærsk Data IBM (USA) 2.868 August 2004 IT services and consultancy. 
Dmdata IBM (USA) 330 August 2004 IT services and consultancy. 
Aston 
Business 
Solutions 
Tectura 
(USA) 600 August 2004 IT services and consultancy 
IO interactive Eidos (UK) 140 March 2004 Advanced 3D computer games.  
Scandinavian 
IT Group 
CSC Denmark 
(USA) 1200 Dec 2003 
IT consultancy within the airline 
industries 
Navision Microsoft (USA) 1300 May 2002 
Integrated software solutions for 
small and medium-sized businesses.  
Catalog 
international 
Intentia 
(Sweden) 30 Feb 2002 
Applications for non-production e-
procurement and B2B sell-side e-
commerce.  
Scandihealth 
(60%) CSC (USA) 264 Nov 2000 
IT for the health section, including 
electronic patient journals. 
Datacentralen CSC (USA) 900 March 1996 IT solutions for the public sector. 
 
                                                 
8 IT-Brancheforeningen, “IT-erhvervet, Nøgletal”, http://www.itb.dk  
9 Berlingske Tidende, “De store æder sig større”, 4 October 2004 
10 Computerworld, “Mantraet ‘Voks eller dø’ vender tilbage”, 24 September 2004, pp. 140-141 
Selections of case 
One of the main criteria for selection of the case was that the takeover 
should not have been too recent in order to address the real impact of the 
takeover. Other criteria were that the acquired company should have had a 
history of its own prior to the takeover. Based upon the identified takeovers 
within the Danish software industry the following two cases were identified 
as the most interesting: 
 CSC’s acquisition of Datacentralen in 1996. 
 Microsoft’s acquisition of Navision in 2002 
After first contacts with the enterprises it turned out that CSC was interested 
in participating in the project whereas Microsoft declined to participate. 
Accordingly, the CSC case was selected as the Danish case within the 
software industry. In the following the case will be described based upon 
interview and other literature. 
CSC’s acquisition of Datacentralen 
This description is based upon interview and emails with Market 
Development Director/Marketing Manager in CSCs Nordic Division David 
J. Seifried (DJS) conducted in July 2004.  
Addition sources include information from the homepages of CSC such as 
annual reports as well as other sources primarily from the general press, cf. 
reference list. 
Datacentralen 
Datacentralen (DC) was founded in 1959 as a partnership between the 
central government, the municipalities and the counties of Denmark. From 
the start, Datacentralen’s mission was to be the IT service bureau of the 
Danish government and to develop and operate the large and complex 
systems required by the state as it entered the computer age (Seifried, 1997, 
p. 30). DC was established as an independent company based upon the 
expectations that a state company would have difficulties in attracting the 
most competent employees if the salaries had to follow the state levels. This 
gave DC a competitive advantage compared to state owned IT companies in 
other countries which had a hard time to attract the most competent people.  
At the time of the takeover DC had around 1000 employees. From around 
1970s and up to today DC has a 75% share of the market of large state-
enterprise companies in Denmark. Customers include: the internal revenue 
services, police, defence and the ministry of finance.  
CSC  
CSC was like DC founded in 1959. To some extend it can be seen as the DC 
of the USA because, although CSC was never state-owned, it likewise 
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 started with creating IT system for the public sector. In the middle of the 
1980’s CSC began to provide services to private sector with success. Thus, 
at the time of their offer they could prove that they managed to serve the 
private sector as well. Today 75-80 % of their turnover comes from the 
private sector. However at the same time they have managed to keep their 
share in the public sector. Thus, both sectors are important for CSC today. 
At the point of the takeover CSC had around 30.000 employees; today the 
employ more than 90.000, cf. table below. 
Table 5 Turnover and number of employees, CSC 
•  
CSC 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Turnover   
(Bio. $.) 
4,2 5,6 6,6 7,7 9,4 10,5 11,4 11,3 
# Employees 
(in 1000) 
34 41 45 50 58 68 67 90 
Source: CSC Fact Book, February 2004 
Reasons for takeover 
Reasons for selling DC 
The primary reason for selling DC was hte wish of the Danish government 
to increase the competition within the Danish IT sector in general and the 
public IT systems in particular. The general thought was that DC had 
enjoyed a sort of monopoly, and the sector could benefit from increased 
competition. Additionally, the Danish government wanted to ensure that 
Denmark maintained and built a position as a country with an effective, 
well-functioning government sector and administration, and believed that 
IT, while already important, would play an even more important role in the 
future. Furthermore, first attempts towards privatisation had proved 
successful, cf. below. 
CSC reasons for acquiring DC 
The main reason for the takeover was to get access to the Nordic region. At 
the point of the takeover CSC was not significantly represented in the 
Nordic countries. 
Privatisation process 
The first step towards privatisation of DC was taken in 1992 when DC 
together with Mærsk Data created Dan Computer Management (DCM) on a 
50-50 basis. The business of DCM was the operation of systems. DCM was 
considered  a success. The customers were satisfied and the mix of the two 
cultures turned out fine.  
The success made the government pursue the possibility of a full 
privatisation. As a result a process was initiated together with McKinsey, 
the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Research & Information 
Technology, Kammeradvokaten, and DC. They invited potential buyers to 
meetings. Around 10 international companies were invited as potential 
buyers, and these were asked to answer a set of questions and present their 
ideas. In January 1996 the Ministry of Finance narrowed the number of 
potential buyers down to three candidates: CSC, IBM and EDS. Soon after 
EDS dropped out of the candidate field leaving CSC and IBM11. 
The candidates were assessed by a steering committee, in accordance to four 
criteria: 
1. Vision (to what extent did the company’s vision fit the expectations 
of DC and the Danish Government) To what extent did the potential 
buyer has a vision that was attractive for Denmark; what were the 
philosophy and thoughts behind the bid? 
2. Business solutions 
a. Value added to DC (How would they add value to DC, 
increase innovativeness, customer satisfaction, etc?) 
b. Cultural fit (Does the philosophy of the company fit DC? 
They had to show that they planned to take care of the Danish 
employees.) 
c. Partner quality (turnover, level of earnings, solidity, etc.) 
3. Industry structure (plans regarding the IT service industry in 
Denmark, e.g. plans regarding changing (increasing/decreasing) the 
competition in Denmark) 
4. Terms (how much are they offering) 
Ultimately the Danish state chose to enter into final negotiations with CSC.  
The contract was signed March 23rd 1996.  At first CSC bought 75% of DC. 
The remaining 25% was acquired in 1999.  One can only speculate if 25% 
ownership was initially maintained as a symbolic decision that made the 
privatisation easier to accept politically. Soon after the takeover CSC went 
into negotiations with Mærsk to buy out their 50% share in DCM. In August 
1996 the agreement was in place and in September 1996 CSC got ownership 
of DCM with its 250 employees12.  
                                                 
11 IBM sagde først nej, Computerworld 29, March 1996, p. 26 
12 RB-Børsen, Mærsk Data sølger DCM-aktiver til CSC (2. opdat.), 8 August 1996 kl. 1731 
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 Impact of takeover within the acquired firm 
Philosophy of CSC 
While we cannot conclude as to why specifically that CSC was chosen as 
the acquirer of DC the business philosophies of CSC may have been one of 
the primary reasons. CSC philosophies: 
 Local First, Global Second. CSC believes in the local management, 
languages and culture (of the approximately 24.000 employees in 
Europe only around 1 % are Americans, compared to e.g. EDS where 
around 10-14% of their European employees are Americans.)  CSC 
presents itself as a local company with access to a global network. 
 Long-term Focus. CSC perceived the takeover as a long-term 
investment. Thus, they did not have any dramatic plans regarding 
DC. The general perception of some of the other candidates were that 
that they perceived the culture of DC to be old fashioned and one on 
which a future could not be based. Thus, there was a fear that they 
would disintegrate the company into smaller parts, conduct massive 
layoff and so on. CSC however made clear that their philosophy was 
not to buy and destroy but to have a more long-term goal.  
In relations to the philosophies however, it should be mentioned that the 
larger freedom also could be related to the general growth within IT at the 
time of the takeover. The liberty of action is greater during good times.  
Impact 
Turnover and employees 
The development in the number of employees and revenue in DC/CSC 
Denmark can be seen in the following table. In the late 1980s the number of 
employees was around 1800. However, technological improvements such as 
the change from punch cards to new technology reduced the number of 
employees to 885 in 1994, while at the same time keeping their customers. 
Table 6 Turnover and number of employees, CSC Denmark 
•  
CSC 
Denmark 
1994 1995 1996/ 
1997 
1997/ 
1998 
1998/ 
1999 
1999/ 
2000 
2000/ 
2001 
2001/ 
2002 
2002/
2003 
Turnover 
(Mio. DKK) 
968 1008 1317 1219 1320 1459 1643 1970 2008 
# Employees 885 930 1054 1070 1137 1188 1508 1705 1667 
Source: CSC Danmark Årsregnskab 1998/99, CSC Danmark A/S Årsrapport 2002/2003 
 
From 1996 up to 2000 the growth has been primarily organic. Since then the 
growth has also been based on acquisitions such as Scandihealth in 2001 
(employed 264, turnover: 202 millions DKK)13, e-huset in 2001 (173 
employees) and Scandinavian IT Group in 2003 (Employed 1200, turnover: 
1,64 billions DKK)14. Today, CSC Denmark employs around 260015. In 
general the turnover of personnel has been relatively low. Many of the 
employees from the days of the DC are still here. 25 years anniversaries are 
relatively frequent. CSC’s philosophy has been to use existing employees. 
Motivate them, up-qualify them, give them new additional tools, 
procedures, and access to the global knowledge network.  
Uncertainty in the first years 
In the first years after the takeover there was a lot of uncertainty. A 
somewhat negative feeling started to emerge around the employees. The 
combination of lack of new orders, loosing one of the first re-competes, low 
customer satisfaction, low growth and earnings all contributed to the 
negative feeling. In addition the customers started asking about the lack of 
big changes. CSC however, kept calm knowing that such a process of 
change takes time. They announced that they had a long-term goal.  
In addition cases like the AMANDA started to get a lot of negative press in 
the media. AMANDA was a project started under DC and taken over by 
CSC. The system was developed to support the employment services. From 
its first day of operation it was reported that the system had a lot of 
problems slowing down the productivity of the employment offices. The 
mood in the company was not great and some employees started to doubt 
whether their jobs were safe. After the first difficult years the mood started 
to change. Among other things a new CEO facilitated this change.  
Customer satisfaction 
In 1996 CSC conducted a survey to identify the satisfaction among its 
existing customers. Only one of the big customers was satisfied. Customers 
representing more than 100% of the surplus were not satisfied (i.e. the 
satisfied customers didn’t generate any profit!). Today the satisfaction level 
is high (4+) on a scale from 1-5. (82% of the customers are satisfied or very 
satisfied according the a recent study16) 
Market and competitors 
At the point of the takeover the primary market of DC was the public sector, 
accounting for around 90% of the turnover. Today the ratio between public 
and private market is about 50/50. Throughout the process (from around 
1970’ies and up to today) CSC has had a 75% share of the market of IT 
                                                 
13 CSC-køb på plads, Computerworld 21. November 2000, p. 29 
14 CSC køber Scandinavian IT Group, Computerworld 18. December 2003 
15 According to www.csc.com/dk   
16 CSC Danmark A/S,  
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 systems in big public companies in Denmark. Thus, the change in the 
public/private ratio is based upon growth in the private sector. 
One of the fears after the takeover was that CSC would loose some of its big 
public customers as a part of re-competes (renewal of existing contracts). 
The challenge of CSC was that due to EU regulations all big public service 
contracts must undergo public invitations to tender. CSC actually expected 
to loose some of their big customers, partly because of their low customer 
satisfaction. In reality CSC only lost one major deal with one of their big 
clients. This however was one of their first big re-compete after the 
takeover, so it frightened them. It was a big defence system called 
DEMARS which they lost to IBM17.  
The biggest competitors of CSC/DC are IBM and Kommunedata (KMD). 
So far however KMD is more a potential than an actual competitor. So far 
they have in a somewhat oligopolistic sense each had different focus. CSC 
has focused on the national level, whereas KMD has focused on the 
municipality level. Potentially however, KMD could be a big competitor. 
Among other things they have a huge saving which potentially could be 
used to dump prices. Other competitors include CAP Gemini and Ementor 
in addition to other medium sizes companies that support smaller public 
tasks. CSC is performing very well compared to their competitors which 
currently are experiencing low or negative growth and earnings. Thus from 
the outset as a state owned company, CSC has managed, with the same 
employees, to turn from general low performance and low customer 
satisfaction to performing better than the global competitors. 
Impacts in innovation 
Neither DC nor CSC focused on conducting pure research. They focus on 
the application of technology. Their innovation is how they can create value 
for their customer through application of available technology.  
The DC strategy was less focused. On one side they wanted to be the best 
house of system developers and system operators in Denmark, on the other 
side they started to ‘play’ with developing new products to the mass-market. 
In the beginning of the 1990s they established an investment fund with 
around 25 million DKK for new products to the mass-market, but the 
investments never succeeded. Few of the products were finished. A possible 
reason for the failure was due to it being a completely new market for DC. 
The expertise of DC is related to the market of complex customised system 
and not the mass-market. Among other things they lacked knowledge on 
how to market and sell on the mass-market. 
The takeover has influenced the toolbox of the employees in terms of 
additional tools and methods. As a large company CSC can afford to invest 
in good methods and methodologies. An example of this is their business 
change methodology called Catalyst, that not only addresses the technical 
                                                 
17 Recently CSC has lost two more re-competes [Berlingske Tidenende, CSC taber store ordrer, 9. 
October 2004] 
aspects but also how to carry out the change process, addressing ‘soft 
issues’ such as humans, business values, having a clear objective, and so on. 
In this respect it should be noted that James Champy, one of the two authors 
behind the book, Reengineering the Corporation that proliferated Business 
Process Reengineering (BPR) in the 1990ties, was a leading manager in 
CSC. Thus, BPR are one of the trademarks of CSC. Accordingly, CSC 
highlights the need for not just supporting existing processes with IT but to 
re-consider (reengineer) the processes before adding IT support. 
Generally the employees of DC had a rather technical approach, most of 
them being computer scientist and only a few of them academics. One of the 
first things after the takeover was the establishment of a large investment 
programme that invested training enhancing thei competences of employees 
and learning them additional tools and methods. This is based upon the 
strategy that innovations can emerge when people have the right options and 
tools, and they are challenged to think creative. Furthermore, CSC added 
knowledge sharing as a new concept. The employees are encouraged to 
exploit and contribute to the global knowledge network of CSC.  
Improved hit rate 
If the company got a new AMANDA order today the staff would address it 
differently. First of all they would apply methods such as Catalyst (cf. 
previous section) which first principal states that they should develop a 
system that satisfies the customers need at the time of the delivery. And not 
as in the AMANDA case where the requirements consisted of numerous 
binders, which were given at the time of the order, many years prior to the 
system handover. This can be a problem in public procurement, where one 
often ends up creating an arm’s length relationship, instead of partnership.  
In a world of changing needs and high-complexity, partnership, ongoing 
communication, and flexibility are all important to delivering systems that 
meet customer needs at the time of delivery. Another aspect is that they 
have to understand that technology is about people. They have to be in a 
dialog with the end-users and manage their expectations. 
Furthermore, a new sales method called Pioneer has been introduced to 
ensure a fit between what they sell and their overall strategy. That is, they 
should put more thoughts in which orders they pursue, more systematically 
select the tenders and target their sale. Pioneer links the sales process with 
the developers creating a team spirit under the reasoning “if we can’t deliver 
it we shouldn’t sell it” and “what can I do to help you?” This new process is 
very motivating and positive. As a result their hit-rate has improved 
dramatically. In 96/97 they won around 1/3 of their bids. A year after the 
process was introduced it was increased to 69%, since then they have won 
around 75% of their bids. 
Competence centres 
As mentioned the takeover has not resulted in a extensive reallocation of 
people. However, in some situation where the solutions are more global they 
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 have gathered people in competence centres. An example is in Norway 
where they have gathered a group of people responsible for developing 
solutions for the financial sector. In Denmark CSC has a competence centre 
for health care (after the takeover of Scandihealth) and is among the leading 
within tax-systems, and digital government. As a consequence they have 
helped their colleagues in USA developing tax-systems.  
However, the big difference, compared to for instance IBM, is that it is the 
local division and not a global business unit that has the final decision of the 
market segment. The main responsible of solutions to the Danish public 
sector should be located in Denmark (and not in a foreign business unit far 
away). This is not to say that they do not exploit expertise of  foreign 
colleagues. In practice, the customer could choose between the most 
competent person within CSC or the most competent Danish speaking 
person within CSC. Thus, projects in Denmark are conducted with the 
participation of CSC employees from all around the world.  
Investments 
In terms of investment CSC Denmark can make there own decisions 
regarding on what to pursue, however to get global funding professional 
business cases must be created and argued for. For instance they developed 
a solution for web-technologies. CSC Denmark did not have all the money 
locally so CSC international supported them.  Likewise the takeover of 
Scandinavian IT Group was also a result of work carried out by CSC 
Denmark but where the money came from CSC International. Thus, the 
takeover has extended the possibilities and given access to bigger funds. 
Sponsorship 
In relation to their quest for being perceived as a local Danish company, 
their first sponsorship was to support The Royal Theatre in Denmark, and 
the second was the bicycle team managed by Bjarne Riis. Thus, through the 
sponsorship their aim was to support CSC’s desired position of being a 
Danish company first, with access to global competencies.  
Not least the sponsorship to the bicycle team has been a door opener. They 
are aware that among the general population the knowledge regarding CSC 
and its business is not that impressive. However, it helps to give the general 
impression of it being a Danish company. With regards to their primary 
target group in Denmark, which consist of probably not more that 120 key 
persons, most of them already know CSC (regardless of the sponsorship). 
But the cycle team keep their name fresh in their mind and not least the 
sponsorships enables CSC to invite their customers to non-traditional 
customer arrangements such as the tour the France. Accordingly of the 
many invitations (~ 300) an average CEO receives to various arrangements 
and seminars the invitations from CSC has a good chance of being meet 
positively. Hence, it enables them to get in contact with the CEOs and not 
‘just’ the IT people within the customer companies. Although the latter have 
the technical knowledge, it can often be the CEO who has the final say in 
large, IT decisions. The sponsorship has given CSC Denmark a higher than 
average press. Within the whole group CSC Denmark is having a high 
growth and is leading on outsourcing.  
Leadership 
In general, the type of leadership executed from CSC international has been 
a type of hands off. That is, as long as they perform as promised, e.g. with 
regards to key figures such as revenue and profit, CSC Denmark has a high 
degree of freedom, which from the interviewees point of view is very 
motivating.  However, as is true in most companies, in periods of slower 
growth, there is greater central oversight. 
Innovation through bids 
Bids on large, complex IT-solutions can be very expensive, sometimes 
costing between 2-5 million DKK. Accordingly, CSC needs to be careful at 
which orders they pursue. The high cost of a bid is associated by the 
complex nature of the solutions, high customisation level and the need for 
assessing if they possess the right competencies or should pursue to develop 
them. Thus, their investments in new innovations are related to creation and 
latter fulfilment of new bids.  
CSC has an opportunity review committee that assesses which opportunities 
to pursue and which competencies to develop in order to enable future 
innovations and solutions. They want to be customer and market-driven 
while supporting CSC’s strategy. An example is the FESD initiative (Fælles 
Elektronisk Sags og Dokumenthåndterings), where CSC Denmark assessed 
it to be an important future market. Thus, they decided to invest in 
developing the competencies needed. Solutions such as FESD (including 
electronic patient journals) require local knowledge. Thus, if the knowledge 
is not present it needs to be developed locally; it cannot be imported from 
foreign partners. 
Market matrix 
CSC applies a 3-D matrix to divide the market and the corporation. The 
matrix consists of three dimensions: 
 Horizontals divided according to competencies (e.g. consulting, systems 
integration, outsourcing) 
 Industries (e.g. public, healthcare) 
 Geography (underlining that the contact to the customer should be local) 
The customer added value is among other things generated through the local 
customisation, which makes the system stand out from a standard system.  
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 Negative aspects 
In general the takeover has been positive. Some of the negative aspects have 
for some people been the change from being part of a smaller local company 
to a global enterprise. The have lost a few persons on that account.  
Impact in the surrounding innovation environment  
No big difference 
The takeover has not influenced the partnership with local companies. CSC 
has contributed with global partners where they can get good discount and 
the like. But in terms of partners CSC Denmark primarily interacts with 
local partners, for instance cooperates primarily with Oracle Denmark and 
not Oracle USA. In addition CSC also has cooperation with the Danish IT 
association where they address the local/national challenges. 
Regional strengths 
CSC Denmark is responsible for CSCs activities in the Nordic region. Their 
focus is local. Compared to export companies they want to be in close 
proximity to their customers (cf. previous description of their philosophy). 
For that reason they have national offices in each of the Nordic countries 
severing the local customers. In some aspects where the solutions are more 
global they have however gathered the people in competence centres, as 
described earlier.  
Policy recommendations/lessons learned 
Cultural fit 
It is very important to consider the cultural fit. That is, the Nordic countries 
should hold onto the Nordic values and not give in to the international 
business environment with weekend work and high divorce percentages. 
Thus, it is important to look at the intensions of the acquirer. Ownership is 
one thing; another thing is the philosophy of the takeover company. In case 
of CSC the philosophy has been the most dominant factor. 
Type of ownership (public/private) vs. foreign owned (global/national) 
The takeover of DC by CSC not only included a change from Danish to 
foreign (USA) owners but also a shift in the form of ownership from being 
public to being privately owned. CSC’s acquisition of DC, and thus the 
change of ownership form, has had a significant impact on DC’s 
development. While DC was trying to keep pace with modern management 
techniques, financial management, customer satisfaction, etc. the results 
were limited. CSC brought with it a higher-level of professionalism, a 
clearer, more-focused strategy, higher expectations, and greater access and 
investment in tools, methodologies and services.  
After an initial start-up period, DC under CSC’s ownership began to grow 
and develop significantly.  In an 8-year period, turnover and employees 
doubled and customer satisfaction increased dramatically. And during this 
period, CSC began to be seen as a major and professional brand within IT 
services in Denmark.  According to the interviewee, it is highly unlikely that 
these same results would have been achieved without a change of 
ownership. Additionally, CSC has given local staff and customers access to 
expertise, competencies, and references/project experience that were not 
available earlier. In an increasingly complex world, being part of a global 
network of 90.000 employees allows new challenges and questions to be 
addressed more quickly and increases the available experience base 
significantly.  
The privatisation of DC can be seen as one of the most successful 
privatisation process initiated by the Danish State. It has not only created 
workplaces but also increased revenues and done so by building the 
business with the staff that was there at the time of the privatisation. Today 
CSC stands as a strong and successful brand in Denmark, and few even 
remember that CSC started with the acquisition of DC. 
Privatisation 
The basis driver behind privatisation should not be to gain a short-term 
income. The driver should be a more long-term goal in relation to increased 
value such as improved quality and lower prices. Sometimes love eventually 
appears after a ‘forced marriage’, but nonetheless the starting point should 
be more long-term. In the case of CSC the takeover is a success today but it 
was not perceived as such in the first years. 
Outsourcing 
Acquisition has a parallel in outsourcing. Outsourcing can also be seen as a 
type of acquisition. When CSC competes to get outsourcing contracts, the 
main competition is not about technology. In relation to outsourcing the 
most important aspects are related to people. Such as how good they are to 
take over the employees, keep the employees, motivate them, further 
enhance them, etc. For instance when cleaning is outsourced the task of the 
cleaning personnel changes from being peripheral to core business. 
Accordingly, the cleaning person gets the latest equipment, new training and 
the like and suddenly experiences that her/his work is very important. While 
strong technical skills are an absolute must, experience with transforming 
organisations and people is the key competitive differentiator. 
Change process 
CSC success is closely related to their focus on the human aspects. 
Furthermore, they were aware of the fact that there are negative elements 
50 
 related to every change process (cf. Managing at the speed of change by 
Daryl R. Conner, 1993). Thus, they have a long-term perspective and 
prepared their employees for the process. 
Success with existing people 
Another important lesson from the takeover has been that it has been 
possible to build a future on the existing employees. The interviewee thinks 
that it has surprised many that CSC has managed to change the company to 
a success by motivating the existing personnel and providing them with new 
tools and methods. 
Establishment of ownership 
A means to success is that the have managed to establish a feeling of 
ownership among the employees. The DC employees have taken part in the 
birth of CSC Denmark. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Danish pharmaceutical case: Nycomed’s acquisitions 
of DAK-Laboratoriet 
The pharmaceutical industry in Denmark 
The Danish pharmaceutical industry has traditionally been split up in two 
very different segments: 
• The research based industry 
• The generic pharmaceutical industry 
The research-based part of the pharmaceutical industry in Denmark 
accounts for more than 90 % of the total industry measured in employment, 
value added and other relevant figures. 
The companies in the generic pharmaceutical industry (the so called 
“generic companies” or “copying producers”) produce pharmaceuticals 
where the patent of the active substance has expired. Hence they usually do 
not have comprehensive R&D departments to develop new substances and 
can thus compete by selling generic products to very low prices compared 
with the patent protected original products.  
The whole market for pharmaceuticals in Denmark has increased over the 
years. In 1999 the total pharmaceutical sales in Denmark were 10.662 
million DKK, in 2003 the total pharmaceutical sales in Denmark were 
14.678 million DKK.  
The total Danish pharmaceutical export in 2003 came to DKK 34,4 billion. 
The export has more than quadruple since 1990 where the export was 7,7 
billion DKK. Today about 90% of the Danish pharmaceutical production is 
exported. In comparison the export of the Danish industry as a whole 
amounts to about 60% of the production18. 
Denmark’s import of pharmaceuticals in 2003 was 11.373 millions DKK, 
increasing from 3.088 millions DKK in 199019. The largest import countries 
were Germany (15,6 %), UK (13,3 %), Sweden (13 %), and Spain (9,8 %). 
The total employment in the pharmaceutical industry in Denmark was in 
year 2000 15.131 persons. In total 3.735 persons were in R&D activities. Of 
which 1.599 persons were academic educated people in research and 2.136 
were non-academic educated people. The growth in employment has during 
the period 1993 – 2000 been 29,5 %20.  
                                                 
18 The Danish Association of the Pharmaceutical Industry (Lif), www.talogdata.dk  
19 The Danish Association of the Pharmaceutical Industry (Lif), www.talogdata.dk
20 The figures are based upon a questionnaire among the members of the Danish Association of the 
Pharmaceutical Industry (Lif). Accordingly the number are less than the employment in the whole 
industry. (www.talogdata.dk)  
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 In European pharmaceutical industry the total employment in 2002 was 
588.091 persons of which 100.503 in R&D. The annually growth in total 
employment has since 1990 been 1,2 %. 
Selection of case 
The pharmaceutical industry in Denmark differ from other countries in the 
way that many of the Danish pharmaceutical companies are owned by 
foundations that have as one of its main purposes to protect the companies 
against takeovers. This type of ownership model is especially prevalent 
among the research-based pharmaceutical companies. As a consequence few 
Danish pharmaceutical companies has been taken over and most of these are 
generic companies. Among these the research team identified two potential 
cases: 
• GEA taken over by the German Hexal group in 1998 
• DAK-Laboratoriet taken over by Norwegian Nycomed in 1991. 
After first contacts with the companies it turned out that Nycomed was 
interested in participating in the project. Hence it was selected as the Danish 
pharmaceutical case. In the following the case will be described based upon 
interview and other literature. 
Nycomed’s acquisitions of DAK-Laboratoriet 
This description is based upon interview with Alejandra Mørk (AM), senior 
vice president, international product development in the Nycomed Group. 
The interview was conducted in June 2004.  
Addition sources includes information from the homepages of Nycomed 
such as annual reports as well as other sources from the general press, cf. 
reference. 
DAK-Laboratoriet 
DAK-Laboratoriet was created in 1922 by the Danish Pharmaceutical 
Association.  The purpose of DAK-Laboratoriet was to create 
pharmaceuticals for the Danish pharmacies. At the time of the takeover in 
1991 DAK had 320 employees and an annual sale of 520 million DKK21. 
Nycomed 
Nycomed's activities started in 1874 with import and manufacturing of 
pharmaceuticals for the Norwegian market. In 1990 the company had 
around 1000 employees. In recognition of the company's strengths in both 
imaging and pharmaceuticals, Nycomed AS was split into two companies in 
1990 - Nycomed Imaging AS and Nycomed Pharma AS.  
                                                 
21 Berlingske Tidende, “Apoteker sælger deres produktion”, 15 December 1990, 2. section, erhverv, p.1 
Nycomed was established in Denmark as a result of the acquisitions of (cf. 
Table 4): 
 pHarma Medica in 1988 
 DAK-Laboratoriet in 1991 
 Benzon Pharma in 1991 
In 1997 Nycomed merged with Amersham creating Nycomed Amersham 
plc, cf. Table 4. 
Nycomed Holding A/S was a dormant company until May 14th, 1999. On 
that date the investors behind Nordic Capital and Nycomed Amersham 
subscribed for 68,9% and 31,1% of the shares respectively, and the 
company acquired the Nycomed Pharma division from Amersham plc22. 
In September 2001, the investors behind Nordic Capital acquired the 
remaining shares from Nycomed Amersham. This gave Nordic Capital 
approximately 98% of Nycomed Holding A/S. Management of the 
Nycomed Group owned the remaining shares23. 
Nyco Holding ApS was founded October 1, 2002 and is today the ultimate 
parent company in the Nycomed Group (the Group)24. 
On November 29, 2002, an investor group led by CSFB Private Equity, 
together with certain employees and members of the Group’s management, 
made capital contributions to facilitate the acquisition by the Group of all of 
the outstanding shares in Nycomed Holding from Nordic Capital25. The 
acquisition of Nycomed Holding was done through the established Nyco 
Holding ApS. 
 
Table 7 Nycomed history in brief 26
Year Main events 
1988 The parent company changed its name to Hafslund Nycomed AS. Pharmamedica AS and 
Basoderm AS in Denmark (dermatology products) and Varilab AB in Sweden (optothermic 
spectroscopy) were acquired. 
1990 Nycomed had approximately 1,000 employees. Nycomed AS was divided into two companies: 
Nycomed AS (Imaging) and Nycomed Pharma AS. 
1991 
 
Several mergers and acquisitions expanded Nycomed Pharma's activities in the Nordic 
countries. These activities included  
 a merger with Collett Marwell Hauge in Norway (OTC products)  
                                                 
22 Nycomed Holding A/S, annual report 2001, p.5 
23 Nycomed Holding A/S, annual report 2001, p.5 
24 Nyco Holding ApS, Annual report 2002, p. 7 
25 Nyco Holding ApS, Annual report 2002, p. 7 
26 The history of Nycomed is based upon interview with AM and information from the websites 
http://www.nycomed.com, and http://www.nycomed.dk  
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  marketing collaboration with Benzon Pharma in Denmark (prescription drugs) 
followed by a takeover in 1991  
 the purchase of DAK Laboratoriet, Denmark's largest pharmaceutical manufacturer of 
generics. 
1992 The Hafslund Nycomed Corporation acquired Hydro Pharma a/s, Norway, through Nycomed 
Pharma. The Hafslund Nycomed Corporation thus became one of the leading Scandinavian 
pharmaceutical companies and among the largest suppliers of drugs in Norway and Denmark.  
The Christiaens International BV group was acquired to strengthen Nycomed Pharma's sales 
and distribution network in Europe and to establish a solid market presence in the Benelux 
countries. 
1996 Hafslund Nycomed's pharmaceutical business became Nycomed ASA. Hafslund Nycomed 
ASA changed its name to Hafslund ASA and focused primarily on energy production.  
A new sales and distribution centre for pharmaceutical products was established in 
Novosibirsk, Russia. Contract production of sterile products was started in Russia.  
By the end of 1996, Nycomed had 5,600 employees world-wide. 
1997 The Research and Development units in Linz, Vienna and Bioreg (Oslo) were closed down and 
the activities were transferred to other units.  
Nycomed ASA and Amersham International plc merged into Nycomed Amersham plc. Total 
revenues was at the time approximately NOK 15,000 million and the total number of 
employees amounted to approximately 11,600. 
1998 In December 1998, Nycomed was demerged into Nycomed Pharma Holding AS and Nycomed 
AS. Nycomed Pharma Holding AS became then the owner of the Nycomed Pharma Business. 
To further strengthen the multioffice profile, a reorganisation into fully integrated legal entities 
was decided and implemented from 1999 in Norway, Denmark, Belgium and Austria. 
1999 Nycomed Pharma was sold to Nordic Capital, a leading Scandinavian private equity firm. 
2002 Nordic Capital has entered into a definitive agreement to sell Nycomed to a company owned by 
CSFB Private Equity, Blackstone Capital Partners and NIB Capital Private Equity NV. 
Turnover and employees 
Since its separation from the Amersham the development in terms of 
turnover and number of employees has been as following: 
Table 8 Turnover and number of employees, Nycomed   
•  
Nycomed 
Holding 
1999* 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Turnover (€ 
in millions) 
256.3 462.0 508.3 562.9 635.5 
Average # of 
employees 
2240 2306 2418 2665 2831 
 
Source: Nycomed Holding Annual A/S Report 2000, Nycomed Group Annual Report 2003 
* the turnover for 1999 include operations for a period of seven months covering the period 
after the separation from Amersham in May 1999. The turnover is converted from DKK 
with an exchange rate of 7,42 DKK/€. 
Today Nycomed is present in 19 European countries27.  
As of December 31, 2003, Nycomed had 2.795 full-time employees, of 
whom28: 
• 1.045 were employed in marketing and sales; 
• 1.095 were employed in operations; 
• 128 were employed in international product development; 
• 353 were employed in finance and administration; and 
• 174 were employed in international marketing and business 
development, quality assurance and human resources. 
Around 600 of their employees are located in Denmark of which 500 are in 
their headquarter in Roskilde, Denmark. In general Nycomed has around a 
10% turnover among their employees.  
Type of development  
Neither Nycomed, nor the three Danish companies including DAK-
Laboratoriet can be considered  research companies. All of them focus on 
development activities related to generic products, such as applying known 
substances in new improved products. An example would be a new method 
for absorption such as a plaster instead of a pill. Another example is to apply 
a known substance in a new setting.  
Although the company does not perform pure research the development 
process is still relatively long. The development time for new pills is 
minimum 3-4 years, and to develop a new plaster takes around 7 years. The 
long process consists of the following activities: first the product has to be 
developed; then its durability has to be proven; then the toxicology has to be 
tested e.g. on animals; then clinical test on people; finally registration of the 
product. Compared to the industry Nycomed’s development function is only 
around 20-25% the size of their generic competitor such as Forest 
Laboratories.  
Reasons for takeover 
Reasons for selling DAK 
Before the acquisition by Nycomed the association of pharmacies in 
Denmark, Danish Pharmaceutical Association (Dansk Apotekerforening) 
owned DAK-Laboratoriet. Thus before the acquisition the association of 
pharmacies in Denmark was positioned at both the side of the table as the 
producer and pharmacies. This was not expedient from a politic point of 
                                                 
27 Nyco Holding ApS annual report 2003 
28 Nycomed Group Annual Report 2003 to Bondholders, p. 46 
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 Nycomeds reasons for acquiring DAK 
Nycomed vision was at the time to establish a European therapeutic- 
pharmaceutical division as a road to growth in addition to their contrast 
media business. Nycomed had a stable income from their contrast media 
business and wanted to invest in a new area as a mean to future growth. The 
vision should be reached through acquisitions. The primary reason for the 
acquisition was to get marked access. In addition to the three Danish 
acquisitions (DAK-Laboratoriet, Benzon-Pharma, and Pharma-medica) 
Nycomed acquired the Austrian CL Pharma Group  (Chemilens) and some 
years later a sales company in Belgium (Christiaens International BV 
group), cf. Table 4. 
Impact of takeover within the acquired firm 
Changeable period 
Seen from the point of view of an employee in a development function it 
has been a very changeable period since the takeover. DAK-Laboratoriet 
was shaped for the sale. One of the prime mechanisms for shaping was 
through reduction of activities including development activities.  
Movement of R&D centre 
After the acquisitions the R&D centre was moved to Austria. The 
Norwegian R&D manager was moved to Austria, and the Danish 
development-division became a subsidiary of the Austrian centre. In the 
years after the movement to Austria the expectation to the pharmaceutical 
market was not fully met. The projects were too expensive compared to 
their relative earnings. As a consequence the centre was reduced over a 
period of time ending out with a total close down of the Austrian R&D 
centre29. 
Merger with Amersham 
In 1996 Hafslund-Nycomed was split into Hafslund focusing on energy 
production and Nycomed focusing on the pharmaceutical part including 
imaging. In 1997 Nycomed merged with the British based Amersham. 
Amersham integrated the imaging part of Nycomed into its business and 
chose to sell the pharmaceutical part of Nycomed. During the time when 
pharma was a part of Amersham there was only a little interest in it and a 
very low investment in research and development. 
                                                 
29 A more subjective assessment from AM was that seen from the Norwegian headquarter it was probably 
also easier to carry out reductions in Austria compared to in the motherland. 
Demerger – sold to Nordic Capital 
Nordic Capital a private equity firm bought Nycomed pharma in 1999 in a 
pursue to trim the business of Amersham-Nycomed. The research 
employees felt this as a big turning point (a liberation), which changed the 
purpose (raison d’être) of the business from making capital to the other 
branches of Nycomed to creating their own business.  
With regards to the research and development activities the sell off caused a 
clean up of the activities. At the point of the sale Nycomed Pharma had a 
development departments with around 120 person divided between a few 
activities in Austria, approximately 50 persons in Norway, and 50+ persons 
in Denmark. 
Centralisation of development activities in Denmark 
In the pursuit to establish a critical mass it was decided to centralise all the 
development activities in Denmark. Why Denmark? The official story was 
that the access to competencies was better in the Øresund region compared 
to Oslo region. Another possible subjective reason for the choice of 
Denmark could be that at the same time other activities were centralised in 
Denmark including the movement of the headquarter. Yet another reason for 
choosing Denmark was that the Danish department possessed the most 
relevant competencies from the point of view of potential for creating new 
products in relation to the identified future focus of Nycomed Pharma.  
AM assesses that the primary reason for choosing Denmark was the access 
to competence. Hence, the development centre would probably have been 
placed in Denmark anyway even if the headquarter was kept in Norway. 
Thus the decision was based upon where the most relevant competencies 
were and where the best access was to new competencies. Most of the 
Norwegian colleagues were offered to be transferred to the new centralised 
development centre in Denmark. However, only a few persons (3+) 
accepted the offer; 2 of them are still in Denmark. Today the development 
department consist of around 130 persons. Furthermore, the Øresund region 
today works as a very important means for recruiting experienced and 
qualified personnel. 
New ambitious owners 
In the years between the takeover of DAK-Laboratoriet by Hafslund 
Nycomed to the sell of to Nordic Capital there never was a long term 
strategy. They never managed to carry their development project through. 
All the time they were evaluated on a more short term, which was very 
frustrating.  
The sale first to Nordic Capital and latter the group around CSFB Private 
Equity (cf. Table 4) has been liberating for Nycomed. Both groups of 
owners acquired Nycomed as an investment and have been nurturing it 
accordingly. That is, their investment is depending upon the success of the 
company. Whereas in the previous constellations the pharma division was 
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 functioning more as a mechanism, that delivered capital to other divisions in 
the group. The previous owners did not have an ambition for the pharma 
part. The new owners have a high ambition in terms of high growth 
expectations. They have coherent strategy plan for the business in terms of a 
relationship between the desired growth and activities. As a part of the new 
ownership the management was changed replacing the management with 
experienced industry people. The old management team was also 
experienced but that have not managed to deliver sufficient results.  
One of the experiences with having investors as owners without any detailed 
knowledge of the industry had been that it is much easier. That is they put 
up clear goals related to the development of the business, but leaves the 
operation of the business to people who are knowledgeable in that. 
New market possibilities 
The international Nycomed is different from the Danish Nycomed (and the 
previous DAK-Laboratoriet). In Denmark the  business of the company 
traditionally has been closely related to medicaments for the pharmacy 
market such as Kodimagnyl and Hjertemagnyl.  
Currently, Nycomed aims at a pan-European business based upon product 
specialised for hospitals. That is, in the recent years the focus has changed 
towards whole of Europe. Thus, the development function is focused on 
more innovative products developed for the international hospital market. 
This shift is a result of the new owners’ analyses of where the biggest 
growth potential was. Their European focus enables them to offer access to 
the European market for other companies in terms of sales and marketing as 
well as knowledge regarding final development, test, and registration of new 
products where other companies have concluded the more basis research. 
Learning process 
It has been a long process from the small Danish companies in the late 
1980s up to today. This is not to say that the time couldn’t have been 
shortened with some years, but in general such a change process is a 
learning process that takes time. The expectation at the time of takeover of 
DAK-Laboratoriet by Hafslund Nycomed was that the acquisition would 
give access to the Danish marked, and then the rest would follow. However, 
they had to acknowledge that the companies were very different and that the 
product pipeline did not match all the sales companies. The new ownership 
since 1999 has had the courage to look at the pipeline and move towards the 
hospital segment. Hence, today’s business seems more thoroughly 
considered.  
Impact of takeover in the surrounding innovation 
environment  
Partnership 
Nycomed’s current growth strategy in relation to its products is that they 
primarily buys up products already developed by other companies. (In 
addition to developing a few products from scratch on their own.) The only 
buys up products that have been tested on people and proved that it works 
(i.e. fairly late in the process). One of the strengths of Nycomed today is 
their knowledge of the European market, in terms of registration authorities 
and marketing and sales channels. Hence, they offer their partners 
everything from conducting clinical test in Europe, registration and 
marketing in Europe. In comparison they could only manage the Nordic 
region in 1997-98.  
New product ideas 
New product ideas primarily come from internal Nycomed employees in a 
combination of: development personnel, clinicians, technologists, and 
marketing personnel. The products are developed based upon research 
coming from a combination from: 
• Clinical/medical research at hospitals 
• Market development 
• Technological development 
Movement of development activities 
As it is today they would not consider to move any of their development 
activities to a new location, e.g. in relation to some of their product sites. 
Their production as such does not have a potential in relation to the 
development activities. 
Two scenarios could speak for a movement: 
1. if they got engaged in a long-term partnership with another company 
possessing key competencies related to a geographical area 
2. in case of a merger with a company (this is hypothetically, they have 
currently no plans) with a larger development department they would 
consider to move. 
That is, the decision would be related to the location of competencies. 
Network primarily from overseas  
As mentioned previously the Øresund region is a very important base for 
recruiting new and experienced employees. The region is primarily applied 
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 for recruitment and not for shared innovation projects. They have a network 
with Danish and Swedish biotech industries. However, most of their new 
products and shared development project are with partners that come from 
overseas. 
Lessons learned 
Motivation behind acquisition – market or competencies 
In a takeover situation one of the most important aspects that can influence 
the success of the takeover is the acquirer’s motive for buying the acquired 
company. For instance, as the case of Hafslund Nycomed acquisition of 
DAK-Laboratoriet, if the most important arguments for the acquisition is to 
get access to new markets then the R&D department ceteris paribus would 
have a harder time to keep their competencies locally after the acquisition. 
In this situation it is not that strange if the development department feels 
neglected and confused. On the other hand if the primary reason for an 
acquisition is related to possession of competencies then the development 
activities would be nurtured more.  
Hence, the people that are not related to the motivation of the acquirer (e.g. 
R&D or sales) would have a tendency to feel neglected. Looking at the 
takeovers in Denmark the majority of the takeovers have been market 
driven. 
Difference between acquisitions and demergers 
In a takeover situation the challenge is related to integrating the two 
businesses and getting synergy out of the acquisition. In most cases the 
management would be occupied with managing the transition process and 
maybe already focused on conducting further acquisitions. In a demerging 
situation where a company is split into smaller pieces, the complexity of the 
demerged part is smaller and accordingly the leadership can be more 
focused. Thus, the odds for a better leadership are higher. 
Success today, not 6 years ago 
It should be noted that the takeover of DAK-Laboratoriet by Nycomed took 
place in 1991 and that a lot have happened since then. As mentioned the 
time up to Nycomed pharma was sold of the Nordic Capital was very 
frustrating for the development people. Thus, had the interview been made 6 
years ago it would have presented a totally different story. The success 
today is related to the demerging and not least that there has been time to 
undergo the change process.  
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Company cases Finland 
By Juha Oksanen & Nina Rilla 
The Finnish software case: Iobox 
Introduction 
The roots of Iobox can be traced to year 1999 when it was established in 
Helsinki. The tale of Iobox lasted only to the beginning of 2003 but has 
remained as success story from the technology boom that brought on many 
unsuccessful stories as well. Iobox was bought by Spanish Telefónica’s 
affiliate called Terra Mobile in summer of 2000.  
Iobox offered mobile internet services that were accessible from computer 
or mobile phone. At the time of buyout Iobox’s customer database 
constituted of nearly million registered users being the largest in the field. 
The number of employees grew rapidly employing over 120 workers by the 
year 2001.  
Iobox case offers us an example of software company operating during the 
technology boom in the early 21st century. Different phases in its existence 
happened rapidly creating some disappointed and some extremely satisfied 
persons. Traces of Iobox were cut sort and for example financial 
information was impossible to obtain. 
The software industry in Finland 
The Finnish software industry and software entrepreneurship have grown 
particularly rapid since the early 1990s. Success stories of Finnish high 
technology firms entering to global markets with Nokia as the leading figure 
has prepared the way also for software companies. Nowadays the software 
industry is among most prominent industry sectors in Finland even though it 
is still relatively small. Depending on the source and used criteria the 
estimated number of software companies varies from about 1,100 to more 
than 3,000.  
Since the 1970s, the Finnish software industry has mostly focused on 
providing technological solutions to business-to-business niche markets. 
Ground for software product development and production has developed 
gradually from the 1980s onwards, but the number of pure software product 
companies in Finland is still rather small (Toivanen, 2000).  Companies' 
business ranges from infrastructure software and data security solutions to 
various Internet and wireless applications.  
Small domestic market, low degree of productization and 
internationalisation are assessed to be weak points especially when 
compared to US based firms in the packaged software segment. A positive 
turn is nevertheless identified here: development is moving from custom 
software developed for local markets towards mass-market software 
intended for international distribution (Lamberg, 2003). 
The Finnish software industry has followed a different development path in 
comparison to countries where the initial thrust for the software industry 
came from needs of a strong military industry. A recent report (Tyrväinen, 
Warsta and Seppänen, 2004) maintains that development of Finnish 
software industry and broadly defined software cluster has been affected by 
development in other industrial segments using software products and 
services. In the 1970s automation in industries, in the 1980s electronics 
industry and in the 1990s telecommunications have successively left their 
tracks in the domestic software industry. Retail- and wholesale trade, 
banking and financing sector as well as media sector have also contributed 
significantly to growth of Finnish software industry through the demand for 
software based solutions.  
The software and knowledge-based industry has had a special position in 
Finnish technology policy over the last decade. The government has been 
active in funding technology programmes targeting ICT sector. The reigning 
approach to technology and industry policies has paid a particularly close 
attention to active support for new and established technology-based firms 
— new firms in particular are given active counselling and support. Autere 
and Autio argue that because of this approach good practice recipes have 
been rapidly and widely disseminated in the closely-knit community of 
technology based new firms in Finland. (cf. Autere & Autio, 2000) 
Until very recently the takeovers of Finnish origin software firms by the 
foreign based companies have been relatively rare phenomenon. Even the 
internationalisation of the industry is still in an early phase at large. This 
should come as no surprise when we remember the fact that the majority of 
software companies are very small and with restricted resources. The 
companies are mainly owned by their founders and their family members, 
with only minor foreign and external ownership. Even in the "Born Global" 
companies the ownership is often shared between firm's management, 
employees and venture capital companies from Finland and/or abroad.  
Within the last year there has been signs that interest in Finnish software 
firms is growing among foreign companies. Swedish based WM-data AB 
acquired in the beginning of 2004 Novo Group Oyj which was a leading IT 
services company in Finland. In July 2004 Finnish Saunalahti Group Oyj 
divested its international Mobile Entertainment operations by selling its 
wholly owned subsidiary, Jippii Mobile Entertainment Oy to iTouch plc. 
The buyer originates from South-Africa but headquarters nowadays in the 
UK and specialises in mobile value added services. Further, in late summer 
2004 TeliaSonera reached an agreement to sell its wholly owned Sonera Zed 
Ltd to Wisdom Entertainment, which is a Spanish interactive media group. 
Zed was an independent aggregator and reseller of digital content to mobile 
phone users. Wisdom Entertainment's subsidiary LaNetro provides similar 
services to Zed's in Spain and Latin America. The divestment was reasoned 
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 from TeliaSonera's side as another step in strategy to focus on its core 
business.  
There has been also a small amount of larger domestic software companies 
to whom acquisition of other firms has been an important part of their 
growth strategies. The history of Finnish-Swedish Tieto-Enator Corporation 
exemplifies this kind of evolvement — the company came into existence in 
1999 when Finnish firm Tieto Corporation (founded 1968) and Swedish 
Enator Ab (founded 1995) merged. Since the mid-1970s the Finnish Tieto 
had carried out over 20 strategic acquisitions mostly in Finland, but also in 
Sweden, Norway and Latvia. Especially during the 1990s the company 
experienced rapid growth through a number of acquisitions, mergers and 
strategic alliances. The pace has even accelerated after the formation of 
TietoEnator: the company has strengthened its expertise of the chosen 
industries by acquiring IT service companies and outsourced IT units both 
in Finland and other countries. 
Iobox in brief 
The roots of Iobox go back to year 1995 when a young Finnish entrepreneur 
founded company called GNW Finland Oy. The company opened its first 
free e-mail service in late 1997. From early on the service was targeting not 
just domestic but also international markets. Originally the service was 
available in five languages, in Finnish, English, Swedish, German and 
Italian. Earlier, comparable services were provided by US-based companies, 
such as HotMail-service. Contrary to the American counterparts the free 
email service was not based on expected cash flow from ad-incomes but on 
on-line sale of ICT and cellular phone articles and utensils through the 
Internet. The free e-mail service was seen as a way to make company 
known among potential customers. The number of subscribers increased 
rapidly and less than three months the new service had more than 10 000 
users, most of them still from Finland.  
A new company, Iobox was established in January 1999 with three 
employees. Original owners comprised the founders, private investors, so 
called business angels, and three Finnish venture capital firms (Eqvitek, 
Capman, SFK Finance) and a US based venture capital company (Alta 
Berkeley Associates). The new company's mission was to provide added 
value services within telecommunication sector linked with Internet.  
In late 1999 the company had 20 employees and in next summer 2000 
already 120 employees of which about three quarters in Finland. Key 
personnel had background in bigger companies. For instance, Iobox's two 
top executives had a several years of experience from large international 
consulting offices, whereas technical staff came mainly from Nokia, Sonera 
and other Finnish high-tech firms. According to ex –Iobox manager firm’s 
personnel strategy was to recruit the best professionals in their field. The 
best employees were allured to the company with various extravagant 
compensations as was the custom during the Internet boom in the early 21st 
century. The company’s aim was to be a leader in the mobile business and it 
resolutely worked towards that target. Finally, at the time of selling, the 
company had the largest mobile platform in the world.  
Iobox qualifies genuinely as a "Born Global" company which according to 
literature (e.g. Autio, Lummaa and Arenius, 2002) are characterised by 
"aspire for a rapid international growth from early on their lives" and 
implementation a global strategy since inception of the new venture. 
Reaching out for international markets from the inception is a common way 
to internationalise for small high technology firms. Iobox was quick to raise 
a second round of venture capital funding already in mid-December 1999, 
when a syndicate of investors led by Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital 
Partners made a decision for $13 million of new equity funding for 
internationalisation. In next spring the company established its new 
headquarters in London, UK.  
From a company perspective Finland offered a superb test market for its 
services but real potential for growth was seen to exist in the Central-
European markets. On the basis of successful trials in domestic market, 
Iobox launched e-mail and m-commerce services targeting European 
markets. Services were tailored to be compatible both with existing GSM-
standard mobile phones and the new generation of Internet-ready mobile 
handsets using WAP (the Wireless Application Protocol) standard.  
At that time Iobox had 350,000 users spread throughout Finland, Sweden, 
Germany and the UK. In addition to services for consumers, Iobox was 
focusing on developing a platform which were allowing partners — such as 
operators or media firms — to rapidly develop wireless services. There were 
also plans to launch company services in Italy, Spain and France where 
number of mobile phone users was foreseen to increase substantially in 
coming few years. 
In public Iobox, engaging in the development of technology and the 
provision of wireless Internet services, became known as a company that 
offers mobile telephone users a wide choice of ring tones and icons for 
mobile handsets. The company got additional visibility in early 2000 when a 
leading US technology journal, Red Herring, named Iobox among the 
world's 100 most important companies "most likely to change the world". 
The only other Finnish company on the list was Nokia. 
Terra Mobile in brief 
Terra Mobile was founded just a few months before Iobox acquisition by 
Telefónica Móviles and Terra Lycos, both being subsidiaries of a Spanish 
based telecommunications group, Telefónica S.A. The Spanish origin 
multinational has a strong presence especially in the Spanish and Portuguese 
speaking markets in Europe and Latin America with more than 100 million 
customers worldwide. Its shares are traded on the Spanish Stock Market and 
on those in London, Paris, Frankfurt, Tokyo, New York, Lima, Buenos 
Aires, São Paulo and the SEAQ International Exchange in London.  
The underlying reason behind establishing a new mobile service company 
was an aim it to be listed on stock exchange. Representative of former Iobox 
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 revealed that listing during the Internet boom was seen as the one and only 
way of developing your business. However, in no longer than six months 
from the merger listing was cancelled due to unfavourable market 
conditions.  
In the heydays of ICT revolution Telefónica Group was vigorously 
expanding its international businesses and carried out substantial internal 
reorganisation involving allocation of assets among the various global 
business lines. From the perspective of Iobox case the most important 
decisions were creation of two new global businesses: Terra and Telefónica 
Móviles, in 1999 and 2000 respectively.  
Terra got wide publicity when it acquired the US based internet portal 
company Lycos Inc. in year 2000 and formed new Terra Lycos. In the end 
of the very same year Telefónica Móviles, which comprises the group's 
mobile operations, was listed on Madrid and New York Stock Exchanges. In 
addition, in line with the parent group's internationalisation goal Telefónica 
Móviles successfully bid in 2000 and 2001 for five UMTS licences in 
Europe including Spain, Germany, Italy, Switzerland and Austria. 
Telefónica Móviles launched in June 2000 a wireless internet service portal 
(WISP) "e-moción" in Spain and Latin America. The new joint venture 
Terra Mobile S.A. was intended to establish, develop and operate the 
Telefónica Group’s global mobile portal in all of the countries where 
Telefónica Móviles operates. Terra Mobile's mission was to boost the 
development of Internet services using cellular technology — in practice to 
create, promote and operate a mobile Internet portal enabling customers to 
access a wide range of e-services. 
Takeover 
In July 2000 Terra Mobile S.A. acquired whole capital stock of Iobox for 
216 million euros. The purchase was made in cash, and that could said to be 
a spectacular move when such big money was in question. The buyout got 
wide publicity in Finland and abroad. 
The operations of these two merging companies did not largely overlap as 
Terra Mobile was still on its start-up phase as were its technological projects 
as well. Iobox’s technological solutions and customer base were carefully 
evaluated before the merger, evaluation period took long time leading to the 
purchase in the end. The buyer wanted to be assured that the platform’s 
technology was able to handle large customer base and users of the portal 
were real customers.  
Telefónica Móviles owned 49% and Terra Lycos 51% of Terra Mobile’s 
stocks. Terra Mobile on the other hand was a single owner of its new 
purchase, Iobox. Iobox name remained as the official company name after 
the takeover and it operated as a head of all Finnish operations. Under Iobox 
group were its subsidiaries, e.g. Terra Mobile Finland and Iobox’s 
technology centre which was separated as an individual unit. Iobox’s 
headquarter stayed in London to where it had moved earlier to enhance its 
internationalisation wishes.  
At the time of the takeover the Finnish mobile portal and content provider 
had more than one million registered users in Europe. In Germany alone, the 
number of users was over 782,000 at the end of 2000. The number of active 
users was larger than any of today’s portals has. The new owner acquired 
not though only customer contacts but also the technology platform and 
business concept of Iobox, which were after the deal transferred and 
integrated into business of the parent companies.  
Terra Mobile paid large sum of Iobox´s mobile portal but as former 
manager of Iobox says, “…they, i.e. Terra Mobile, got current and valuable 
merchandise. They got one of the world’s fastest and largest mobile 
platforms”. 
Reasons for merger 
As Iobox operated mainly on venture capital the legalities of lucrative 
business forced it to search for strategic partner as its outgoings exceeded 
income. In the words of former manager of Iobox, “Iobox was actively 
searching for strategic partner in spring 2000”. The buying company, 
Telefónica A.S which is the parent company of Terra Mobile, was able to 
offer ready made market access to Spanish and Latin American markets as 
well as resources for research and development.  
Terra Mobile' strategy was based on swift approach — by testing advanced 
technological solutions and quickly adopting promising ones the company 
aimed to provide services interesting and useful for customers. This aim did 
not diverge markedly the ideas driving already Iobox business: around half 
of the staff at Iobox was involved with product development even though in 
words of a key partner of the company "the company was closer to 
marketing company than the one focusing on research. The company 
products were partly developed internally, partly integrated solutions made 
by others outside of the company".  Prior to buyout Iobox and Telefónica 
had customer relationship that showed that companies were not completely 
unknown to each other.  
At the time of acquisition Terra Mobile needed a mobile platform that was 
able to serve large amount of users. High technology markets are fast 
moving and new products are developed continuously. Because of this 
Telefónica was looking for a ready-made business which would suit to its 
requirements. As was mentioned earlier the aim of Telefónica was to create 
company that concentrated on mobile services and was meant to be listed in 
the stock exchange. Iobox fulfilled Telefónica’s requirements completely.  
However, the reasons behind the merger stayed unclear to Iobox’s former 
employees as comments former manager of Iobox, “We could not 
understand why Telefónica did not use our know-how more broadly.” 
Telefónica’s strategy was to compete its projects externally no preference 
was given to its own affiliates. According to employee of Iobox Telefónica 
did not make full use of its purchase, he implies that it could have entered to 
European mobile ringing tone and logo market if it wanted. Nowadays 
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 Telefónica operates only on Spanish and Brazilian markets, European 
markets have stayed unconquered. 
After the merger 
Soon after the deal Terra Mobile became one of the leading European 
mobile portals with its 4.7 million subscribers. The mobile services were 
marketed in the UK, Germany, Sweden and Finland under the Iobox brand, 
whereas in Spain and Brazil the services were launched under the Terra 
Mobile brand. In 2001 Terra Mobile had over 200 employees in Madrid, 
London, Helsinki, Oulu, Stockholm and Munich.  
The Finnish affiliate, Terra Mobile Finland Oy was parent company's sales 
and marketing organisation in Finland. The tasks included development and 
marketing of innovative mobile services both independently and in co-
operation with partners. In addition, Terra Mobile had in Finland an 
independent technology centre which had a major role in development of 
mobile portal and in its launch on international market. The number of staff 
working at the technology centre peak over 80 employees. The technology 
centre was responsible of maintenance and development of platform while 
supporting functions were given to other affiliates.  
Level of R&D was significant at Iobox before the takeover. New platforms 
were developed at high speed. At the time of merger company had 
constructed the third Generation platform which replaced its predecessor the 
second Generation platform. Iobox’s technological unit even bought one 
Finnish firm which concentrated also on software development. Iobox´s  
strategy at that time was to invent country customised services and to set up 
business in Spain as well. We could say that R&D was more market than 
technology initiated. As former employee of Iobox says, “Markets however 
were technology driven”. R&D stayed at Iobox after merger since they were 
the developers of mobile platform and possessed know-how for its further 
development.  
In first comments the deal was deemed to be good for Finland's information 
technology sector as a whole. The deal was thought to open up new 
international channels/markets for other Finnish IT companies developing 
and marketing mobile applications and services. Terra Mobile took into use 
a service platform which was common for country versions. Terra Mobile 
Finland was seen as a gate through which promising mobile service 
innovations developed by the Finnish IT-firms could get entry to 
international distribution.  
Before the deal was publicly announced, it was expected in market that 
Iobox would be listed in a stock exchange either in Helsinki or somewhere 
else. Although the entire company was sold to Terra Mobile, the CEO of 
Iobox did not see it as a corporate takeover: "We did not sell the company, 
we just found a strategic partner. Operations will continue as they have so 
far," he said in a press conference when the news about deal was released. 
He also stressed that Iobox had not actively looked for a buyer. After the 
completion of the acquisition the acquired company was consolidated in the 
financial statements of the Telefónica Group by the global integration 
method. 
Terra Mobile’s headquarter stayed in Madrid and Terra Mobile Iobox’s in 
London after the merger. Technological department of Iobox was situated in 
Helsinki while platform hosting operations remained in London to where 
they had been moved before takeover. 
Impacts of takeover within acquired firm  
The acquisition made fortunes for the founders of Iobox. Also in short 
history of Finnish venture capitalism the exit from Iobox meant for the three 
domestic VCs profits unheard of before. At the time of sell off Iobox 77% 
of the company's shares were owned by corporate investors. After the deal a 
representative of the venture capital company Eqvitec noted in a press 
interview that “Iobox was unique, something that won’t happen again".   
After the merger the former CEO and the founder of Iobox continued as a 
deputy CEO of Terra Mobile. He had also a seat on the board of directors in 
the new company. Another founder of Iobox was assigned as the director of 
the company's European operations. The former product-marketing director 
of Iobox was nominated as a managing director of Terra Mobile Finland Oy. 
The managing director had joined Iobox in its infancy and was a member of 
company board and responsible for product and service development at that 
time. It could be interpreted that key personnel stayed in the company after 
the merger. Employees were interested to see how merger would turn out, as 
former manager describes it “People were curious to see the outcome. 
Naturally, also Telefónica’s bonus system which was under construction 
kept employees committed to Iobox and Terra Mobile”.  
The two business cultures collide  
Unification of two business cultures in the situation of buyout is hardly ever 
straightforward. It needs possibly even more attention when companies 
from two differing countries are in question. Iobox and Terra Mobile did not 
either avoid difficulties in the merger process. According to former manager 
of Iobox issue that hampered creating a common working culture at the first 
was language – more specifically lack of common language. When 
communication is deficient misunderstandings are unavoidable. Spanish 
counterparts, nevertheless, learned English in order to overcome 
communication difficulties. Sometimes the language barrier does not exist 
even though there is not a common language, as former manager of Iobox 
reminds, “Technical staff usually can easily communicate to each other as 
do for example marketing people but difficulties arise in management”.  
Even though the language barrier was hindering the unification it was not 
the only obstacle. Spanish and Finnish working cultures differed quite 
largely. On behalf of Iobox employees’ frankness and trustworthiness were 
appreciated while Spanish counterparts did not always stick to deadlines and 
standing up against your supervisor was unheard of. Some difficulties 
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 constituted the fact that management of Terra Mobile and Telefónica did not 
exactly understand what Iobox’s produced. Nor did Iobox’s management 
apprehend why they as a whole were bought up. Despite these obstacles the 
two differing companies learned to work together at the end.  
Co-operation  
Iobox co-operated with other firms in some extent prior takeover, for 
instance with game developers. Nevertheless after the merger co-operation 
projects were approved by Terra Mobile that made Iobox to terminate some 
of its co-operation projects started prior takeover. However, new projects 
arose after the merger.  
After the buyout Iobox had some co-projects with Telefónica’s R&D centre, 
which was independent unit inside Telefónica Group. However, as former 
employee of Iobox points out, “Terra Mobile got a lot in the buyout. The 
number of employees was 120-150 people which meant that manpower was 
quite large, and was able to produce large amount of services by itself. 
There was not a huge demand for co-operation”. Certain co-operation 
projects were started when first signs of shutdown were seen, these projects 
were related, for example, to transfer of technology. 
The collapse of markets 
The turnabout of ICT markets globally in 2001 hit hard also the new owners 
of Iobox. In November 2001 Terra Mobile refocused its business model and 
decided to withdraw from Finnish and Swedish markets. Reasons given for 
the move were the "aim to rationalize internal synergy and optimize cost 
structure of the owner companies Telefónica Móviles and Terra Lycos" and 
concentration on the most significant markets.  
Making profitable mobile-services business on Finnish and Swedish 
markets were seen extremely difficult. As a result of the decision the 
company gave notice to circa 60 employees, of which most (over 50) were 
located in Finland. At the same time Telefónica Móviles and Terra Lycos 
announced that their customized services for Nordic markets were about to 
be closed by the end 2001. According to Terra-Mobile it had more than 5.8 
million registered users of which 1.2 million customers in Finland and 
Sweden in the end of fiscal year 2001.  
The last songs of the ex-Iobox can be found in the Telefónica Group's 
Annual Reports for 2002 and 2003. In the Annual report 2002 it was 
announced that Telefónica Móviles wrote off €154 million which were 
attributable to the cancellation of the goodwill of the Terra Mobile 
subsidiary Iobox, as a result of the restructuring of company’s operations 
outside Spain.  
This was however just a drop in the ocean — Telefónica wrote off assets 
and restructuring costs valued at €12 341 million relating to the foray into 
UMTS business in Germany, Austria, Italy and Switzerland. At the end of 
2002 exposure in Germany, Austria and Switzerland was totally eliminated 
and a write-down was taken for the goodwill of Terra Mobile which centred 
its activities in Spain, its principal market. In total, Telefónica Group 
recorded a €5,576.8 million net loss for the 2002 fiscal year, compared with 
a €2,106.8 million net income the year before. This result can be attributed 
to the posting of €16,217.9 million in extraordinary results. 
The close down  
A year after the takeover technology boom showed signs of deceleration. 
Terra Mobile was forced to cut costs that lead to redundancies at Iobox’s 
operations. The hosting centre from London was moved to Madrid, and a 
technology transfer project was launched in order to transfer platform 
development know-how for Spanish counterparts, more specifically to 
Telefónica’s R&D unit. Former R&D manager of Iobox says that the period 
was devastating for many Iobox employees but sees it also as a logical 
outcome given the market situation at that time. The technology transfer 
project was the last project of Iobox’s R&D operations at the end of 2002.  
“Even though the ending of one saga was unfortunate the close-down was 
managed well on behalf of Telefónica and Terra Mobile”, says a former 
R&D manager. Management had the right tools for redundancies, and fair 
compensations were paid to employees. The closing down process was 
managed communally; managers of Iobox took part into the process as well. 
Impacts of takeover in the surrounding innovation 
environment 
In the early 2000 Finland was regarded as one of the leading countries in the 
mobile business. Many small prospering companies and skilful employees 
existed in Finland. Finland’s technological knowledge and know-how was 
widely recognised at that time. A Finnish Iobox having the largest mobile 
platform of the world attracted many buyers. Finnish companies had 
credibility in  mobile business. However, after the technology boom 
investment and trust on mobile technology was almost non-existing. 
“Nowadays the markets are refreshing a bit. There is investors who again 
believe in the mobile business”, says a person working in mobile business in 
Finland.   
Former employees of Iobox are well situated in Finnish high technology 
environment. Ex-managers of Iobox have found challenging posts from 
other high tech companies that shows their experiences are valued in the 
field. Furthermore few companies have been established by former Iobox 
employees. While the technology boom was flourishing the pool of skilful 
employees was not wide, employees were trained in-house. Training has 
paid off from the societal point of view since professionals in the field of 
mobile technology are increasingly appreciated today when high technology 
markets show signs of recovery.   
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 Conclusions 
Iobox as a takeover case is without doubt an extraordinary example which 
highlights features closely linked to a specific historical moment — the ICT 
boom.  Therefore the case has to be analysed cautiously and broad sweeping 
generalisations about the impacts of takeover must be avoided.  
At first sight the story looks like an exemplary case in which foreign 
takeover leads to transfer of accumulated knowledge and assets abroad and 
the close down of business in the country of origin. On the other hand it is 
clear that Terra Mobile's decision to acquire the Finnish company was based 
at that time on assumed market potential of Iobox mobile portal solutions. In 
this sense, Terra Mobile was buying know-how tested in the market as well 
entry to Central- and Northern European markets. 
Overall, the picture we get from impacts of takeovers changes with time. 
This holds true also for Iobox case. It can be argued that at the time of the 
acquisition -- and shortly after -- the transformation of ownership was 
interpreted positively reflecting the attractiveness of the Finnish ICT 
industries and know-how internationally. Accordingly, for the involved 
domestic venture capital firms the exit from Iobox was an exceptionally 
profitable deal.  
The situation looked quite a different when ICT sector harboured in 
difficulties and Terra Mobile decided to close down its activities in Finland 
and Sweden and withdraw from markets there. In the short run, the decision 
had negative impacts for the employees who lost their jobs. It is, however, 
extremely difficult, if not next to impossible, to estimate if effects of the 
takeover and subsequent close-down of activities in Finland in the long term 
were either positive or negative. There are arguments for both views as seen 
above.   
In case of Iobox we can speculate that a lot of experience gained during the 
internationalisation of the company has stayed in Finnish business in spite 
of close-down of activities in Finland. Former employees of Iobox have in 
many instances found challenging posts from other high tech companies. In 
addition, few companies have been established by former Iobox employees.  
This is not to say that impacts of close-down would always and in every 
sector be alike. Rather, sectors differ quite markedly from each other when 
it comes to the "ease" to establish new business activities. In this sense the 
software industry presents different end of a continuum compared to 
themore mature pharmaceuticals sector. The software industry involves 
generally speaking less investment in comparison to other capital intensive 
sectors. In addition, in rather new and rapidly developing industries like 
software sector the pace of technology development and markets may 
decrease barriers to new firm establishment and entry on market. 
 
The Finnish pharmaceutical case: Santen Oy 
Introduction  
Santen Oy, former Oy Star Ab, operates in the ophthalmic industry.30 It 
produces ophthalmics to both European and American markets, and 
specialises on glaucoma.31 Oy Star Ab, founded in 1922, was sold to 
Japanese Santen Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd in 1997 when former owner 
Huhtamäki re-organised its businesses and forfeited its ophthalmic unit. 
Santen Ltd wished to broaden its operations to Europe when ophthalmic unit 
of Huhtamäki owned by Leiras, i.e. Oy Star Ab was on sale. Oy Star Ab 
offered prosperous European wide exporting markets, know-how in R&D 
and production facilities for Santen Ltd’s purposes. Santen Pharmaceutical 
co. Ltd is one of the three largest ophthalmic companies in the world.  
While Santen Oy has been affiliate of Japanese Santen Ltd its operations has 
steadily increased. The number of employees has doubled and heavy 
investments have been made on manufacturing and R&D facilities in 
Finland. Santen Oy acts as an independent affiliate and is heading 
corporation’s European operations.  
Background information of pharmaceutical industry in 
Finland 
The Finnish pharmaceutical industry has developed in phases in the past 
decades. Already in 1950’s the international co-operation was common 
among pharmaceutical companies. However, in 1960’s international co-
operation decreased due to removing import control and tariff protection but 
centralisation moves on industry started. Imported products captured nearly 
half of the Finnish medicine markets in the 1970’s. This forced 
pharmaceutical companies into specialisation and strengthened competition 
between international companies.  
However, many domestic pharmaceutical companies did not have resources 
to meet these challenges. In the 1990’s co-operation with various actors in 
the pharmaceutical industry became increasingly important as research and 
development costs increased. International conglomerates started to 
centralise their businesses that led to various acquisitions in pharmaceutical 
sector. Today some pharmaceutical companies are converting into 
companies concentrating on marketing and selling while others invest in 
research, development and own production. (Leiraksen Käytännön Lääkäri, 
2003: 4-5.) 
                                                 
30 Of or relating to the eye; ocular. 
31 Any of a group of eye diseases characterized by abnormally high intraocular fluid pressure, damaged 
optic disk, hardening of the eyeball, and partial to complete loss of vision. 
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 Today around 160 pharmaceutical companies operate on the Finnish market. 
Some companies operate directly, having their own office in Finland, some 
through representatives. The three largest companies in the field are Pfizer, 
Orion Pharma and AstraZeneca. Multinational companies have acquired 
many Finnish pharmaceutical firms. Among the ten largest players on the 
market only one domestically owned company, Orion Pharma, can be 
found. Orion Pharma is the largest domestic employer in pharmaceutical 
industry, employing 3 400 people in Finland. Many Finnish pharmaceutical 
companies have ended up into foreign ownership. Nowadays Leiras Oy is 
part of German multinational Schering AG. Tamro Corporation became a 
subsidiary of a German pharmaceutical wholesaler Phoenix Pharmahandel 
AG in 2003. (Kivisaari & Lovio, 2004; http://www.orion.fi; 
http://www.pif.fi; http://www.tamro.fi.) 
The total sales of medicines in the year 2003 in Finland at retail prices were 
€1.5 billion. Over half of the industry’s turnover constitutes of international 
operations. Finnish pharmaceutical companies have gained international 
appreciation of their development of successful medicines, such as for 
Parkinson’s disease. Exporting is mainly aimed at the European region. 
(http://www.pif.fi.) 
The Finnish pharmaceutical industry’s investment in research and 
development is of good international standard; annual investment being 
17% of industry’s turnover. New medicine development is risky and long 
term projects. It has been estimated that cost for developing a new medicine 
is around €560 million, and the whole process from concept to sale takes on 
average 12-13 years.  
Finland’s pharmaceutical industry has been active in conducting clinical 
trials, 409 clinical trials were carried out in year 2003. Finland’s success in 
clinical testing is due to suitable conditions that it offers for conducting 
clinical trials, e.g. professional health care workers, high level of medicinal 
science, a long tradition in keeping country-wide registers and favourable 
attitude of patients and authorities. (http://www.pif.fi.) 
Another characteristic of Finnish pharmaceutical markets is the law on 
generic substitution, which means that pharmacies change subscribed 
medicine to cheapest or nearest cheapest generic medicine 
(http://www.nam.fi). Law was introduced in April 2003.  
We could conclude that Finnish pharmaceutical industry has evolved 
following international trend of companies’ concentration on producing and 
marketing only few pharmaceuticals. Large multinational pharmaceutical 
companies have established foothold also on Finnish markets. 
Santen Oy in brief  
Santen Oy, affiliate of Japanese Santen Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd is located in 
Tampere, Finland. Its turnover is around €78.3 million, and is 100% owned 
by its Japanese parent company. Around eighty percent of turnover 
constitutes from exports. Santen Oy exports products to 30 countries and 
has subsidiaries, representative and sales offices in various countries such as 
in Germany, all Nordic countries, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Czech 
Republic and Russia. Its worldwide specialisation in on glaucoma but R&D 
concentrates also on opthalmitis, allergies and dryness of the eye.  
Company employs total 448 people in Finland, around 40 people more are 
situated in different European marketing units. Santen Oy operates as head 
of European operations, it produces pharmaceuticals both to European and 
American markets. Because of its modern facilities in Tampere it is one of 
the consolidated corporation’s R&D centres. Around 20 percent of turnover 
is used for research and development. Research focuses on glaucoma and 
diseases of the anterior segment of the eye. Clinical research department is 
situated in Helsinki. The company holds marketing authorisation for 261 
medicines in Europe at the moment. The three largest markets on the 
grounds of sales are Finland, Russia and Sweden. Santen Oy’s product 
portfolio constitutes of around 40 ophthalmic medicines. Number of 
employees working in R&D has doubled after takeover being around 80 at 
the moment.  
The ophthalmics industry is highly concentrated world-wide, number of 
global competitors is relatively low. The largest global competitors are 
Swiss Novartis, two American companies Allergan and Pfizer, which sells 
few ophthalmic medicines among other pharmaceuticals. Another European 
competitor can be found from France, called Alcon. 
The parent company –Santen Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd in 
brief  
Santen Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd (hereafter Santen Ltd) was established in 
1890 in Osaka, Japan. Santen Ltd is among the three largest companies 
specialising in ophthalmic pharmaceuticals in the world. It operates in three 
main business segments: prescription pharmaceuticals, over-the-counter 
(OTC) pharmaceuticals and medical devices. Today the company is market 
leader in prescription ophthalmics in Japan. Their share is almost 80 percent 
of company’s net sales. Net sales were ¥90 253 million (€672 million) and 
company’s expenditure on R&D was ¥12 719 millions (€95 million) in 
2003.  (Annual Report 2003, Santen Ltd.) 
Santen Ltd’s first product was a cold medicine. Already in 1899 it launched 
its first eye drops. These drops became company’s hit product for many 
years and allowed the company to specialise in ophthalmics in 1950s. It has 
further proved its innovative capabilities, for example through the 
introduction of Japan’s first plastic eye drop container in 1962. This 
container was easy to carry and gained rapidly popularity among consumers. 
Company was listed on Tokyo stock exchange and Osaka securities 
exchange in 1977. (http://www.santen.co.jp) 
The corporation’s internationalisation started in 1993 when the first foreign 
subsidiary was established in Napa, California. The unit’s focus is on 
marketing and sales but also to foster relations with top research centres and 
universities in the USA. Santen Inc employs around 250 people. The year 
after, in 1994, a subsidiary was established in Germany. Santen GmbH 
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 serves as a link to European markets. A Taiwanese subsidiary was opened 
the same year as the corporation acquired its Finnish affiliate in 1997. An 
American medical device manufacturer Phacor Inc was acquired in 1998. 
Another American company Advanced Vision Science Inc, which 
manufactures ophthalmic medical devices was bought in 2001. This unit has 
also strong competences in research and development of intraocular lenses. 
A Korean affiliate was established in 2000. (http://www.santen.co.jp) 
Nowadays Santen Ltd has three modern manufacturing plants in Japan and a 
modern R&D centre in Nara, also in Japan. The corporation headquarters is 
located in Osaka, Japan. Currently corporation employs approximately 2100 
employees. (http://www.santen.co.jp.) 
History of Santen Oy  
Oy Star Ab was established in 1922. It was decoupled from Tampereen 
Rohdoskauppa Oy, which was established in 1895. The main motive for this 
split was to segregate manufacturing from wholesale operations. The former 
laboratory of Tampereen Rohdoskauppa Oy became a medicine factory – 
Oy Star Ab. The main products in the early years of the company were 
Lacro pastilles and Hota powder. The Lacro pastilles’ reputation as 
medicine was disputable as they were regarded more as pastilles for cough. 
Hota powder, on the other hand, was a painkiller. These products kept 
company alive in many critical economical situations over the years. Oy 
Star Ab survived from economical depression in 1930s and 1940s World 
War II mainly because of good management skills and cutting down its 
unprofitable products. (Wilkman, 1972.) 
In 1950s the company could finally concentrate on medicine manufacturing. 
Work in a modern medicine factory with new methods could begin. During 
this period international co-operation was strengthened and systematic R&D 
work started. The recruitment of the first research manager enhanced 
research work. Increased competition, rapid development of pharmaceutical 
technology and marketing forced the company to act quickly in the 1960s.  
Heavy investments in international operations and R&D continued 
throughout whole decade. The first ophthalmic product was put into 
production in 1964. In the 1970s further changes were made in production. 
The share of eye care products, tablets and ointments increased. 
Concentration in pharmaceuticals started in 1970’s, Oy Star Ab was 
exceptional in the Finnish pharmaceutical sector as it was able to 
concentrate on ophthalmic medicines as early as 1970’s. This was possible 
mainly because of profitable exports to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union 
markets were large and exports flourished. The money gained could be used 
for R&D. (Wilkman, 1972; http://www.santen.fi.) 
Oy Star Ab became the only Finish medicine manufacturer concentrating in 
ophthalmics in the 1980s. Other Finnish pharmaceutical companies, such as 
Orion, left the ophthalmic business in favour of Oy Star Ab while Oy Star 
Ab gave up its antibiotics business. Oftan eye drops constituted 78 percent 
of company’s export. Oy Star Ab was originally part of Tampereen 
Rohdoskauppayhtiö, which changed its name into Tamro Oy in 1971 in the 
merger with one of its competitors Oy Aurum-Pharmakon Ab. Tamro Oy 
withdrew from pharmaceutical production in 1987 that lead to selling of 
pharmaceutical plants, including Oy Star Ab, to Huhtamäki Oy. Oy Star Ab 
became an ophthalmic unit of Leiras Oy which was responsible of 
Huhtamäki corporation’s pharmaceutical operations. (http://www.santen.fi; 
http://www.tamro.fi.) 
Santen Oy was established in 1997 when leading Japanese ophthalmics 
company, Santen Ltd acquired ophthalmic unit of Leiras Oy. However, the 
conglomerate Huhtamäki Oy wanted to concentrate on packaging and 
confectionery and divested its other operations in 1996, among these were 
pharmaceuticals. Schering AG who concentrates on hormonal medicines 
bought Leiras Oy but was not interested in its ophthalmics unit, former Oy 
Star Ab. So the ophthalmic unit was kept separate from Schering AG deal. 
The acquisition of ophthalmic unit was completed in 1997, and Oy Star Ab 
had become Santen Oy.  
Today Santen Oy manufactures products to European and American 
markets, and is leading ophthalmics manufacturer in the Nordic countries. 
Company’s aim is to become leading company in ophthalmic 
pharmaceuticals in Europe. (http://www.santen.fi.) 
Reasons for takeover 
One of the main motives for Santen Ltd to acquire former Oy Star Ab was 
its desire to access European markets. The Russian markets seemed 
especially enticing to the Japanese parent company. Santen Ltd wished to 
expand to overseas markets at that time and sought partners from Europe. 
The ophthalmic unit of Leiras Oy exported to many European markets and 
offered ready-made channels for Santen Ltd.  
The ophthalmic sector is quite small, as only a few companies operate in the 
field, and even smaller number of them was on sale at the time. The timing 
of the takeover was convenient for both sides. Huhtamäki’s divestment of 
pharmaceuticals and leaving ophthalmic unit of Leiras outside the deal of 
Schering AG fit well with Santen Ltd’s plans to acquire an European 
ophthalmic company.  
Finland’s EU membership in 1995 played a minor role in the acquisition. 
The societal issues coming among participation to EU such as predictable 
taxation had an influence on Santen Ltd’s decision to seek partners from EU 
member countries (Tampereen Kauppakamarilehti, 2002). 
As stated by vice president of R&D operations at Santen, the companies had 
had contacts in the form of collaborative projects in the early 1990s, before 
takeover.  This meant that the two companies were not completely 
unfamiliar with each other. The Japanese colleagues were assured of Finnish 
counterparts’ abilities and competencies. The former Oy Star Ab’s 
competence and know-how in R&D combined with knowledge on exporting 
attracted the Japanese multinational. As vice president of R&D operations 
points it, “…at the time of acquisition Oy Star Ab already had some FDA 
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 approved medicines which allowed their marketing on large US market”. 
This naturally attracted the Japanese counterparts as they were at that time 
at the beginning of their internationalisation operations. The former Oy Star 
Ab’s know-how was acknowledged also by other potential bidders, other 
non-European companies were interested in acquiring ophthalmic unit of 
Leiras as well.  
Santen Ltd was seeking for pharmaceutical company that already operated 
in ophthalmics and additionally had facilities for production. The 
ophthalmic unit of Leiras fit well with Santen’s requirements and future 
plans, and the two companies had synergy benefits which ensured that the 
acquisition was handled in good spirit. According to the emeritus professor 
of pharmacology at the University of Helsinki the acquisition was managed 
more appropriately than some previous mergers in the field.  
Impacts of takeover within acquired firm 
Santen Oy’s current investments in R&D would not be possible without a 
solid parent company. The aim of the former Oy Star Ab was to become an 
international company when one of the largest ophthalmic manufacturers in 
the world offered internationalisation opportunities for the acquired Finnish 
company (Hildén, 2002: 8).  
The multinational parent company has provided resources to conduct R&D, 
i.e. enlarged facilities in Tampere, capital and know-how. The resources 
Santen Ltd can offer for its Finnish affiliate are well appreciated, according 
to interviewed managers of Santen Oy. Santen Oy’s resources have 
increased and made it possible conduct larger scale R&D projects than 
before.  
Nowadays Santen Oy exports to over 30 countries and has operations in 
many countries. Even though former Oy Star Ab had wide export markets 
before the takeover Santen Ltd has offered opportunities to further enlarge 
the foreign operations. Such wide foreign operations could hardly be 
possible without the help of its Japanese parent company. The degree of 
internationalisation has increased significantly.   
Regardless of how positive the acquisition is, difficulties are inevitable 
when two differing working cultures are to be unified. Santen Oy is trusted 
by its parent company and operates as an independent affiliate and head for 
European operations. Being part of a corporate group means that more 
significant decisions are approved by the headquarters in spite of the 
affiliate’s independence. Decision-making after the takeover has become 
stickier because of the distance and cultural factors, as was stated by the 
project director of Santen Oy. Contacts between units in different continents 
are mainly conducted with the help of video-conferencing, electronic mail 
and telephone. “Meetings in person are more irregular. However, trips to 
Japan are now and then  inevitable”, states the project director from Santen 
Oy.  
Santen Ltd established Global Project Teams to facilitate research and 
development between Santen’s units in various locations. Project 
management is constructed in a way that allows members from each 
continent to participate as well as differing regional requirements to be 
taken into consideration in the early stage of product development. The head 
of the global project team comes generally from Japan. Another benefit of 
this model is that it allows workers to get acquainted with the working 
habits of others and offers a platform for knowledge transfer. In the opinion 
of the project director of Santen Oy R&D becomes more effective when 
large project meetings are handled with only a few core project team 
members who operate as messengers between sub-teams and the global 
project management.  
In spite of the organisation of global project teams the exchange of workers 
is still unusual. Only a few employees are working elsehwere than in their 
home units. Cultural factors, such as language barriers, hinder exchange 
between Japanese and Finnish units. “Lack of employee exchange is a 
problem as it would offer good way for learning for Santen’s employees. It 
would enhance spill-overs of know-how to universities as well”, says a 
professor from the University of Kuopio. Organising global project teams 
has been the most significant change in operational mode. Some change in 
external co-operation can also be seen. Co-operation with universities has 
slightly increased mainly because change in universities’ way of action, they 
are more eagerly marketing their know-how and services to companies. 
Interviewed university professors see this as a common trend in all Finnish 
universities.    
Nowadays basic research is largely done in Japan where new research center 
provides excellent facilities. The role of research has changed at Santen Oy. 
Before the acquisition basic research was conducted in Tampere, now this 
unit concentrates more on product development as stated by project director 
of Santen Oy. However some basic research is still conducted in Finland 
and its volume has stayed somewhat unchanged compared to the period 
prior to acquisition. Currently Santen Oy employs around 10 people in basic 
research. Because of the change in basic research the patenting is mainly 
done in Japan where most of the basic research is conducted.  
Compared to role of basic research large part of corporation’s clinical 
testing is carried out in Santen Oy. Professor from Univesity of Kuopio 
believes this phenomenon is partly due to a overall trend of pharmaceutical 
companies’ concentrating on certain operations. Clinical testing must be 
maintained in companies whereas know-how for basic research can easily 
be found from external sources, such as from universities. Research has 
decreased in Santen Oy because of its Japanese parent company’s 
investments in new research center in Japan. On the other hand, Santen Oy 
concentrates more on product development and clinical testing. 
Nevertheless number of employees working in R&D has doubled at Santen 
Oy since takeover, currently employing around 80 people.  
Santen Oy exported to various countries in Europe as well as outside Europe 
prior the takeover. Wide exporting channels allured Santen Ltd as it wished 
to expand European markets.  Santen Oy manufactures products to 
European and American markets like it did before the acquisition. The 
takeover opened the way to Asian markets which are, however, taken care 
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 of by parent company and affiliates located in Japan. As the vice president 
for R&D of Santen explains, an approval from local authorities is needed for 
marketing of pharmaceuticals. Therefore products developed for European 
and American markets may not be sold in Asian markets. Santen Oy’s 
primary markets can be found in the Scandinavian countries. The company 
produces over 40 ophthalmic medicines, and has around 260 sales permits 
in Europe. At the time of acquisition Santen Ltd did not have any of its own 
products on the European markets which prevented conflicting interests as 
regards the product portfolio.  
Being part of multinational company provides opportunities for smaller 
companies. Even though Santen as a name is less known in Finland than Oy 
Star Ab was, it has value in international markets. The ophthalmic industry 
is relatively concentrated in where Santen Ltd is among the largest 
operators. Representatives of Santen Oy see belonging to multinational 
organisation positive; it will bring visibility to affiliate rather than being 
small independent international company. 
Impacts of the takeover in the surrounding innovation 
environment 
Innovation relies more on intra-corporate resources than contancts with 
partners from the outside. Santen Oy evaluates projects more carefully now 
than prior to the acquisition – according to a professor from University of 
Kuopio. Not all projects are implemented, and both global and local projects 
have to be approved in Japan.  
Project practices have changed as a project director of Santen explains, 
“projects are now approved on a basis of estimates of time, markets shares, 
sales, costs and other relevant issues. Evaluation is made more carefully”. 
Co-operation with universities has been strong in Santen Oy prior to the 
takeover. The level of co-operation with universities has not changed 
significantly after the acquisition. University projects are still considered 
important, but as basic research in Santen Oy is largely carried out by its 
parent company some change may be perceived. In addition Santen Oy 
increasingly utilises services of contract laboratories. Externalisation has 
become common in business because of tightened competition, and 
pharmaceutical industry does not provide an exception. Specialised know-
how and expertise are commonly searched from external sources.  
At Santen Oy the importance of co-operation with various operators in the 
innovation environment has been acknowledged. However, concerns 
regarding the need for more intensive co-operation have been raised.  
The peculiarities of Finnish innovation system are not yet completely 
understood in the company headquarters. This hinders participation in co-
projects with different institutions. The co-operation with contract 
laboratories has increased somewhat after the acquisition. According to 
project director of Santen Oy, the need of specified technology or know-
how in certain projects drives the company to seek external resources but 
after first evaluating internal resources in different continents. 
Conclusions 
The overall impression of the acquisition is very positive. It seems that both 
companies have benefited from the acquisition. Santen Oy’s resources have 
increased significantly as has its degree of internationalisation. Santen Ltd 
has, on the other hand, gained foothold in Europe.  
Unifying two distinct cultures entails challenges that have to be overcome 
for the companies to build one common organisational culture. Finnish and 
Japanese cultures are very dissimilar. Still, at the same time similarities have 
helped these two companies to find a way to successfully work together. 
However, the unification process is long and demanding and many obstacles 
are still to be overcome.  
Increased clinical testing in Finland will naturally require a workforce that 
can conduct clinical testing. However, recruiting competent employees has 
proved to be difficult at the moment.  
Another challenge for the future is generic substitution which was 
introduced only one year ago. Even though the interviewees did not see this 
issue as a large problem it still does have an effect on every pharmaceutical 
company. Some concern has been raised on level of quality on medicines 
since the new law puts emphasis on price. It has been argued that level of 
R&D in pharmaceutical business is in danger to decrease if companies are 
forced to concentrate only on price issues in the development.  
Taking a full advantage of multinational company’s employees’ know-how 
means that employee exchange should be more a tradition than an 
exception. Being part of multinational company has offered opportunities 
for Santen Oy, when cultural factors such as language problems has been 
overcame offered opportunities may be fulfilled even more successfully.  
Co-operation modes could be even stronger between universities and Santen 
Oy as the firm has access to strong international network of know-how 
through its parent company. Contacts with different participants in the 
network of ophthalmics should be further enhanced. Santen Oy has already 
provided valuable knowledge for Finnish operators in ophthalmic sector. 
Ophthalmic industry is a small niche market with few multinational 
companies in where competence would be gained by building a strong 
network, which then would increase knowledge in ophthalmics among 
Finnish operators. 
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Company cases Iceland 
By Elva Brá Aðalsteinsdóttir  
The main features of the Icelandic economy 
The economic and political situation since 1990 
Since Iceland became a republic in 1944 there have been both periods of 
economic growth and recession in the country, depending on the market 
value of the island’s main export, namely fish-products (Jón Ingvar Kjaran, 
2004).  High inflation rates and the unstable currency have made the 
economic situation of Icelandic small and medium sized firms insecure and 
reduced their competitive advantage somewhat (Jón Ingvar Kjaran, 2004).   
In the early 1990´s the situation changed dramatically (Jón Ingvar Kjaran, 
2004).  The nation was hit by an economic recession which was mainly due 
to political and economic changes in Eastern Europe (Magnús S. 
Magnússon, 1993).  Unemployment increased and many companies suffered 
financially.  In order to cope with the situation, trade unions, employers and 
the government made a settlement.  It was symbolically called the National-
consensus agreement.  It included collective agreements on wages, as well 
as agreements on general welfare issues such as the cost of food and 
housing (Árelía Eydís Guðmundsdóttir, 2003).   
This agreement can to some extent be compared to the Swedish Saltsjöbads-
agreement (Gylfi Dalmann Aðalsteinsson, personal communication, 13. 
February 2001).  After the Saltsjöbads-agreement had been made in 1938, a 
period of stability in employment relations followed with a great reduction 
in conflict between the main actors.  This was also the case in Iceland (Gylfi 
Dalmann Aðalsteinsson, personal communication, 13. February 2001).  
What is more, for the first time inflation lowered and became similar to the 
inflation rates in the other western countries (OECD, 1995).  The National-
consensus agreement provided the favourable economic conditions which 
were needed for growth and innovation to evolve; it also created 
opportunities for start-up companies. 
Economic liberalisation  
Today, Iceland is a member of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA), but 
not a member of the European Union (EU).  But through membership in the 
European Economic Area (EEA), Iceland maintains close economic ties to 
the EU.   
Iceland joined the EEA in the 1994. What followed was a more open 
economy, altered laws and regulations regarding the financial market, as 
well as regulations regarding the labour and service market (Jón Ingvar 
Kjaran, 2004).  In the 1990’s accessibility to foreign capital and loans 
became easier, and limitations on ownership or transfer of foreign currency 
were abolished.  In 1985, The Iceland Stock Exchange (ICEX) was 
established.  Export and import restriction were also reduced and Icelandic 
companies could now establish themselves on foreign markets, both within 
the EEA and in other economic areas (Helgi Skúli Kjartansson, 2002).   
Today, Iceland adheres to OECD codes dealing with the movement of 
capital, and is party to various bilateral, multilateral and international 
agreements relating to movement of capital and foreign direct investment 
(Jón Ingvar Kjaran, 2004).  With very few exceptions, foreign direct 
investment in Iceland is not subject to limitation.  The same applies to the 
movement of capital.   Foreign investment in Iceland has shown a large 
upswing in the last few years, largely because foreign investors have been 
sought in IT, software and biotechnology to diversify the economy away 
from fishing (www.uktradeinvest.gov.uk).  
The labour market 
Iceland’s labour force numbers about 160.000.  This is a somewhat flexible 
labour market in comparison to other European countries.  The relatively 
high employment mobility and lean employment regulations have in many 
ways been stimulated by rather low unemployment rates in Iceland; from 
1980 to 2000 the rates were on average around 1 to 2,5% (Birgir Ísl. 
Gunnarsson, 2004).   
As well as benefiting from a flexible labour market, companies that rely on 
export benefit from operating in a labour market that has a well-educated, 
English-speaking workforce. As a result, high-tech companies have had a 
large supply of educated workers and only during periods of an economic 
boom been forced to hire computer specialists from abroad. 
Research and development work in Iceland 
During the past decade, there has been a remarkable increase in expenditure 
on research and development work (Prime Minister’s Office, 2004).  
Icelander’s spent 3% (€ 250 million) of their gross domestic product on 
research and development undertakings in 2001, compared to 1.1% in 1990.  
Thus, in 2001 Iceland reached the goal which the European Union had set 
itself by 2010.  Today, Iceland is ranked 4th among OECD countries for the 
R&D/GDP ratio.  Commercial companies spend about € 150 million on 
R&D.  This constitutes about 60% of Iceland’s total expenditure on R&D 
(Rannís, 2003).   
Between 1999 and 2001 expenditure on R&D increased by about 40%, a 
unique figure among countries in the OECD.  By far the largest increase, 
just under 80% was among commercial companies, especially new 
companies in emerging branches of industry with a heavy basis in R&D. 
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 The ICT industry in Iceland 
The Information and Communication Technology sector (ICT sector) has 
been a focal point for economic and social development in Iceland, as in 
most developed countries (Invest in Iceland Agency, 2004).  This can be 
seen for instance in the growth in the number of jobs and turnover in the 
ICT sector and the entrepreneurship that are characteristic features of 
Iceland today. 
Iceland has a large-scale infrastructure well suited to the new technological 
requirements of enterprises.  This infrastructure has served as a major 
support for the fast growth in the ICT industry and the adoption of technical 
solutions throughout the society.  Mobile phone penetration is among the 
highest in the world, as well as Internet penetration, over 85% of Iceland’s 
population has access to the Internet.   
Enormous development and investment have taken place in the 
telecommunications and telecom systems in recent years, partly as a result 
of deregulation and competition in the sector.  The government has also 
undertaken initiatives to encourage market penetration by foreign players, 
passing legislation to ensure nationwide access to state-of-the-art 
telecommunication services.   
The legal environment has been substantially deregulated, so that Icelandic 
legislation on telecommunications is now fully compatible with that in the 
EU and is based on current telecommunications directives in the European 
Economic Area.   
Recent trends 
The Icelandic ICT sector is undergoing rapid development (Invest in Iceland 
Agency, 2004).  Innovative solutions have been developed and many have 
achieved success in international markets.  Nevertheless, a downturn hit the 
Icelandic market in 2000, as elsewhere in the Western world, and this 
difficult situation has been challenging for the ICT sector.  Mergers and 
acquisitions have been common, and some companies, not managing to 
survive the recession, have gone bankrupt.  Investors and founders of 
companies have responded to the difficult market by merging companies in 
order to build stronger units that are better equipped to expand and serve 
foreign markets as well as the Icelandic market.   
Employment 
There has been a rapid growth of jobs in the ICT industry in Iceland (Invest 
in Iceland Agency, 2004).  The number of people employed in the industry 
doubled from 1991 to 2001, with the highest number in 2000, when activity 
within the industry peaked.   
The ICT industry is divided into four main sectors: Manufacturing, 
Wholesale, Telecommunications, and Software & Consulting.  Software 
development and consulting is the most important field in the ICT sector, 
with growth in employment being the highest there.  There are round 140 
ICT companies in Iceland and the number of jobs in the sector is just under 
5000, 45% of which are employed in software development.  In 2002, there 
were 2.176 jobs in the software industry.  This means that the numbers of 
jobs in the sector has decreased, since in 2001 the jobs were 2.693 
(www.si.is).   There were 4.852 jobs in the information technology sector in 
2002, which means that there are fewer jobs in this sector; in 2001 the IT 
sector comprised of 5.483 jobs. 
People working in ICT-consultancy services are fairly young; nearly 60% 
are 35 or younger.  Women account for 30% of the workforce in ICT 
services and 40% in telecommunications. 
Education 
Through the growth of the ICT sector in the last decade, the demand for 
quality staff has increased (Invest in Iceland Agency, 2004).  In order to 
meet this growing demand, the education system and various institutions 
have opened up new fields that are of particular value to ICT.  Between 180 
and 220 students graduate annually from Icelandic universities with a 
degree or diploma in computer sciences or software engineering.   
Turnover 
Turnover in the ICT sector has grown in recent years (Invest in Iceland 
Agency, 2004).  Turnover doubled from 1995 to 2001, increasing from USD 
440 million in 1995 to USD 887 million in 2001, but went down slightly in 
2002.  In the software industry, turnover amounted to ISK 20 milliard in 
2002 and in the information technology industry it was approximately ISK 
64 milliard that same year. 
Export 
There has been a strong tendency in Iceland to seek out opportunities abroad 
(Invest in Iceland Agency, 2004).  The value of exported Software & 
Consulting services has grown rapidly over the last decade.  Software 
exports from Iceland amounted to ISK 3.732 million in 2003, an increase of 
ISK 324 million, or 9.5% from the previous year, measured at constant 
prices32.  Software accounted for 1.3% of Iceland’s total foreign currency 
earnings in 2003, which is marginally higher than the previous year’s share 
of 1.2%.   
The main market region for Icelandic software is Europe (Central Bank of 
Iceland, 2004).  Europe’s share has been growing at the expense of the US 
in recent years.  Last year, Europe accounted for more than 69% of total 
Icelandic software products.   
                                                 
32 Calculated at fixed prices based on the average exchange rate. 
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 Almost 74% of exports of software and computer services in 2003 were 
accounted for by sales of standard and custom software (Central Bank of 
Iceland, 2004).  Sales were equally divided between standard and custom 
software.  This is a considerable turnaround from the year before, when 
software accounted for almost 84% of exports by this sector, divided 
between 56% standard and 44% custom. 
Iceland’s exports of software and computer services were 0.09% of the 
OECD total, and equivalent to 0.13% of total EU exports. 
Funding and investors 
The number of venture capitalists focusing on ICT has decreased somewhat 
in the last two years following mergers in this field (Invest in Iceland 
Agency, 2004).  Among internationally known companies owning Icelandic 
operations in ICT are Microsoft Corp. (in Navision) and Eastman Kodak (in 
Computer Knowledge). 
The Icelandic software case: The Eastman Kodak 
takeover of Computer Knowledge Inc. 
Multinationals have been researched considerably in recent years and the 
central topic in this research includes the difference between multinational 
corporations originating in different countries (Lovio, 2003), as well as 
relations between multinational corporations and local companies and 
business units.  In Finnish studies, for example, the focus has either been on 
studying the acquired companies’ success in terms of growth, profitability 
and the development of R&D investments.  The other focus has been on 
studying the impact of foreign ownership on management, in terms of 
business strategy, corporate governance and the diversity of business areas 
(Lovio, 2003).   
Very few Icelandic studies have been done on the effects of foreign 
acquisitions, whether the focus is on the acquired firms’ success or on 
management.  Moreover, almost none have been done on the effects of 
foreign acquisitions from the business unit perspective.  This case will not 
only be analysed from this perspective but more specifically an attempt will 
be made to analyse the effects of the acquisition on the innovation 
capabilities of the acquired firm.  As such, this study will add to the 
available literature on foreign takeovers in Iceland.  The case is based on an 
interview with one of the former owners of Computer Knowledge Inc., as 
well as available material from annual reports and the media. 
The paper is organised as follows:  First, a basic description is given of the 
Computer Knowledge, Inc. (hereafter CKI) case by touching on the firm’s 
history as well as by giving some insight into the operations of the parent 
company, Eastman Kodak Company (hereafter Kodak).  Secondly, reasons 
for the takeover will be explained, both from the perspective of the parent 
company and that of the former owners.  Thirdly, an attempt will be made to 
analyse the impact of the takeover within the acquired firm, as well as on 
the surrounding environment.  The section that follows will describe the 
takeover process.  Also, the Icelandic innovation policy will be discussed 
from the perspective of one of the former CKI owners.  In the final section, 
some conclusions will be drawn. 
The Computer Knowledge Inc. case 
Computer Knowledge Inc. is a medical software company which specialises 
in administrative systems for the high technology hospital departments.  The 
system, which has been given the name RIS 2010, is more specifically a 
Radiology Information System which is used for information processing in 
radiology departments.  It is a complete and modern information system that 
enables health-care facilities to electronically produce, route and maintain 
patient records, requests for procedures and other key documents. 
The company was founded in 1983 by Professor Oddur Benediktsson, 
mainly as a result of a program created by the Nordic Council of Ministers.  
The objective was that the Nordic countries were at the forefront in cancer 
research and therapy.  The Icelandic group was allocated the task of creating 
a registration system for various therapeutical procedures.  One of the main 
objectives in the Council’s program was that companies were to be founded 
based on the new products that research teams in the Nordic countries 
developed.  Thus, Professor Benediktsson founded the company based on 
the new registration system he had developed with his team.   
In 1985 the focus was shifted towards software purposely designed for 
radiology departments.  In 1992 the company was sold to the CKI 
employees.  Three of them then owned 90% of the joint stock, while the 
other two owned 5% each.  Lastly in 2000, Kodak proposed a takeover.  The 
contract stated that Kodak would purchase all joint-stock but that CKI’s 
management would be in charge of all operations within the company.  
Today, CKI is a development centre within Kodak’s Health Imaging 
Division.  Other similar centres are situated in Canada, the US, and in Israel.  
The Health Imaging division formed a new business segment in order to 
expand its participation in the medical imaging-information field.  The unit, 
dubbed “PaRis”, combined CKI with Health Imaging’s Picture Archiving 
and Communications System (PACS) business.   
To be more precise, PaRis combines CKI and Health Imaging’s wholly 
owned PACS subsidiary, Cemax-Icon in California, into a single unit within 
Health Imaging’s framework of regional and functional organisations. 
PaRis integrates imaging-information systems that incorporates CKI’s RIS 
offerings (medical information-management systems) with Kodak Picture 
Archiving and Communication Systems (medical imaging-management 
systems) produced by Cemax-Icon.   
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 Eastman Kodak Company  
Early years 
In 1879, London was the centre of the photographic and business world and 
George Eastman went there to obtain a patent on his plate-coating machine 
(www.kodak.com).  An American patent was granted the following year.   
In 1880, he began the commercial manufacture of dry plates.  The success 
of this venture so impressed business man Henry A. Strong, that he 
consequently invested some money in the infant concern. 
On January 1, 1881, Eastman and Strong formed a partnership called the 
Eastman Dry Plate Company.  Late that year, Eastman resigned from his 
position at the Rochester Savings Bank to devote all his time to the new 
company and its business.  While actively managing all phases of the firm’s 
activities, he continued research in an effort to simplify photography.   
In 1883, Eastman startled the trade with the announcement of film in rolls, 
with the roll holder adaptable to nearly every plate camera on the market. 
With the KODAK camera in 1888, he put down the foundation for making 
photography available to everyone. 
In 1884, the Eastman-Strong partnership had given way to a new firm, the 
Eastman Dry Plate and Film Company, with 14 shareowners. A successive 
concern, the Eastman Company, was formed in 1889. 
The company has been called Eastman Kodak Company since 1892, when 
Eastman Kodak Company of New York was organized. In 1901, the present 
firm, Eastman Kodak Company of New Jersey, was formed under the laws 
of that state. 
Eastman built his business on four basic principles; mass production at low 
cost, international distribution, extensive advertising and a focus on the 
customer.  He saw all four as being closely related.  Mass production could 
not be justified without wide distribution. Distribution, in turn, needed the 
support of strong advertising.  From the beginning, he imbued the company 
with the conviction that fulfilling customer needs and desires is the only 
road to corporate success. 
To his basic principles of business, he added these policies; foster growth 
and development through continuing research, treat employees in a fair, 
self-respecting way, and reinvest profits to build and extend the business.   
Kodak's history is one of progress in developing these basic principles and 
policies. 
World distribution 
By the time Eastman launched his dry plate business in 1880, European 
interest in photography was keen, but its practice was mostly limited to 
professionals (www.kodak.com). 
Eastman recognized the potential of the world market for amateur 
photographers. Only five years after the Eastman Dry Plate and Film 
Company was established in the U.S., a sales office was opened in London. 
Within the next few years, particularly after the introduction of the KODAK 
camera and Eastman's simplified methods, picture-taking became popular 
with hundreds of thousands of amateurs. 
In 1889, the Eastman Photographic Materials Company, Limited was 
incorporated in London, England, to handle distribution of Kodak products 
in countries outside the U.S. At first, all goods were manufactured in 
Rochester. Before long, the combined international and domestic demand 
outpaced plant resources. 
Construction of a factory in Harrow, England, just outside London, was 
completed in 1891. By 1900, distribution outlets had been established in 
France, Germany, Italy, and other European countries. A Japanese outlet 
was under consideration, and construction of a factory in Canada was 
underway with the organization of Canadian Kodak Company, Limited. 
Today, Kodak has manufacturing operations in Australia, Brazil, Canada, 
China, France, India, Mexico, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the U.S. 
and Kodak products are available in virtually every country across the 
globe. 
Health Imaging at Kodak 
Eastman Kodak Company’s role in health imaging can be traced back to the 
birth of diagnostic imaging technology with the discovery of the x-ray in 
November of 1895 by Wilhelm C. Roentgen (www.kodak.com).  Less than 
a year later in 1896, George Eastman’s company introduced the first capture 
medium, a photographic paper, designed expressly for x-ray purposes.   
In 1914, Kodak employed two radiography experts to solve customer’s 
technical problems.  By 1929, the technical staff had increased to 26.  In 
1996, the unit, that serves the health imaging customer, became the Health 
Imaging Division.  In 2001, Health Imaging became one of three business 
groups formed by realignment within Eastman Kodak Company.   
Today, Kodak’s Health Imaging Group is a world leader in developing, 
manufacturing and marketing intelligent imaging products from analog to 
digital and providing innovative medical-imaging services, including those 
to assist customers with interoperability and other needs.  Its product 
portfolio includes computed radiography (CR) and digital radiography (DR) 
systems, laser imagers, picture archiving and communications systems 
(PACS), radiology information systems (RIS), traditional mammography 
systems and various other products.   
The group’s 2003 revenues were USD 2.43 billion. 
30 
 Reasons for takeover  
From Eastman Kodak’s perspective 
CKI’s acquisition cemented the relationship it had had with Health Imaging 
(HI) since 1993.  HI had served as the exclusive distributor of CKI’s RIS 
2010 and had begun to integrate Kodak PACS offerings with the RIS 2010 
to create image-information management systems for hospitals and other 
health-care facilities.  While these efforts had been focused within Europe, 
PaRis was to be used for global expansion.   
Hence, the decision to acquire CKI was a strategic one, in other words, CKI 
was strategically important to Kodak.  RIS 2010 had become a critical 
component for their product line and acquiring the company meant that 
Kodak gained access to the radiology information market.  It also provided 
them with an opportunity to closely observe opportunities in the broader 
health-care information arena.   
In short, Kodak acquired CKI to acquire a new product that complimented 
its previous product range and by doing so it was able to access a new 
product market and improve its position in the international market. 
Last but not least, it had become necessary for Kodak to gain control over 
the copyright of the product.  CKI had developed a product that exceeded 
other similar products on the market and Kodak wanted to ensure that they 
were one step ahead of their competitors. 
From the former owners’ perspective 
The reason behind the decision of the Icelandic owners to sell was twofold.  
First of all, 90% of CKI’s revenue had been the direct result of collaborating 
with Kodak.  That is, until then CKI had almost entirely been doing business 
with Kodak.  Thus, when Kodak proposed that they would take over the 
firm, the owners felt some pressure.  Kodak had the power to back out of 
agreements to collaborate and shift their focus to other comparable 
companies.  Moreover, as will be explained later, the Icelandic market was 
not responding to the new product and for the company to be able to 
continue to operate if needed to shift its focus to markets overseas.  Kodak 
was CKI’s key to the international market.  
However, the bargaining power was not entirely in the hands of Kodak.  The 
Icelandic owners realised that they had created a product, based on years of 
R&D, which exceeded the products of their competitors.  Furthermore, the 
employees, which at that point were only five, had developed skills and 
knowledge that had become very valuable.  The former owners therefore 
felt confident that they had a strong bargaining position. 
A contract was made that stated that Kodak would purchase all the shares, 
and by doing that, Kodak gained total control over the company.  The 
contract stated that the former owners would receive payments gradually 
until 21. September 2004, at that point in time, they were to receive the final 
payment.  The contract also stated that the operations of the company would 
remain unchanged until 21. September 2004.  This second part of the 
contract meant that the employees were prepared to stay with the company 
and remain its employees for the next four years.   
This was seen as a win-win situation since the employees were ensured the 
same governance for the next four years and the company kept the key 
personnel, who were vital for the continued development of the product.  
After all, the capabilities of the company are inside the heads of its current 
employees.   
In September 2004, the company and the employees had to decide if the 
arrangement was to be kept for another period.  Before the contract ran out 
one of the former owners said that; “the feeling is that Kodak will want to 
keep this arrangement and that the employees will want to stay with CKI for 
quite some time” (our translation).  As of yet, no drastic changes have been 
made at CKI and the company operates in a similar fashion. 
Impacts of takeover within acquired firm 
Human resources and turnover 
The key personnel have stayed with the company in accordance with the 
requirements specified in the contract.  CKI had five employees before the 
takeover and has hired two employees since.  The three former owners are 
now employees at CKI. 
The net profit in 2002 was ISK 5, 2 million (€ 59.565).   
Corporate governance and management culture 
As the contract went, CKI management and leadership stayed the same.  As 
a result, the CKI organisational culture did not alter.  In that sense the 
employees did not experience any major changes.  
Nevertheless, the managers at CKI have experienced some differences 
between the Anglo-Saxon and Nordic business management culture.  For 
example, demands for business performance and reporting requirements 
have grown.  Also, investment and personnel plans need to be very well 
justified.  In short, it has been important to prove the profitability and to 
ensure the availability of any other statistics required by headquarters. 
The most noticeable difference in the management culture is in the method 
of communication.  The Kodak company structure is hierarchic and the 
relations within the structure are formal.  CKI has to communicate more 
frequently with Kodak and give more detailed information than it did before 
the takeover.  It should however be pointed out that the different 
management styles have not led to conflicts and the managers at CKI have 
remained fairly autonomous.  Their autonomy is very much facilitated by 
two factors; CKI is geographically far away from the corporate headquarters 
and the unit has been performing well as a business unit. 
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 Access to resources 
Access to resources, such as marketing channels, has improved 
considerably.  With regard to financial resources, it is important to note that 
Kodak is a company that very much adheres to its strategic planning.  Since 
CKI became Kodak’s subsidiary, access to financial resources is ensured, 
but all CKI’s actions (e.g. when hiring personnel) have to be justified and 
rationalised. 
Knowledge interaction 
As has been mentioned before, Kodak bought CKI solely because of its 
developmental capabilities.  It was a strategic decision to buy the company 
and have it based in Iceland.  What is more, Kodak did not have a choice 
when it came to the location, since the former owners were only willing to 
sell their shares if Kodak agreed to the location.    Since the time of the 
takeover, Kodak has put various procedures in place to ensure that the 
knowledge that resides in Iceland spreads to other development centres.  By 
doing this Kodak has ensured that the company will not be affected if 
anything negative happens with regard to the operations of one of its 
development centres, in this case CKI.   
CKI now collaborates with a Canadian development centre which is 
developing the American version of RIS 2010.  CKI is in charge of this 
process.  This entails mutual visits between Reykjavik, Iceland and Canada 
as well as exchanges of documents that have to do with the project.  In 
addition some CKI employees visit the Kodak headquarters regularly.  
Impacts of takeover on innovation 
The EU defines innovation as new products and processes or significant 
improvements in products and processes.  A technological product and 
process innovation (TPP innovation) has been implemented if it has been 
introduced to the market (product innovation) or used within a production 
process (process innovation).  TPP innovations involve a series of scientific, 
technological, organisational, financial and commercial activities (Eurostat, 
2004).   
It can be safely said that the takeover has not altered CKI’s product 
innovation in a negative way.  After the takeover, the RIS 2010 product was 
introduced to a new market which basically means that product innovation 
has occurred to a greater extent at CKI. 
It is interesting to note that whilst the takeover has improved the product 
innovation within CKI, the process leading up to innovation has changed 
considerably.  This will be explained in the next chapter. 
Patenting 
CKI has never used patenting to protect its system.  The system itself has 
copy protection built in it which means that it cannot be manipulated.  Also, 
the company has protected itself, so to speak, by continuing to develop the 
system based on the foresight of its employees. 
Impacts of takeover on surrounding innovation environment  
The RIS 2010 product idea started out within an academic environment and 
in the Icelandic healthcare sector.  CKI had therefore, right from the 
beginning, close ties to the surrounding innovation environment.  When the 
collaboration with Kodak began in 1993, the national institutions lost all 
access to the system.  Today, all ideas that have to do with the development 
of the system come from abroad, either from Kodak’s customers or from 
their researchers.   
What happened was that once the system had been developed sufficiently to 
be sold, the institutions that gave considerable input in the beginning did not 
have the budget to purchase the system.  Also, other institutions which had 
some form of an information system were not given any financial resources 
to purchase this new system.  Hence CKI had to search for prospective 
buyers abroad to be able to continue operating.  This is when Kodak entered 
the scene.   
It can not be argued that the takeover per se had negative effects on the 
surrounding innovation environment.  One of the former owners maintains 
that the short-sightedness of the Icelandic government negatively affected 
the innovation environment.  According to him, the various institutions that 
had worked on developing the system from the beginning and provided the 
company with all the resources it needed to be innovative were not able to 
access the system because the government was not prepared to purchase the 
system when it was still being developed.  Thus, the institutions lost the 
access that they had had to the system.  In other words, the researchers and 
developers who worked hard in the beginning to develop the system are not 
able to reap from what they sowed.   
Some would argue that CKI also suffered after their ties to the surrounding 
environment were severed.  CKI could now no longer rely on feedback from 
the researchers or the potential users of the system in Iceland.  In other 
words, both CKI and the surrounding environment lost valuable contacts. 
One of the former CKI owners points out that it could be argued that the 
takeover had some positive impacts on the innovation environment in 
Iceland.  Some of the former CKI owners reinvested in small start-up 
companies in Iceland, following the Kodak takeover, and by doing so they 
reinforced the environment that these companies survive in.  The ICT 
industry in Iceland needs more venture-capital and this takeover gave a 
financial boost to the industry to some extent.  One of CKI’s former owners 
maintains that those individuals who have profited from their ICT business 
are generally willing to handover some venture-capital to other new start-up 
companies.  This is because they have gained considerable experience in 
turning these small companies into profitable entities. 
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 The takeover process 
The takeover process itself was a learning experience for the CKI owners.  
In hindsight they realise that they were somewhat unrealistic in their 
demands.  This however turned out to be something that helped CKI; by 
putting a relatively high price-tag on the company, they were able to place 
the company in an international context.   
One of the former owners points out that Icelanders often lack the necessary 
technique to negotiate with foreign companies.  Besides not having the 
experience and technique, they often become impatient and lack the stamina 
to finish the whole negation process.  The CKI owners on the other hand did 
finish the process, mainly because they had such a firm belief in their 
company and the product.  CKI had been turning a profit for quite some 
time and the owners realised they had a special product to offer.   
Experiences after the takeover 
At this point in time, it can safely be said that the takeover has only lead to 
positive outcomes for the CKI employees and former owners.  The CKI 
employees describe Kodak as a “reliable company”, since all obligations on 
Kodak’s behalf have been fulfilled.  According to one of the former owners 
at CKI, the top-managers at Kodak have been very satisfied with both the 
financial situation at CKI, as well as with the developmental progress of the 
RIS 2010 system.   
Kodak made the final payment to the former owners on September 21st 
2004.  The operation of CKI has not changed, and the company has not been 
relocated.   
The Icelandic innovation policy 
The government has to some extent created the conditions that are necessary 
for start-up companies to thrive.  From CKI’s point of view, there remains 
much to be done.  For the first part, companies such as CKI have had to face 
the fact that the governmental organisations, companies, various institutions 
and the general public seem to be more willing to buy foreign software, than 
Icelandic software. Some are even willing to pay three to eight times more 
for foreign products, when the Icelandic products are fully compatible, 
according to one of the CKI respondents. He gave the following example; 
“One of the largest hospitals in Iceland, bought RIS 2010 from Kodak in 
Denmark at a price that was five times higher than the price we had initially  
offered. We tried to get them to buy the system when it was still at the 
development stage, and that’s when we really needed the financial 
resources (our translation). 
Small companies such as CKI have been focusing on developing specialised 
products, rather than the standardised products, in order to be noticed and 
ultimately survive. The former CKI owner points out that if Icelanders are 
not prepared to purchase local products that are fully compatible with the 
foreign products, there is no financial basis for this kind of industry in the 
country. To put it simply, someone has to pay so that the developmental 
process can take place. 
The former CKI owner points out that the ICT industry would be grateful 
for small-scale governmental initiatives, something like providing 
Icelanders with Internet access, free of charge, would create a basis for 
companies in the ICT industry. Companies such as CKI often compare 
themselves to similar companies in the Nordic countries, and have seen that 
some governmental programs have supported the industry considerably. 
Conclusions 
Both Kodak and CKI have expressed their satisfaction with the situation as 
it is today.  One of the CKI respondents pointed out that Kodak’s innovative 
culture and company values were a perfect match with CKI’s culture, in 
other words, they two companies were culturally compatible.  This finding 
underpins the importance of the companies (i.e. the parent company and the 
acquisition target) having compatible cultures and capabilities, as well as 
compatible business strategies.   
The Kodak takeover of CKI was successful in many respects, mostly with 
regards to the product innovation that has been taking place at CKI.  Product 
innovation has continued in the company, mainly because Kodak provided 
the resources that CKI needed.   
Foreign ownership has primarily had a positive impact on the development 
of CKI, which is evidenced by the fact that the company has hired more 
people after the takeover.  Kodak has also been successful in building 
commitment to the new entity and confidence in the future which meant that 
the key employees were willing to renew their contract with the company 
after their initial contract ran out (i.e. 21. September 2004).  The employees 
have expressed that there is high morale at the workplace, and they have 
remained productive, both of which point to the success of the takeover. 
There are some risks that CKI has had to face after the takeover.  CKI now 
has a stronger link with the global economy than they did before, because 
they are now a part of a leading global company in their own line of 
business.  This link can however be seen as potentially weak since the new 
owners have no historical or national commitment to CKI.  The role of CKI 
is small in the context of their business as a whole, and Kodak does have 
similar developmental centres elsewhere in the world.  This basically means 
that CKI has to compete for their position within the parent company.  Thus, 
while the status of CKI has improved in terms of external market position, it 
has landed in competitive settings within the parent company.  This could 
mean that although CKI is beautifully matched with Kodak (i.e. with 
regards to resources and marketing channels), it faces higher risks if the 
commitment by the owners decreases.  Cost-cutting programs could 
seriously affect CKI. 
Overall, a lesson has to be learned, firms like CKI have to be nurtured from 
the beginning and supported.  Although the Icelandic environment has 
provided CKI with many of the necessary resources, such as well-educated 
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 employees, more could be done to help small start-up firms like CKI to 
survive.  The ICT industry faces problems because of tax issues.  In some 
cases, public organisations have chosen to establish departments within the 
institutions to carry out tasks that the independent, ICT businesses are 
designed to perform.  This is because value-added tax comes into play in 
these businesses.  The government could easily simplify the business 
environment and help these businesses grow by, for example, doing 
business with companies such as CKI, instead of establishing its own 
departments. 
It could be argued that in this case no “brain-drain” occurred since all the 
employees stayed in Iceland, but in another similar scenario the opposite 
could easily have happened, that is, the parent company could have 
relocated the business unit and the Icelandic ICT industry could have lost 
valuable talent.  Of course, “brain-drain” could easily happen later in this 
case. 
 
The Icelandic pharmaceutical case: deCODE genetics, Inc 
The pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry in Iceland 
Since the Icelandic government has promoted the development of the 
biotechnology industry, the sector has emerged as a second, significant 
high-tech industry, after IT/Software (www.iceland.org).  Iceland makes an 
ideal home for biotechnology research as the population is, genetically 
speaking, relatively homogeneous.  The country has a sophisticated, high-
quality healthcare system and extensive genealogical records.  Through 
these, resources can be generated to identify genes associated with a 
multitude of diseases.  Research based on this population provides insights 
into the pathogenesis of these diseases, and the depth and 
comprehensiveness of the Icelandic genealogical database are unrivalled 
worldwide.   
One of the country’s most promising hi-tech projects is the charting of the 
nation’s genetic material for the purpose of discovering the transmission by 
heredity of diseases and their related genetic material (www.decode.is).  The 
project is based both on genealogy and the fact that Icelanders have for 
centuries remained a rather isolated nation due to the country’s geographical 
position, causing rather limited mixing of the nation’s blood with other gene 
pools.   
It should also be mentioned that Iceland’s advantage in the field of 
biotechnology is related to nature and the country’s geographical position 
on the mid-Atlantic ridge, which is the reason for its wealth of hot springs 
and high-temperature areas, the habitat of thermophilic bacteria, which may 
be utilised for different industries, e.g. the pharmaceutical industry.   
The pharmaceutical industry is opening new export markets, mainly in 
Europe, for a variety of products.    
The history 
The pharmaceutical industry in Iceland was initiated in the nineteen thirties 
by Stefan Thorarinsson, Ltd, the first drug wholesaler, making medicament-
tablets for sale over the counter.   
The local pharmaceutical industry developed gradually over the next years.  
The Institute for Experimental Pathology was established 1948. One of its 
tasks was production and distribution of sera and its own vaccine against 
diseases of animals, especially sheep. The Department of Immunology has 
participated in vaccine development in later phase testing of patients groups. 
The Institute of Biology introduced biotechnology to the Icelandic society in 
the late seventies (Thorvald Finnbjörnsson, 2004).  In the mid-nineties a 
programme was initiated by the University of Iceland, Icetech and the 
Icelandic Fisheries Laboratories on intracellular enzymes from thermophile 
and psycrophile organisms.  This programme was financed by the Icelandic 
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 Research Council. The effort later continued as a part of a Nordic umbrella 
program initiated and financed by the Nordic Industrial Fund.  Considerable 
amounts of funding came into the country from this source, and other 
research funding was made available to the biotechnology sector. The 
success of entrepreneurs in the field encouraged others to go abroad to 
continue studying the subject.   
The real breakthrough came with the founding of two genome companies, 
deCODE genetics in 1996 and the Iceland Genomics Corporation (ICS) in 
1998, both basing their business ideas on the genealogical transparency of 
Icelanders (Thorvald Finnbjörnsson, 2004).  The pioneers of both 
companies were Icelandic professors working in the US.  The establishment 
of these companies created a need in Iceland for well educated staff in the 
field of biotechnology.  Icelanders working in academia abroad were given 
a chance to come back home to participate in exciting projects.   
Patenting 
Iceland had a special position within OECD in patenting. The first patent 
law was introduced in 1923. Then it was not possible to patent 
medicaments, only their production methods. This and the smallness of the 
market resulted in that applications for foreign patents were seldom made. 
A new patenting law took effect 1992 which means that it is now possible to 
patent medicaments.  
Production 
The government’s health-budget is ca. 8 % of the GNP (gross national 
production). The wholesale cost of pharmaceuticals is one fifth of the total 
health-budget where the government pays 75% and the patient 25% for use 
outside hospital. The Ministry of Health has accordingly issued rules for 
doctors to prescribe less expensive generic drugs, when possible, rather than 
more expensive original ones. This and the size of the local market is part of 
the reason why the pharmaceutical industry is trying its luck on the 
international market.  
Health-related R&D in Iceland 
According to statistics from the OECD, Iceland had the fourth largest 
percentage of health-related R&D in government budgets in 2002, measured 
as a percentage of GDP (OECD, 2003).  The average annual growth rate 
from 1995 to 2002 was 26.7%.  Only the US and the UK had higher 
percentages than Iceland. 
R&D in biotechnology from 2001 – 2003 
In 2003, The Icelandic Centre for Research conducted a study on R&D in 
biotechnology in Iceland (Thorvald Finnbjörnsson, 2004).  One of the 
findings in the study was that turnover in organisations working on R&D in 
biotechnology peaked in 2002.  Higher education institutions and public 
institutions, the University hospital included, had the most significant role in 
the development of R&D in this field (Thorvald Finnbjörnsson, 2004).  
Nevertheless, 95% of total R&D expenditure in biotechnology came from 
various companies.   
R&D activities in biotechnology peaked in 2001 (Thorvald Finnbjörnsson, 
2004).  The total expenditure that year was € 114 million.  In the years after 
2001, the expenditure decreased somewhat.  One of the explanations for this 
is that some of the largest companies in this field laid-off some of their 
employees after having invested in automatic equipment that would 
facilitate the R&D activities.  This indicates that R&D expenditures do not 
always reflect R&D activities.   
It is clear that the new type of companies emerging in recent years and are 
actively participating in R&D activities in biotechnology, are not at all 
similar to other more traditional companies (Thorvald Finnbjörnsson, 2004).  
One of the differences is that the funding of R&D activities comes to a great 
extent from abroad.  This could be a result of research contracts that these 
companies have gained.  In some cases, companies have been getting 
considerable financing from foreign research funds, such as the European 
Commission’s Framework programmes.   
In 2001, almost 900 employees performed R&D in the companies in this 
study (Thorvald Finnbjörnsson, 2004).  In 2002 the number had gone down 
to 850 and in 2003 the number had gone to 640.  This development does 
give a good picture of the development during this period.  This means that 
the decrease in headcount for personnel active in R&D is about one-third of 
the total workforce dedicated to this field of research.   
The new emerging biotechnology industry has a different method of 
working than the more mature branches in Iceland (Thorvald Finnbjornsson, 
2004).  The new companies rely more heavily on co-operation with other 
organisations domestic or foreign.  The respondents in the study reported 
about 340 co-operation partners in the country and abroad.  Of those 340 
partner organisations, approximately 220 were foreign and 120 domestic.   
The respondents reported 38 patents granted in the period from 2001 to 
2003, as a result of their R&D activities (Thorvald Finnbjörnsson, 2004).  
The majority came from the business sector, only one came from a different 
sector.  It should be mentioned that three companies were behind 26 of the 
37 patents granted to companies in the field of biotechnology.  When asked 
how many publications had resulted from the R&D work in biotechnology, 
some 230 publications were mentioned in all sectors.  Companies were 
responsible for almost half of the publications.   
The respondents were asked to give an idea of the obstacles they met during 
the R&D phase (Thorvald Finnbjörnsson, 2004).  The primary obstacle was 
the lack of funding from public authorities, from the Venture Capital fund or 
other similar types of funding mechanisms.  The R&D performers did not 
complain about the access to qualified personnel.   
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 deCODE genetics, Inc. 
The deCODE genetics, Inc. (hereafter deCODE) case is somewhat different 
to the other cases presented in this module.  Whilst the other cases are about 
Nordic companies that have been taken over by foreign multinational firms, 
the deCODE case is about a multinational company, that is deCODE, its 
operations and some of its acquired companies.  This case is therefore 
described more from the point of view of the multinational company, rather 
than the companies that it has taken over.   
deCODE has had a great impact on the biotechnology and pharmaceutical 
industry in Iceland, not least when it comes to the concept of “brain-drain” 
and “brain-gain”.  This case will describe the reason why deCODE has 
remained based in Iceland and an attempt will be made to explain what this 
has meant for the Icelandic labour market and ultimately the innovation 
environment in Iceland. 
The following case will be organised as follows:  First a general description 
of the company will be give followed by a short description of deCODE’s 
patenting activity.  Thirdly, the human resources at deCODE will be 
described, as well as the knowledge interaction that takes place within the 
company.  Some financial information will be given, as well as a description 
of the corporate governance style.  The last sections touch on deCODE’s 
newest acquisitions.  The final section discusses the Icelandic innovation 
environment from deCODE’s perspective.  Lastly some concluding remarks 
will be given. 
Introduction 
Founded in 1996 by Dr. Kári Stefánsson, deCODE is a leading population-
based genomics company (www.decode.is).  When the company was 
founded, US investors provided venture capital that amounted to USD 10 
million.  This amount of money was necessary to ensure that the company 
would be able to operate for the next two years.   
deCODE conducts research into the genetic causes of common diseases and 
operates one of the largest and most advanced high-throughput genotyping 
laboratories in the world.  At this point in time, deCODE has mapped 25 
disease genes and isolated 7.  Through its in-house development program 
and together with strategic partners, deCODE is developing a range of 
products and services for diagnosing, treating, and preventing disease.  The 
pharmaceutical industry is deCODE’s principal customer base for their 
gene-discovery and contract chemistry businesses. 
The company leverages its expertise in human genetics to offer innovative 
products and services in bioinformatics, genotyping, pharmacogenomics and 
clinical trials. deCODE's US-based pharmaceuticals and structural biology 
groups conduct downstream development work on targets derived from the 
company's proprietary research as well as contract service work for 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies.  
deCODE’s key strengths are the growing portfolio of proprietary drug 
targets, its integrated drug development capabilities, its unrivalled 
genealogical resources, the cutting-edge proprietary bioinformatics, the 
world-leading, high-throughput genotyping operations (approximately 30 
million genotypes per month), and its subsidiary Encode, which is 
performing integrated pharmacogenomic studies and clinical trials.  
deCODE was awarded a 12 year license to build and run the aforementioned 
Centralised Health Sector Database (CHSD).  The CHSD differs from 
similar projects elsewhere in an important respect, its nationwide scope.  
The database will collect information in a coded and anonymous form from 
patient records from Iceland’s National Health Service institutions and store 
the data for the purpose of research and statistical analysis with the aim of 
increasing knowledge in order to improve health and health services.  The 
CHSD is described in more detail in a later section. 
Patents and proprietary rights 
Patents and other proprietary rights protections are an essential element of 
deCODE’s business (deCODE genetics, Inc., 2003).  The company 
currently relies on patents, trade secret law and contractual non-disclosure 
and confidentially agreements to protect their proprietary information.   
deCODE actively seeks patent protection in the US and other jurisdictions 
to protect technology, inventions and improvements to inventions that are 
commercially important to the development of the business.  These include, 
among other things, genes the scientists discover, mutations of genes and 
related processes and inventions, and other inventions based on these genes 
as well as methods developed in their biostructures and pharmaceutical 
groups for the discovery and development of drugs. 
As of year end 2003, they had 24 issued US patents and eight issued patents 
in non-US jurisdictions.  They had 65 pending patent applications in the US 
and 81 pending patent applications in non-US jurisdiction.   
Employees 
In 1996, deCODE started its research in Iceland with 20 employees.  In 
1998 the number of employees at deCODE had reached 100.  The number 
reached 300 early in 2000 and 500 early in 2001.  A large group of these 
employees were foreign specialist who came to Iceland solely to work for 
deCODE.  Based on this fact, one could argue that deCODE’s operations 
led to extensive “brain-gain” in the Icelandic biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical industry from 1996 to 2002.  Many of the foreign employees 
have now left deCODE and only a small group of the key employees have 
stayed with the company. 
The numbers mentioned above reflect a rapid growth period which ended in 
2002.  In October 2002, deCODE had to lay off a third of its employees 
(approximately 700 people) because the exchange rate of the deCODE stock 
fell considerably.  This had a huge impact on the Icelandic labour market 
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 since some of the employees subsequently had trouble finding new jobs in 
Iceland that suited their qualifications and experience.  This action also had 
an affect on the amount of total R&D expenditure in biotechnology in 
Iceland, as has been mentioned, after 2001 this expenditure in general 
decreased somewhat (Thorvald Finnbjörnsson, 2004). 
In 2003, deCODE and all of its subsidiaries employed 414 full-time 
employees (deCODE genetics, Inc., 2003).  Approximately 109 were 
employed in the US and 305 in Iceland.   
Today, more than 90 (22%) of the employees have PhD or M.D. degrees 
and around 250 (60%) have college degrees.  338 (82%) employees are 
engaged in, or directly support, research and development activities, of 
which 267 work within the laboratory facilities and 71 have positions 
associated with the development and support of informatics.  Thirty-eight 
employees are engaged in various professional support functions such as 
Finance, Business Development, Legal Communications, Human Resources 
and Clinical Collaborations, and some 36 are employed in administrative 
support, facilities management, cleaning and security.  In addition, deCODE 
utilises part-time employees and outside contractors and consultants as 
needed and they plan to continue do so.   
Most of deCODE’s employees work in laboratory settings and the largest 
group of employees comprises biologists, biochemists and doctors.  As a 
point of interest, almost 50% of deCODE’s employees are women and the 
average age has been around 33 years.  
Knowledge interaction 
Knowledge interaction at deCODE occurs at most levels in the company, 
but most evidently in the laboratory settings.  All of deCODE’s research is 
undertaken with a cross-sectional approach, that is, doctors, biologists and 
other specialist work in close collaboration.  All research is done in a group 
setting and the group is responsible for the project right until the end.  These 
groups include researchers based in Iceland and abroad.  The interaction can 
range from exchanging document to mutual visits. 
deCODE is defined as a “knowledge organisation”.  This means, for 
example, that employees are required to monitor what is taking place in 
their field of research, attend scientific conferences and some take an active 
part in writing peer-reviewed articles and various other articles.   
Financial information 
deCODE have financed their operations primarily through funding from 
research and development collaborative agreements, and the issuance of 
equity securities and long-term financing instruments (deCODE genetics, 
Inc., 2003). 
Under all circumstances, deCODE will require significant additional capital 
in the future, which they may seek to raise through further public or private 
equity offerings, additional debt financing or by other means.  As deCODE 
has pointed out, no assurance can be given that additional financing or 
collaborations and licensing arrangements will be available when needed, or 
that if available, will be obtained on favourable terms.  If adequate funds 
will not be available when needed, deCODE may have to curtail operations 
or attempt to raise funds on unattractive terms. 
deCODE’s revenue increased to USD 46 million in 2003, compared to USD 
41.1 million in 2002.  According to deCODE, this growth reflects continued 
expansion across their product development and other service businesses.  
From their revenues, deCODE were able to derive the funds necessary to 
sustain their investment in R&D. 
In the second quarter of 2004, deCODE experienced losses of USD 13.3 
million.  This was a marked increase from the year before when deCODE 
lost USD 10 million.  During the first six months in 2004, deCODE lost 
USD 25.3 million.  According to deCODE, the main reasons for this loss 
were, among other things, lower levels of revenue and an increase in 
operational costs. 
Research and development expenses 
The research and development expenses in 2003 were USD 63.5 million 
(deCODE genetics, Inc., 2003).  The expenses decreased from the year 
before when they were USD 89.6 million.  Of these amounts, deCODE 
estimates that approximately USD 44 million was spent on customer-
sponsored research and development activities in 2003.  In 2002, USD 48 
million was spent on these activities.   
The 29% decrease in 2003 as compared to 2002 was principally attributable 
to the cost reduction measures they implemented in late 2002, taking 
advantage of investments in automation in their disease-gene research 
programs (deCODE genetics, Inc., 2003).  This action had considerable 
impact on the amount of R&D expenditure in the biotechnology sector in 
Iceland.  As has already been pointed out, the expenditure decreased 
somewhat after 2001, and that can be attributed to some extent to the 
developments at deCODE (Thorvald Finnbjörnsson, 2004).  Nevertheless, 
these cutbacks meant that there was a marked increase in productivity which 
enabled deCODE to continue their discovery and downstream work with 
substantially lower costs. 
Significant customers 
Historically, a substantial portion of deCODE’s revenue has been derived 
from contracts with a limited number of significant customers (deCODE 
genetics, Inc., 2003).  deCODE’s largest customer, Roche, accounted for 
approximately 43% of the company’s consolidated revenue in 2003.  That 
same year, Merck accounted for approximately 19% of the consolidated 
revenue.   
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 Corporate governance and management  
deCODE genetics, Inc. was listed on NASDAQ and EASDAQ in 2000.  
Today approximately 13.000 to 14.000 individuals own deCODE shares.  It 
is interesting to note, that deCODE’s market value soon after the company 
was founded, became much higher than the market value of all the 
companies in the fishing industry that had been listed on the Icelandic Stock 
Exchange.   
The listing on NASDAQ meant that deCODE managers had to become 
more disciplined in their approach to running the company and follow the 
NASDAQ rules and regulations.  In relation to the NASDAQ listing 
deCODE became a member of the Iceland Chamber of Commerce 
(www.verslunarrad.is).  Early in 2004, the Chamber introduced new 
guidelines on good corporate governance working methods.  The guidelines 
clarify the role and work of the board of directors and managers of Icelandic 
enterprises and thus make it easier for them to fulfil their duties.  deCODE 
fully adheres to these guidelines. 
The company has a hierarchic structure with clearly defined departments.  
The genetics research laboratory, for example, comprises of smaller 
departments that conduct research into various diseases.  Within each 
department are little research groups which focus on specific types of 
diseases.  Each group has a team leader who reports to a departmental 
manager.  Every job has been defined; hence every employee has a clear 
idea of his or her responsibility, as well as the method of communication. 
Acquisitions 
As part of deCODE’s business strategy, they continue to consider joint 
development programs and merger and acquisition opportunities that may 
provide them with products in late-stage development, intellectual property 
or financial resources, or with capabilities that will help accelerate their 
downstream drug discovery efforts (deCODE genetics, Inc., 2003).   In this 
section, a short description is given of two of deCODE’s acquired 
companies, that is, Encode, Ltd. (hereafter Encode), which is based in 
Iceland, and MediChem Life Sciences, Inc. (hereafter MediChem), which is 
located in the US.   
Encode Ltd. 
In 2000, deCODE acquired Encode, an Icelandic-based pharmacogenomics 
company.  This acquisition meant that deCODE was able to add a key 
element to its business strategy which is to offer a wide range of products 
that can help the global pharmaceutical industry harness the potential of 
genomics (www.decode.is).  Through Encode deCODE was able to pursue 
its plans to maximise downstream value-creation from its disease-gene 
research and take its in-house efforts further along the drug development 
process.  In other words, Encode was an important link in deCODE’s plans 
to improve its capabilities to service its collaborative partners.   
With this alliance Encode was poised to become a leader in 
pharmacogenomic studies, combining clinical trials with advanced genetic 
research, making it possible to identify the genetic variations that cause 
people to respond differently to the same drugs.  Encode was to operate as 
an autonomous entity and basically provide deCODE, and other 
collaborative partners, with necessary and valuable services.  Based on this, 
it can be assumed that Encode benefited from being taken over by deCODE. 
Encode was established in 1999 as a privately held company by Thor 
Sigthorsson, the former president of Icelandic Pharmaceuticals Ltd. Encode 
is a pioneer in its field of operations since it is the first CRO (Contract 
Research Organisation) founded in Iceland providing comprehensive 
clinical research and development services to the pharmaceutical industry, 
based on the highest ethical standards.  
Since its founding in early 1999, Encode collaborated closely with the 
biotechnology company deCODE in conducting pharmacogenomic analyses 
and at the point of the takeover had acquired a group of partners that 
provided the company with a growing stream of revenue.  In November 
2000, as has already been mentioned, Encode became a subsidiary of 
deCODE.   
Encode is a located in the centre of Reykjavik, the capital of Iceland, and 
currently employs just under 20 Icelandic specialists (www.encode.is).  The 
key employees all have long-term experience within clinical research, 
analytical fields, quality assurance, regulatory affairs and marketing.  
Encode furthermore cooperates with physicians and scientists in Iceland and 
abroad to bring expertise in various therapeutic areas to the company.  Thus, 
Encode has close ties with the Icelandic innovation environment, which can 
only benefit those that also work in this field. 
A key advantage of Encode's pharmacogenomic program is its access to 
deCODE's unique resources: the computerized genealogic database for the 
Icelandic population (i.e. the CHSD) which dates back 11 centuries.  The 
database comprises detailed genotypic data of tens of thousands of 
participants of deCODE's genetic research in over 30 common diseases, and 
phenotypic data covering the same population.  By combining these 
resources with clinical trials and expression profiling technology, Encode 
and its partners gained competitive advantage for identifying the genetic 
variations that cause people to respond differently to the same drugs. This 
enabled Encode's pharmaceutical partners to streamline their drug 
development process and create more effective, tailor-made treatments with 
faster, cost-effective R&D.  
To sum up, deCODE became interested in Encode because of the 
intellectual properties and capabilities that resided within the company.  The 
Encode acquisition was a part of deCODE’s growth strategy and it helped 
deCODE secure its position in the international context.  Encode, on the 
other hand, secured its access to the CHSD, as well as its position from a 
competitive standpoint.  It continues to operate in Iceland, and there are no 
signs that this arrangement will change. 
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 MediChem Life Sciences, Inc. 
In March 2002, deCODE acquired the US clinical development company 
MediChem Life Sciences, Inc.  MediChem was founded in 1987 and 
employs 100 to 200 people (www.business.com).  The company provides 
drug discovery, research and development chemistry services to 
biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies. These services include 
proteomics,33 the creation of customised compound libraries, medicinal 
chemistry, biocatalysis, computational chemistry, and chemical process 
development and chemistry project teams. 
In a shareholder vote, all of MediChem’s shareholders voted in favour of the 
merger of the two companies under which deCODE acquired MediChem in 
a stock-for-stock exchange (deCODE genetics, Inc., 2003).  The acquisition 
of MediChem was a central element in deCODE’s strategy to transform 
deCODE from a company focused on gene discovery into a 
biopharmaceutical company capable of creating and capturing the greatest 
possible value from its discovery capabilities.   
The acquisition benefited the company in three ways: it enabled the 
company to advance its in-house programs in drug discovery.  Secondly, it 
enabled them to negotiate much more favourable terms in their alliances 
with pharmaceutical companies, in which they take their discoveries much 
further down the drug development process and receive a more significant 
share of revenues from sales of products that are developed.  Thirdly, the 
acquisition provided deCODE with a service business generating revenue in 
the short term and maintaining the infrastructure for conduction drug 
discovery work on several programs at once.   
This acquisition is interesting from the “brain-drain and brain-gain” 
perspective.  After MediChem was merged with deCODE a new department 
had to be established to connect the two companies and complete the 
merger.  deCODE had to hire 250 new employees to man the new 
department.   
Two factors affected the decision of whether to pick Iceland or the US as 
the location for the new department.  deCODE argued that financing the 
new department could become more difficult if the department were to be in 
Iceland.  This is because Iceland has not had a unique position when it 
comes to clinical development, compared to its position with regards to 
genetic research.  Moreover, deCODE maintained that they would encounter 
difficulties in finding enough qualified people in Iceland to man the 
department.  Thus, the department was established in the US where enough 
qualified people were available. 
                                                 
33 A branch of biotechnology concerned with applying the techniques of molecular biology, biochemistry, 
and genetics to analyzing the structure, function, and interactions of the proteins produced by the genes of 
a particular cell, tissue, or organism, with organizing the information in databases, and with applications 
of the data (as in medicine or biology) (Dictionary.com) 
The Icelandic innovation environment 
One of the deCODE respondents emphasises that for deCODE to remain 
competitive it has to have qualified employees.  deCODE has found that 
education in Iceland has to some extent been lacking in quality and their 
most valuable employees are the ones who have gained their PhD’s abroad.  
These employees have also gained valuable insight into how companies in 
the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries operate abroad. 
deCODE has collaborated extensively with other companies, research 
institutions and universities in Iceland in the past and it will continue to do 
so.  These have been formal collaborative agreements with Icelandic 
organisations, as well as informal ones.  Researchers at deCODE have for 
example undertaken part-time teaching at the University of Iceland which 
has meant that deCODE has had close ties with the academic environment.  
In the past, students studying biology at the university have worked at 
deCODE during the summer holidays.  This has often resulted in them 
gaining permanent positions with the company. 
Conclusions 
The company has had considerable positive effects on the economic, as well 
as the social environment in Iceland.  It can safely be said that deCODE has 
led to so-called “brain-gain” in Iceland, at least for a period of time.  The 
company hired a large group of highly qualified and educated Icelanders 
who had not been able to find suitable jobs in Iceland.  Moreover, deCODE 
has hired numerous foreign specialists who have enriched the innovation 
environment by adding to the knowledge-base which existed in Iceland.   
This study shows that the smallness of Iceland and the Icelandic labour 
market can be an inhibiting factor for a company such as deCODE.  It is 
evident in the MediChem case, that deCODE’s actions could have led to 
even more “brain-gain”.  The fact of the matter is that the Icelandic labour 
market simply did not have enough qualified people to man deCODE’s new 
department and this influenced deCODE in their decision to establish the 
department in the US.   
When it comes to the effect on the Icelandic biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical industry in general, some argue that the founding of 
deCODE stimulated Icelandic scientists and specialists who were, in one 
way or another, associated with these industries.  Other biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical companies, although much smaller in scale, were founded 
shortly after deCODE started to operate. 
Although deCODE has in many ways positively influenced these industries, 
these cases also indicate the extent to which deCODE can negatively effect 
the labour market and the innovation environment.  A decision to relocate 
the company, as a whole, would have devastating effects on these sectors.  
But whilst deCODE has access to the CHSD it will have close ties with the 
Icelandic innovation environment.   
 
48 
 References 
Árelía Eydís Guðmundsdóttir (2003).  Restructuring the Icelandic model: Can flexibility 
and responsible corporatism go hand in hand?  In:  Ingjaldur Hannibalsson (Ed.).  
Rannsóknir í félagsvísindum IV.  Viðskipta- og hagfræðideild.  Reykjavík:  
Félagsvísindastofnun Háskóla Íslands – Háskólaútgáfan. 
Birgir Ísl. Gunnarsson (2004).  Monetary and financial stability in Iceland.  Monetary 
Bulletin: A quarterly publication of the Central Bank of Iceland, 6, 3, 57-59. 
Central Bank of Iceland (2004).  Software exports in 2003.  Reykjavík: Central Bank of 
Iceland. 
deCODE genetics, Inc. (2003).  Annual Report.  Reykjavík: deCODE genetics, Inc. 
Eurostat (2004).  Innovation in Europe.  Results for the EU, Iceland and Norway.  
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.   
Helgi Skúli Kjartansson (2002).  Ísland á 20. öld.  Reykjavík: Sögufélagið. 
Invest in Iceland Agency (2004).  IT & Telecom in Iceland.  Reykjavík: Invest in 
Iceland Agency. 
Jón Ingvar Kjaran (2004).  Successful Small-Scale Manufacturing from Small Islands – 
The NISSOS Project.  Reykjavík: Unpublished.   
Lovio, R. (2003).  Multinational corporations in a local perspective - The case of 
Varkaus in Finland.  Paper for the 17th Nordic Conference on Business Studies, 
Reykjavik. 
Magnús S. Magnússon (1993).  Efnahagsþróun á Íslandi 1880-1990.  In:  Guðmundur 
Hálfdánarson og Svanur Krisjánsson (Eds.).  Íslensk þjóðfélagsþróun 1880-1990.  
Ritgerðir.  Reykjavík:  Félagsvísindastofnun og Sagnfræðistofnun. 
OECD (2003).  STI Scoreboard: Creation and diffusion of knowledge.  Paris: OECD. 
Prime Minister’s Office.  The Science and Technology Policy Council (2004).  Science 
and technology policy – Iceland. Reykjavík: Prime Minister’s Office. 
Rannís – The Icelandic Centre for Research (2003).  R&D statistics 2003.  Reykjavík: 
Rannís. 
Thorvald Finnbjörnsson (2004).  Analysis of R&D in biotechnology in Iceland 2001 to 
2003.  Paris: OECD. 
  
Websites 
Business.com:  www.business.com  
deCODE genetics, Inc.:  www.decode.is
Eastman Kodak Company: www.kodak.com
Encode, Inc.: www.encode.is  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs:  www.iceland.org
The Federation of Icelandic Industries: www.si.is
The Icelandic Chamber of Commerce: www.verslunarrad.is
UK Trade & Investment: www.uktradeinvest.gov.uk
 
50 
Company cases Norway 
The Norwegian software case: The takeover of Zoomit by 
Kelkoo 
By Siri Aanstad 
Introduction: The Norwegian ICT industry 
The ICT industry34 is a dynamic part of the Norwegian economy, 
characterized by frequent product and market innovations as well as 
ongoing structural changes through mergers and acquisitions. In 2002, the 
industry employed 3,7 per cent of the country’s total workforce and 
accounted for 6 per cent of total turnover.35  
The 1990s saw substantial growth within the ICT industry, which by 2001 
had become Norway’s third largest industry in terms of turnover. In the 
period 1995-2000, turnover as well as employment grew faster than in the 
economy as a whole. Data processing was the single most dynamic area, 
with an average annual growth rate in turnover and employment of 21 and 
19 per cent respectively.36
The ICT industry is among the most R&D intensive industries in Norway. 
In 1999, it accounted for 34,5 per cent of total industrial R&D investments. 
Of the industry’s total investments of NOK 4590 million that year, as much 
as NOK 3800 million - that is, close to 83 per cent - were spent internally.37 
Recent studies have shown that the ICT industry has limited contact with 
external national research environments, and seem to be weakly embedded 
in the national innovation system in general.38  
While the effects of the dotcom crash are still evident, the Norwegian ICT 
industry has experienced growth over the recent period. This has, however, 
been so-called “jobless growth”. The industry’s unemployment rate is still 
high - in September 2004 it amounted to 3,7 per cent, which is only 
marginally lower than the unemployment rate in the Norwegian economy as 
                                                 
34 denoting the production of ICT goods and services 
35 article entitled “Informasjonssektoren sysselsatte 127 701”, published on the webpages of Statistics 
Norway 22.12.2003, URL: http://www.ssb.no/emner/10/03/iktoms/ 
36 Statistic Norway’s ICT barometer 2001, URL: http://www.ssb.no/emner/10/03/sa51/ 
37 Statistic Norway’s ICT barometer 2001, URL: http://www.ssb.no/emner/10/03/sa51/  
38 Narula, Rajneesh and Wibe, Mona Domaas, “Interactive learning in an innovation system: The case of 
Norwegian software companies”, International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Innovation 
Management, 2002; Reve, Torger and Jakobsen, Erik W., Et verdiskapende Norge, Oslo: 
Universitetsforlaget, 2001 
a whole.39 There are nevertheless signs that the situation is picking up. Since 
April, unemployment has been lower than in the same period in 2003, and a 
recent survey shows that the ICT industry expects to increase its 
employment in 2004 and 2005. According to the survey, the industry is 
generally optimistic with regards to future developments.40
Introduction to the case 
In the autumn of 2000, the Norwegian firm Zoomit was taken over by the 
French shopping search engine company Kelkoo. The takeover meant that 
Zoomit, which at the time was a small Oslo-based start-up firm, became part 
of a French controlled multinational corporation (MNC) headquartered in 
Paris. Here, we investigate into how the change in ownership has affected 
the business operations in Norway, focusing on whether the foreign 
takeover has had any effects on local innovation capabilities.  
It should be noted, that Kelkoo in turn was acquired by the US controlled 
multinational Yahoo! in the spring of 2004. Given that this event took place 
only recently, it will not be discussed in further detail here.  
Zoomit 
Zoomit grew out of Maskot Interactive, which was established by Per 
Siljubergsåsen in 1997. The underlying business idea was to offer news 
services to companies and organisations via e-mail and mobile phones. 
Through Siljubergsåsen’s contact with a former colleague, William 
Klippgen, the business idea changed in the direction of launching a 
comparison shopping-portal on the Internet. Klippgen joined the firm, which 
was renamed first to Zoom, and subsequently - around the turn of 1999 - to 
Zoomit. 
As a comparison shopping portal Zoomit provided an online search engine 
that let web surfers search for particular products and get a list of online 
shops that supplies this product. By comparing prices the service helps 
Internet users find the best bargain. The vendors normally pay the 
comparison shopping search engine for each click through or visitor, and 
provides the data the site needs to deliver search results. 
From the beginning, Zoomit had close ties to the ICT milieu at the 
University of Oslo (UiO). Siljubergsåsen had previously studied at the 
Department of Informatics (IFI) and worked at the Department of Media 
and Communication (IMK). A former student at IMK, Gard Jenssen, was 
involved in the development of the business plan for Maskot and sat as a 
member of the company’s advisory board. Jenssen later joined the company 
as Chief Editor in the spring of 2000.  
                                                 
39 news article entitled ”Fortsatt høy ledighet i IKT-sektoren”, published on the web pages of Abelia 
28.10.2004, URL: http://www.abelia.no/ 
40 News article entitled ”Størst optimisme i IKT- og kunnskapsbedrifter”, published on the web pages of 
Abelia 30.06.2004, URL: http://www.abelia.no/ 
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 Zoomit was furthermore started up in close physical proximity to UiO. The 
company was established on the premises of Oslo Innovation Centre, a 
science park41 strategically located only a few minutes’ walk from the main 
university area. Oslo Innovation Centre was also one of the company’s 
investors. The establishment was facilitated by support from FORNY, a 
public policy scheme aimed at stimulating the commercialisation of research 
based business ideas. Through FORNY, Zoomit received support in the 
areas of business plan development, early-stage financing, incubator 
services and investor contacts.42  
At the turn of 1999, Zoomit experienced its first real breakthrough. In the 
course of that year, new capital had been brought into the company by the 
Norwegian investment company Kistefos Venture Capital. In the first 
months of 2000, another NOK 100 mill (app. € 12,1 mill) were raised from 
more than100 Norwegian investors.  
Parallel to the inflow of new capital, the company worked intensely with 
developing its product, resulting i.a. in the introduction of a new web 
design. More people were recruited, many of whom had their background 
from IMK and IFI at UiO. A large number of the company’s employees 
were non-Norwegian - at the most, more than ten different nationalities 
were represented in the workforce. This was only one aspect giving Zoomit 
a highly international profile. As early as in 1998-1999, the company 
launched its web based services in Denmark and Sweden, where students 
had been hired to translate the web pages into the local languages.  
In the spring of 2000, the company was ready to expand beyond 
Scandinavia, and entered negotiations with players in Germany aimed at 
establishing an office there. Whereas these negotiations fell through, Zoomit 
launched its services over large parts of Europe early in the following 
autumn by adding seven new languages - English, German, French, Italian, 
Spanish, Dutch and Finnish - to its web site. At about the same time, the 
company acquired the Dutch start-up Koopwijzer, which at the time was 
one of the most popular interactive buyers’ guides in the Netherlands. In 
connection with this acquisition, Johan Dolven - Zoomit’s CEO at the time - 
stated that  “Our aim is to become the most popular starting point for 
shopping on the net in Europe, and we are moving quickly in that 
direction.”43
The dotcom crash hit the international economy only few months after 
Zoomit’s “take-off” at the beginning of 2000. Thus, the continued 
expansion of the company’s operations that year took place despite of the 
generally depressed situation in the ICT industry. Nevertheless, Zoomit’s 
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R&D institutions; and has a management team actively engaged in fostering the transfer of technology 
and business skills to tenant organisations 
42 http://www.program.forskningsradet.no/forny/uploaded/nedlasting/FORNY_brosjyre.pdf 
43 http://www.prnewswire.co.uk/cgi/news/release?id=34670 
investors - who at the time included Oslo Innovation Centre, Kistefos 
Venture Capital, the Norwegian insurance company Storebrand and the two 
founders Siljubergsåsen and Klippgen - saw the need for scaling down the 
expenses, and encouraged the management to look for alternative expansion 
strategies. It was against this background Zoomit entered negotiations with 
Kelkoo in August 2000. 
The takeover by Kelkoo in 2000 
Zoomit’s vision to become a leading pan-European comparison-shopping 
service was shared by the French company Kelkoo (meaning “Quelle Coup! 
or “What a find!”). Immediately after its establishment in October 1999, 
Kelkoo had embarked on a strategy for expanding internationally through 
mergers and acquisitions. After the acquisition of the French company 
Promodujour.com in January 2000, Kelkoo merged with Spanish 
Dondecomprar.com and British Shopgenie.com in the course of the 
following spring. 
With Zoomit’s offices in the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands 
and Kelkoo’s offices in France, Spain and the UK, there was a good match 
between the companies in terms of geographical presence. Negotiations 
began in August 2000. For Kelkoo, Zoomit was attractive due to the 
company’s well-established position in the Scandinavian markets, its 
attractive product design and user-centric functionality, as well as its 
thorough knowledge of both the German and Dutch markets. And whereas 
Zoomit ideally wanted to stay independent, cooperation with Kelkoo 
appeared to be a good alternative when the general market conditions made 
it difficult to continue on one’s own. 
The chemistry between the two parties was good throughout the 
negotiations and the term merger, rather than acquisition, was consistently 
used. In formal terms however, the outcome was that Kelkoo acquired 
Zoomit. Zoomit’s original investors were left with 35 per cent of the shares 
of the new company, which was priced at approximately NOK 800 mill 
(app. € 95 mill).44  
Post takeover developments 
Before the takeover, Zoomit and Kelkoo had been two fairly similar 
companies in distant competition with each other. The companies did 
however differ in terms of main focus and corporate strengths. Whereas 
Kelkoo was heavily oriented towards business development and highly 
efficient in this area, product development was the main strong point of 
Zoomit. 
This “distribution” of corporate strengths appears to have been of 
importance to the role Zoomit was given in the Kelkoo organisation. The 
                                                 
44 Aftenposten, Norsk jubel over Yahoo!-kjøp, 27.03.04, found on the WWW 01.07.2004, URL: 
http://atekst.mediearkivet.no/form?action=visartikkelid=AFT2004/16467 
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 Kelkoo management clearly acknowledged Zoomit’s product development 
expertise, and assigned the corporate responsibility for this area to the 
Norwegian unit from the very beginning. In practice this means, for 
instance, that the Oslo office focuses on the user interface, including Web 
design and how to present search results in the most efficient way, while the 
Grenoble unit develops the underlying software technology. 
Thus, the unit got a position in Kelkoo resembling what has been termed a 
“Centre of Excellence” (CoE) in the strand of literature on MNCs focusing 
on subsidiary roles within these organisations. Although the definition 
remains somewhat unclear, the central attribute of a CoE is held to be that it 
plays an important role in the strategy and development of the whole 
MNC.45
Shortly after the takeover of Zoomit, Kelkoo decided to launch a new, 
standardized web site for all its markets. The Norwegian unit was given a 
central role in the development of the new site. While this meant an 
immediate inflow of resources to the unit as well as a cementation of the 
product development function in Norway, the “boost” in activities proved to 
be short term. The depressed situation in the international ICT industry 
compelled Kelkoo to cut down on its operations and as soon as the new web 
site had been launched, the product development function was more or less 
put on ice. Over a period of three to four months in the spring of 2001, the 
product development team in Norway was reduced from fifteen to three 
employees. This was however part of a company wide rationalization 
process, in which Kelkoo’s overall workforce was more than halved in the 
period from October 2000 to August 2001, from approximately 240 to 107 
at the lowest level. 
In the Norwegian unit, a downscaling of the workforce had in fact begun 
even earlier on. This was due to the gradual phasing out of the unit’s 
platform technology function (i.e. the software and the algorithms that 
collect and compare products and prices and that generate the relevant 
search results) which had been initiated shortly after the takeover.   
Following Kelkoo’s takeover of Zoomit, a positioning fight broke out 
between the technology development managers in Norway and France. The 
Norwegian team, under the leadership of William Klippgen, was at the time 
in the process of developing a new agent technology which was believed to 
be superior to the technology in use in Kelkoo. The Kelkoo management 
nevertheless decided to centralise the platform technology development 
function in France, resulting in Klippgen leaving the company and his team 
being gradually built down. 
The decision to centralise the platform technology development function in 
France can be seen in the context of how Kelkoo came into being. The 
                                                 
45 see e.g. Benito; R.G., “Industrial clusters and foreign companies’ centres of excellence in Norway”, 
Reprint No.2/2000, Department of Strategy, Norwegian School of Management BI; and Forsgren, Mats 
and Pedersen, Torben, ”Centres of Excellence in Multinational Companies: The Case of Denmark”, in 
Birkinshaw, Julian and Hood, Neil (eds.), Multinational Corporate Evolution and Subsidiary 
Development, London: Macmillan, 1998 
company in fact grew out of an EU project focusing on the development of 
new agent technology, including the development of algorithms that can 
generate relevant search results. Among the participants in this project was a 
group of senior researchers from the Grenoble based ICT company Bull, 
who decided to make use of the new technology by setting up a search 
engine company. As a result, Kelkoo was established in October 1999. 
Whereas the administrative headquarters were set up in Paris, the 
company’s technology department was established in Grenoble which is a 
centre for the ICT industry in France. 
During the period of workforce reductions, there was frequent use of 
freelancers in the Norwegian unit. But as Kelkoo’s financial situation 
gradually improved and the central management showed renewed 
willingness to invest in product development, the number of permanent 
employees increased. Today, the staff at Kelkoo’s Norwegian offices 
amounts to 36, out of which ten make up the product development team. 
The product development team, which is led by Gard Jenssen, continues to 
hold the position of a CoE in Kelkoo. The team has substantial freedom in 
developing the product according to its own ideas and on the basis of its 
own expertise, and hence plays a central role in the shaping of Kelkoo’s 
overall strategies and development paths. 
In terms of how work is conducted on a day-to-day basis, the main changes 
following the takeover seem to be related to on the one hand, the split-up 
between the product development function and the platform technology 
function; and on the other hand, the fact that the Norwegian unit has become 
part of - and been given the position of a CoE within - a French controlled 
MNE with an extensive European network of country offices.46
The decision of the Kelkoo management to centralise platform technology 
development in  Grenoble has implied changes in the ways the product 
development team in Norway interacts with this functional area. In Zoomit, 
the product and platform technology development functions were physically 
integrated and characterised by close interaction on a day-to-day basis. With 
the split-up of the two functions in Kelkoo, interaction has been complicated 
by physical distance and language differences. While there is frequent 
contact between the staff in Oslo and Grenoble - by means of travelling as 
well as phone, e-mail and web conferences - our interviewees stress that the 
absence of regular face-to-face interaction does hamper efficient 
communication and cooperation. 
Interaction between the Norwegian unit and other parts of the MNE is not 
limited to the platform technology development department in Grenoble. As 
CoE in the area of product development, the unit has close and frequent 
contact with the product teams at Kelkoo’s various country offices. While 
major development activities are initiated and carried out in Oslo, 
modifications are constantly being made on the basis of feedback from the 
local product teams. According to our interviewees, this feedback is of great 
importance for product development activities in Kelkoo and - furthermore - 
                                                 
46 Kelkoo has offices in a total of nine European countries. 
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 contributes to a general strengthening of the Norwegian unit’s competencies 
and innovation capabilities. 
While there is a high degree of interaction between the Norwegian unit and 
other parts of Kelkoo, intra-firm cooperation and learning is by our 
interviewees believed to be hampered by hierarchical structures in the 
company organisation. Relationships between the central management and 
the various departments in Kelkoo are held to be more hierarchical than 
what was the case in Zoomit, and the flat structure characteristic of the latter 
is considered to have been more conducive to efficient communication and 
cooperation - and in the final respect, to innovation. 
In line with arguments presented by Herstad and others, 47 the relatively 
stronger elements of hierarchy in Kelkoo may be seen as reflecting more 
general differences between corporate governance systems in Central 
Europe on the one hand and in the Nordic countries on the other. One of our 
interviewees, who is Italian and had worked in Italy before becoming a 
Zoomit employee, maintains that the hierarchical practices in Kelkoo are 
more familiar to him than the flat structure characteristic of Zoomit. It 
should be noted however - as our interviewee also points out - that the 
degree of hierarchy in an organisation may be expected to increase with size 
and geographical scope, and that compared to Kelkoo, Zoomit was a small 
start-up firm with relatively limited operations outside its home country.  
When it comes to interaction with external actors, our interviewees state that 
there today exist no close links between Kelkoo Norway and national 
knowledge institutions. Thus, the strong ties that initially existed between 
Zoomit and the ICT milieu at the University in Oslo appear to have been 
broken. Physically, this happended already in the spring of 2000 when the 
company moved out of the premises of Oslo Innovation Centre. The latter 
nevertheless continued to be one of the company’s investors up till the event 
of Yahoo! acquiring Kelkoo in the spring of 2004. 
Nor does the incorporation into Kelkoo appear to have resulted in the 
establishment of new links between the Norwegian unit and external R&D 
environments abroad. According to our interviewees, Kelkoo’s country 
offices do not function as “gateways” to knowledge providers in their 
respective countries, and generally, there are few links between Kelkoo 
departments and external R&D milieus. The exception is the platform 
technology development department which has close and regular contact 
with research environments in Grenoble. 
Conclusion: Effects on local innovation capabilities 
All in all, the takeover of Zoomit by Kelkoo does not appear to have had a 
detrimental effect on local innovation capabilities in Norway. On the 
contrary: The Norwegian unit today employs more than thirty people and 
forms a vital part of Europe’s  third largest online shopping service 
                                                 
47 Herstad, Sverre, Forthcoming dr. polit (Ph.D.) thesis on foreign takeovers in Norwegian manufacturing 
industries, Centre for technology, innovation and culture, University of Oslo
company.48 The unit is furthermore a Centre of Excellence for product 
development, meaning that it has the corporate responsibilities for R&D in 
this area. While the effects of Yahoo!’s recent acquisition of Kelkoo remain 
to be seen, becoming part of one of the world’s leading consumer and 
business services companies may be expected to further strengthen Kelkoo’s 
position. 
In assessing the effects of foreign takeovers, we do however face the 
methodological problem of accounting for the counterfactual position: What 
would have happened if Zoomit had not been acquired by Kelkoo? In this 
case, the problem is reinforced by the fact that Zoomit at the time of the 
takeover was in a start-up phase, meaning that changes in the nature and 
scale of the company’s operations must be expected to have occured 
regardless of any change in ownership. 
With these methodological problems in mind, it is possible to identify a set 
of areas where Kelkoo’s takeover of Zoomit indeed has affected business 
activities - and innovation capabilities - in Norway. While the overall 
impression is that the takeover has been favourable, some negative effects 
can also be read out of our survey. 
On the positive side, it can first of all be argued that the takeover was of 
major importance for the continued existence of the Norwegian operations, 
and thus the preservation and further development of Zoomit’s firm-specific 
competencies. Taking into consideration the dotcom crash as well as 
Norway’s competence level in the area of e-commerce, one of our 
interviewees states that “if Zoomit had not been taken over by Kelkoo, it is 
not at all likely that the company would have survived [author’s 
translation]”.49  
The takeover has furthermore had a decisive impact on the type of activities 
that are carried out in the Norwegian unit. We have seen that the platform 
technology development function was phased out at an early point, and that 
operations subsequently became focused on product development. This can 
on the one hand be assumed to have had a negative impact on local 
innovation capabilities, in that the loss of the platform technology 
development function ruled out a further strengthening of local 
competencies in this area - at least within the context of Kelkoo. On the 
other hand, by specialising on product development the Norwegian unit has 
undoubtedly strengthened its competencies and ability to innovate within 
this area. This can in turn be assumed to have strengthened the unit’s 
position as Kelkoo’s Centre of Excellence for product development.  
According to the litterature on subsidiary roles in MNCs, subsidiaries that 
are assigned a central role in corporate R&D are more likely to form 
linkages to local knowledge providers than subsidiaries with limited R&D 
                                                 
48 Aftenposten, Norsk jubel over Yahoo!-kjøp, 27.03.04, found on the WWW 01.07.2004, URL: 
http://atekst.mediearkivet.no/form?action=visartikkelid=AFT2004/16467 
49 Gard Jenssen, in e-mail correspondence November 2004. While stating that Norway in the late 1990s 
was among the European leaders in developing e-commerce services, Jenssen underlines that the country 
in general is no “leading nation” in this business area.  
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 activity.50As a Centre of Excellence in the area of product development, 
Kelkoo Norway might thus be expected to have strong links to Norwegian 
R&D environments. However, the facts bear out the expectations. As we 
have seen, the close contacts Zoomit initially had with the ICT milieu at the 
University in Oslo no longer exist. There may be many reasons for this 
development, but the takeover by Kelkoo seems to have implied a stronger 
orientation towards and reliance on intra-firm learning and cooperation. 
While this can be argued to limit any positive spill-over effects on external 
actors, interaction with other Kelkoo departments has greatly contributed to 
a strengthening of competencies and innovation capabilities in the former 
Zoomit.  
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The Norwegian pharmaceutical case: The Axis Shield Plc 
takeover of Nycomed Diagnostics 
By Sverre Herstad 
The Norwegian pharmaceutical industry 
The pharmaceutical industry in Norway is made up of a relatively small 
number of companies who are predominantly foreign owned. Main 
operating areas include medical research, clinical testing, marketing and 
distribution, and a total of six companies carry out pharmaceutical 
manufacturing in the country. In 2003, the industry employed 4600 people - 
a number which has been relatively stable over the recent period.51  
Of the 4600 people employed in the pharmaceutical industry in 2003, 
approximately 600 were engaged in research and development activities. In 
2002, the industry’s total R&D investments amounted to NOK 827,5 
million (app. € 100 mill) which represented an increase of 9,5 per cent from 
the previous year. If R&D investments are seen as a percentage share of 
total sales, Norway’s performance is well below the European average - 
whereas the Norwegian pharmaceutical industry in recent years has invested 
approximately10 per cent of total sales in R&D, the average for the industry 
in Europe as a whole is 20 per cent. The main explanation for Norway’s 
relatively poorer performance, is that other European countries host larger 
R&D facilities and thus generate larger R&D investments.52
While the Norwegian pharmaceutical industry is dominated by foreign 
owned companies, one of the largest actors in the industry was for a long 
time under national ownership. Nycomed, which was established as early as 
in 1874, remained a Norwegian controlled company until the merger with 
British Amersham in 1997. At the time of the merger, Nycomed was made 
up of two business units - the contrast fluid unit Nycomed AS and the 
pharmaceutical unit Nycomed Pharma AS. While the contrast fluid unit 
remained part of the new company Nycomed Amersham plc., Nycomed 
Pharma was sold off to the private equity firm Nordic Capital in 1999. As 
we shall see, this forms the background for the Norwegian pharmaceutical 
case study: The takeover of Nycomed Pharma’s in-vitro diagnostics division 
by the UK based company Axis-Shield. 
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 Introduction to the case 
Prior to its 1997 merger with UK based Amersham International Plc 
Norwegian medical corporation Nycomed had three main business areas. 
Nycomed Pharma AS contained its pharmaceuticals and in vitro diagnostics 
areas, while Nycomed AS contained its in vivo imaging area. The latter in 
vivo – in the body – area develop and produce contrast fluids, and was in 
2003 absorbed by US-based General Electric Medical Systems through its 
takeover of the remaining Nycomed Amersham system.  
Perhaps less known is the case in question. The former Nycomed in vitro – 
in-the-glass – diagnostics (IVD) unit is now owned by UK-based Axis 
Shield Plc. In vitro refer to biochemical diagnostics systems conducted 
either centralised in laboratories or decentralised at the point-of-care (e.g. in 
doctors offices).  
During the years prior to the takeover IVD served mainly as a cash flow 
machine for the Nycomed/Nycomed Amersham system, this based mainly 
on incremental improvements and sale of mature diagnostics products. 
Linkages between IVD and the remaining corporate system where few, 
weak and highly person-based; and whereas ideas concerning the 
development of new product lines gained some initial support by corporate 
management, financial backing proved difficult to obtain and key personnel 
felt frustrated as they saw their point-of-care oriented product line aging.  
A part of this picture is perhaps the late 1990s perceived debt problem of 
Nycomed Amersham, and a strong post-merger strategic focus on secondary 
market pricing and boosting price/earnings ratios. Hence, when Nycomed 
Amersham in 1999 announced the sale of a majority stake in Nycomed 
Pharma53 to Swedish based private equity firm Nordic Capital Group, key 
personnel contacted the new owner and suggested a separate sale of the unit. 
Nordic Capital Group agreed that the strategic fit between Pharma and in 
vitro was bordering on non-existing, and hence agreed on splitting 
Diagnostics from Pharma and sell the former separately.   
Subsequent takeover negotiations included a few Norwegian financial 
actors, but the choice fell on Axis Shield as previous contacts suggested a 
strong strategic fit. Axis Shield Plc was created in a 1999 merger in the 
wake of a patent right dispute between UK based Shield Diagnostics and 
Norwegian Axis Biochemicals, the latter which had previous attempted to 
acquire the IVD unit from Nycomed.  Shield Diagnostics constituted the 
financially largest unit in the Axis Shield merger. As a result, headquarters 
of the merged company was located at the Shield premises in Dundee, 
Scotland. At the time of the takeover the Axis Shield product line was 
mainly oriented towards centralised laboratory diagnostics, and the 
company wanted to expand its minor point-of-care portfolio. Axis Shield 
bought a 100% share of what was then labelled Nycomed Diagnostics, 
                                                 
53 Nycomed Amersham initially retained a 30% ownership. The stated reasons for the sale was 
downpayment of debt, and focus on the defined core area of in vivo diagnostics (known as “Imaging”).  
The author has not been able to confirm whether this ownership position was taken over by General 
Electric after its 2003 purchase of Amersham. 
created what we in the following will refer to as Axis Shield PoC and 
consequently gained access to the existing point-of-care product line of the 
latter.  
As of 2004 Axis Shield Plc employ a staff exceeding 400. At the time of the 
Nycomed Pharma-Diagnostics split the latter had some 100 employees, and 
this has now increased to 165 in the Axis Shield PoC development and 
production unit alone. In addition, explorative research initially conducted 
within Nycomed Diagnostics is now conducted at the Norwegian part of the 
Axis Shield Corporate Research Unit at Ulven in Oslo, and sales functions 
transferred to the sales company Medinor that was acquired in 1999. These 
numbers thus underestimate the underlying employment growth. 
From value extraction to radical innovation 
Key PoC actors involved in the takeover negotiations did not attempt to 
conceal the long-term value-extraction strategic behaviour of its former 
owners, nor the resulting maturity of their existing product line. Hence, the 
takeover was negotiated with openness as to the need for radical product 
line renewal, and an immediate effect was the establishment of a point-of-
care technology development programme.  
Subsequent market and technology feasibility analysis resulted in the launch 
of the Afinion platform programme, with the following targeted 
characteristics: a) automated point-of-care diagnostics processing in order to 
eliminate the human error risk inherent in both centralised and decentralised 
manual processing, b) a common platform for a diagnostics range extending 
into some 20 different markers, and not least c) all based on cost-effective 
hardware maintainable at the most decentralised points-of-care (i.e. doctors 
offices) and safely usable by non-professional personnel (e.g. nurses). With 
this Axis Shield PoC departed from previous plans of re-engineering and 
developing the existing product line. The platform development phase of the 
programme is scheduled to be finished within 2004, with the planned launch 
of the Afinion hardware and four basic tests.  
The programme involves accelerating core competence biochemical marker 
development and production, and extended into radical hardware and 
software development. Both Shield Diagnostics and Axis Biochemicals had 
previously mainly developed markers for distribution through laboratory 
equipment brand names such as Abbot, and the departure from this strategy 
hence involved large-scale outsourcing of development activities to 
specialised produces, mainly in Sweden. One respondent thus maintain that 
“...we employ a large number of people externally” through the Afinion 
programme. 
Afinion is financed by retained earnings from the existing Axis Shield 
product line.  In addition 100 million NOK was raised by equity issuance in 
Britain, mainly through institutional agent investments, in sum bringing the 
total product development investment up to 350 million NOK. This is 
significant when compared to a present annual PoC turnover of 200 million 
NOK.  In 2003, point-of-care and hence Afinion accounted for 64% of total 
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 Axis Shield research and development costs, while only generating 35% of 
corporate revenues. Whereas only approximately 1/3 of this is internal RD 
(the remaining 2/3 being conducted externally by contract hardware and 
software developers) it indicates a financial commitment to the Norwegian 
PoC unit that is highlighted by the ongoing substantial technological 
upgrading of the Central Oslo production lines. It is stated Axis Shield 
policy that research and development should focus on generating patentable 
innovations. 
Corporate governance 
Ownership as linkage to UK equity market  
We have previously argued the need to understand the economic systems 
that parent companies emerges out of and the subsidiaries become linked to. 
In the following we follow Doremus et al (1998) in conceptualising foreign 
takeovers as a process where the different investment and innovation 
systems of different national economies become linked and interface. We 
thus start by noting that the UK corporate governance system has a distinct 
outside financial capital character54 (Goergen and Renneboog 2001, Owens 
2001) where judicial primacy is given solely to shareholders55.   
Prior to the Axis Shield merger the ownership and strategic control of Axis 
Diagnostics was dominated by Norwegian venture capitalists Terje 
Mikalsen and Tharald Brøvig, in addition to insiders such as original 
founder Erling Sundrehagen and CEO Svein Lien. Similarly, Shield 
Diagnostics had London-based Norwegian investor Petter Smedvig as its 
largest shareholder and board member. After the merger the original Axis 
shareholders where left with 43 per cent of the shares in the merged Axis 
Shield (Dagens Næringsliv February 2nd 1999), creating a company with 
fairly concentrated and co-ordinated ownership and remaining strategic 
control by non-UK insiders. In this respect, Axis Shield as newly 
established UK firm did not reflect the structure of fragmented market co-
ordinated outsider ownership normally associated with the main UK 
corporate governance system, and hence cannot at this point be seen as an 
agent for such a system. However, the twin CEO structure initially 
established did result in tensions between what was then interpreted as 
distinct British and Norwegian management styles, and consequent 
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dismissal of the Shield Diagnostics CEO and restructuring of the Shield unit 
organisation towards ‘lesser emphasis on finance and marketing’56. 
The large risk capital requirements of the planned Afinion programme 
necessitated equity issuance that diluted the holdings of the original main 
owners. According to our respondents, the raising of 100 million NOK in a 
non-targeted London issuance “...could possibly have been done in Norway, 
but we doubt it. It was anyway surprisingly easy in the UK” (our 
translation). The same respondents further state that “...presence in Britain, 
and thus proximity to its large capital markets, where undoubtedly vital 
when we raised the capital”, and continue to be vital as a means of 
nurturing their relationship to increasingly impatient investors. The largest 
present shareholder of Axis Shield Plc, London-based institutional agent57 
Framlington Investment Management Ltd, holds a 15% stake as of 
December 31st 2003, and there is now no contact between main shareholders 
and company besides official market information (i.e. press releases, 
quarterly and annual reports). 
Qualitative comparative research on national corporate governance systems 
as well as quantitative financial system analysis support both statements by 
the respondent. The former research agenda highlight how outsider 
corporate governance systems show a bias towards stand-alone investment 
programmes that carries a promise of generating patentable, radical products 
and thus quasi-monopoly rents (Porter 1992, Aglietta and Breton 2001).  
Based on this line of reasoning it is tempting to argue that this is a case of 
outsider system financial capital supporting a new technology by its 
constitution of actors focusing distinctly on holding smaller stakes in the 
project. Moreover, there is a perceived potential for generating leaps in 
secondary market pricing.  
Availability of risk-willing equity capital is of course also a question of 
mere size of primary equity issuance markets as well as liquidity of 
secondary markets. The London equity issuance market is comparable with 
similar US markets, and thus notably larger than the main European markets 
of Frankfurt and Paris combined (see Seifert et al 2000 for detailed 
comparative quantitative data on financial markets).  
The Nordic primary issuance markets as well as secondary trading markets 
are minor in comparison. Norwegian venture capital markets are of average 
OECD size, primarily through the existence of the government established, 
managed and recently privatised SND invest equity fund (Baygan 2003) as 
well as the still state-controlled Argentum fund-in-fund set up to assist 
private venture capital funds.  The same markets are however portrayed as 
overly oriented towards traditional sectors, and characterised by lacking risk 
                                                 
56 To the surprise of our respondents, employment in the research department of Shield Diagnostics was 
considered low-status and hence poorly paid, whereas administrative work or marketing functions was 
considered high status and hence much better paid. This was, according to one of the respondents who 
acted as a temporary head of research at Shield, something “...we definetly had to turn upside down”.  
57 An institutional agent is an investment company that invest on behalf of customers rather than itself, 
and hence is subjected to competition from other institutional agents.   
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 willingness (ibid) in the non-public sphere, and Axis Shield PoC 
respondents explicitly state that they have not gained any support 
whatsoever from Norwegian public industrial policy tools.  Hence, when 
respondent statements are interpreted against these qualitative and 
quantitative findings combined, we strengthen our argument that the ability 
of Axis Shield PoC to finance Afinion thus must be seen as a more probable 
outcome given British ownership than e.g. Norwegian ownership.  
Having said this, respondents explicitly state that Axis Shield must achieve 
a positive result by the end of 2005, or be severely punished by the 
secondary equity market and risk a hostile takeover58. Thus, the flip side of 
the UK based ownership and equity issuance coin is direct exposure to what 
some observers (Goergen and Renneboog 2001:185) has label the only real 
market for corporate control in Europe, and by one of the respondents 
characterised as “...complete irrational in how they valuate what we do, 
which is something we must always keep in mind”’. The long-term 
implications of this remains to be seen, and we now turn to focusing on 
mediators between Axis Shield and this market. 
Mediating the linkages to UK corporate control 
We have previously argued the importance of strategic integration as 
enabler of innovation. The concept links up to the insider-outsider 
distinction, and serve to illuminate to what extent corporate structure and 
strategy is defined by insiders with the necessary technological knowledge, 
firm-specific competences and leeway from secondary market fluctuations 
(Morgan 2002) needed to understand how actual allocation decisions 
influence firm organisational learning and innovative capacity59 - and act 
accordingly.   
An important and perhaps more or less defining characteristic of the British 
corporate governance system is fragmentation of ownership and a resulting 
unwillingness of individual owners to be exposed as insiders to the firm, i.e. 
as board members60 (Owen 2001). This has resulted in a common 
                                                 
58 It is important to distinquish between primary (issuance) and secondary (trading) equity markets. In the 
former equity capital is raised, while the latter merely exchange the rights to control over and returns 
from capital raised elsewhere. It thus often refered to as the “market for corporate control”, in that it in 
outsider based corporate governance systems, through the possible threat of a hostile takeover, is 
supposed to serve as the main diciplinary mechanism in the relationship between management and 
owners. Given the technological exposure of Axis Shield to the Afinion programme, and the financial 
exposure to institutional agents, a takeover is a likely outcome given failure and/or further significant 
delays in the former. The 2002 announcement of an expected delay in the programme e.g. resultet in an 
immediate share prize dip from NOK 40 til NOK 10. Secondary market pricing initiated takeovers, 
hostile or not, are fairly common in US and UK.  
59 I.e. strategic decicion makers who, as both insiders and owners, may easily bridge the so-called 
“information gap” inherent in the relationship between outside owners, inside management and inside 
knowledge actors.  
60 Inside positions inhibit anonymous entry-exit in the stock. Further, a main motive  for exposure to such 
positions is a wish to directly influence management, the costs of which are carried by the individual 
agent while the possible benefits are spread out on all shareholders. Hence, avoiding this free rider 
problem would entail larger shareholding in individual companies, in turn severly limiting the exit option 
occurrence of inefficient boards (ibid, Georgen and Renneboog 2001), and 
consequent management autonomy from owners. This in turn imply that the 
alignment of manager and owner preferences are thus necessarily done 
through the market for corporate control, i.e. based on remuneration through 
stock option plans (carrot) and the threat of hostile takeovers (stick).  
Consequently, as often emphasised, the system contains distinct 
disincentives towards long-term planning beyond what can fairly rapidly be 
positively discounted in secondary markets61. Axis Shield respondents thus 
state explicitly state that a major problem of now being a Plc is this 
tendency of the market to punish allocation decisions that, while producing 
short-term outcomes perceived negatively by outsiders, are sensible in the 
longer run, hence highlighting the importance of firm specific mediators 
between the company and this tendency. 
As a result of such mediators the present Axis Shield Plc internal 
governance system emerge as somewhat in opposition to the general picture 
of the external UK system. The history of the company itself (i.e. both Axis 
and Shield had large insider-owners) implies limited experience with being 
exposed to the shareholder value logic of corporate control (Lazonick and 
O’Sullivan 2000), and the existing specialist management and board 
composition temporarily mediate if not contradict the common collective 
action outcome of the system.  
This is stressed by the respondent who state that the initial Axis founder, 
now chief scientific officer of Axis Shield as well as shareholder 62 and 
board member, serve a major “...driving and co-ordinating function that has 
enabled long-term systematic planning” (our translation). Respondents 
further stress that both the composition of the board and top management 
team represent a – in their own words – unique combination of all expertise 
relevant for running the company. Again the same respondents explicitly 
and continuously highlight the firm and person specificities of these 
characteristics.   
Corporate and subsidiary organisational principles 
Post takeover organisational change 
In the Axis Shield case we find few indications of immediate post takeover 
major organizational change in the PoC unit. The unit had already 
established co-operative relations with the old Axis part, and apart from a 
transfer of sales and distribution activities to the Axis Shield sales company 
Medinor our respondents highlight incremental “organic” unit integration 
and specialization through an increasing corporate focus on both harnessing 
synergies and on enabling the different parts to focus on core competencies. 
                                                                                                                                               
and thus contradicting the internal logic of the system as a whole. See Porter (1992) for a brilliant analysis 
of this collective action game. 
61 Either as measurable results, or, as in the Axis Shield case, expecations of future results. 
62 Based on the 2003 annual report the author has estimated that Sundrehagen holds a stable 1% share 
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 R&D for the centralized diagnostics product market is increasingly 
transferred to the Shield unit in Dundee, while the old Axis and PoC units 
have been given sole responsibility for decentralized point-of-care.  
An umbrella function is found in the newly established Corporate Research 
and Development unit, established as a means of enabling synergies 
between the PoC and Lab divisions by serving knowledge exploration 
(Nooteboom) and diffusion functions for both. This is again fairly 
decentralized with activities both at Ulven and Bodø (point-of-care 
research) in Norway and in Dundee (lab diagnostics research). In sum our 
respondents stress the importance of the interplay between decentralized 
lean corporate structures, unit focus on core competencies, the pre takeover 
linkages established between Nycomed Diagnostics and Axis, the bridging 
function of corporate RD and not least the relatively small size of Axis 
Shield – in itself implying lesser scope for bureaucracy and hierarchy. 
An essential part of this picture is the cross subsidizing of point-of-care 
research enabled. Axis Shield plc has gambled years of corporate earnings 
on a radical product development program based in Norway, and thus reveal 
a high level of financial commitment  (Lazonick and O’Sullivan 1998) that 
must be highlighted as a main explanatory variable behind brain gain in 
Norway. 
Corporate learning interfaces and structure of knowledge 
There are of course strong product market similarities between lab and 
point-of-care diagnostics, extending into technological complementarities at 
least at the basic research level. An immediate effect of the takeover was 
availability of complementary knowledge and functions from the 
Norwegian Axis unit, and hence a strengthening of functions Axis Shield 
PoC had not been able to develop within the Nycomed Amersham system. It 
is however generally far too often assumed (Attewell 1996) that a formal or 
perceived existence of potential synergies is necessarily realised as such, or 
merely a question of establishing suitable formal organisational structures. 
In particular, divergences in experiences, routines and frames of reference 
will influence on what interfaces that are formed.  For instance, Nooteboom 
(2000) highlight how knowledge transfers between units rest on cognitive 
complementarity between their respective core competencies; this as brain 
gain  “...requires on the one hand sufficient cognitive distance to yield 
novelty, and on the other hand sufficient proximity to enable 
understanding” (ibid: 290). Axis Shield respondents thus explicitly state 
that a major enabler in creating technological synergies is found in how 
people “...think alike strategically, but based on a somewhat different 
organisational and technological experience-based frame of reference” (our 
translation). This in particular applies to the linkages created between PoC 
and the former Axis activities in Norway. Further, a mediating function 
bridging cognitive distance at the applied knowledge exploitation level of 
the case is found in the above-mentioned Corporate RD division, which take 
care of pre-lab or pre-poc application basic research, as well as post-
application generalisation of what is initially specialised unit knowledge. 
Hence, whereas the increasing unit cognitive focus that follows from 
national specialisations in Lab or PoC respectively in itself can be expected 
to increase cognitive distance, the corporate R&D function contribute to 
bridging it.  
Biochemical marker development overlaps with a limited range of 
established academic disciplines, implying that knowledge bases are 
characterised by analytical rather than synthetical knowledge63 (Laestadius 
1998). Knowledge actors in Axis Shield as a whole can be expected to share 
a fairly similar educational background, and thus a common professional 
language (i.e. not solely tied to Axis Shield itself nor sub-units within it) 
with limited scope for misinterpretation of codes and verbal communication.   
Hence, complementary to the approach of Nooteboom (2000) we could, -- 
based on the work of Alice Lam (1998, 2002) on organisational knowledge 
architectures -- argue that such “professionalism” ease knowledge transfers 
and communication within the corporate structure. One of our respondents 
thus highlights how “...we document everything thoroughly. In principle, 
given the right educational background and hence ability to understand this 
documentation, it is not difficult to understand what we are doing. You may 
say that some of our core developers have knowledge “sitting in their 
fingers”, but this is not the general rule” (our translation). 
Another neglected dimension concerning intra MNE learning interfaces is 
the administrative, supervisory and financial context within which they may 
form. The Axis Shied case highlights how lacking competition enables the 
formation of learning interfaces. This is not surprising given a) the strategic 
fit perceived initially and motivating the takeover, b) the reorganisation into 
Corporate RD as umbrella for Lab and Poc respectively, and again not least 
c) the emphasis put on harnessing synergies by insider strategic decision 
makers.  
Linkages between PoC and Corporate RD emerge as tight and reflexive, of 
course not least because original PoC personnel have been transferred to the 
Norwegian Corporate RD unit as a result of the establishment of the latter. 
Similarly, personnel for the original Axis unit mainly working on Lab 
diagnostics have developed, according to one respondent, tight connections 
with the Dundee unit, and hence serve as a linkage between Dundee and 
PoC due to their knowledge of and contact with the latter.  Whereas our 
three respondents diverge in their interpretations of what has so far come 
out of these linkages, they reveal optimism as to their future role. One 
respondent actuallt stated that “we have now finally come home ownership 
vice” (our translation). 
External learning interfaces 
In the Axis Shield case a main source of new ideas concerning 
improvements of existing PoC products and possible new ones are users in 
                                                 
63 Synthetical knowledge bases evolve when knowledge from different scientific and professional 
communities constitute the professional foundations of organisational learning. 
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 the medical communities. Our respondents explicitly state that medical 
professionals often contact them. This contact, while stressed as important, 
however seems somewhat non-systematic. Again the argument of cognitive 
complementarity and analytical knowledge applies; there is distance to 
ensure novelty and proximity to ensure comprehensibility, and a common 
language by which the actors can communicate. Apart from such contact 
with medical communities our there seem to be little contact between PoC 
on the one side, and professional communities in Norway such as research 
institutions on the other.  
This picture however cannot be seen as resulting from the takeover. The old 
Nycomed system contained, according to our respondents, most of the 
professional expertise relevant for the PoC unit and represented “...a 
university in itself, a unique scientific community which is now completely 
fragmented”.  
Further, Axis Biochemicals was established as a result of the lack of 
relevant domestic employment opportunities of the original founder and 
biochemical researcher, who then worked as a doctor. The latter respondent 
characterizes present Norwegian biochemical university research as 
fragmented, and while opening up for the possibility of Axis itself being 
partly to blame, he states that no significant knowledge has come out of 
such contacts.  
An indirect and seemingly unintended outcome of Norwegian university 
biochemical research is however ‘...the inability of universities to give 
professorships to good researchers, who we then can employ’. Hence, initial 
isolation within the Nycomed system could have been compensated by 
establishing contacts with research institutions abroad.  
A consequence of the takeover is however contact, indirectly through the 
Shield unit and the interfaces analyzed above, with the Scottish universities 
in particular. These were characterized by our technology respondent as of a 
“very high quality”. The same respondent reveals that important 
development projects have sprung out of these linkages, and that some of 
these contain the prospect of producing tests for the Afinion platform.  
External learning interfaces related to specialized suppliers are continuously 
stressed as important in the literature on innovation systems. However, 
inputs to the core processes of both Axis Shield and its PoC unit are mainly 
generic chemicals bought of-the-shelf, and hence such linkages are few and 
bordering on non-existing, apart from one important exception: As the 
Afinion development program include software and hardware development, 
linkages to specialized suppliers have been established and one respondent 
maintain that “...we have a large number of people working for us” through 
external contract development.  Evidence on how this works as learning 
interface is limited; but we do however have some indications that these 
relationships are fairly linear and characterized by modularity based on PoC 
pre-specified requirement. Hence we expect that externalities from these are 
limited mainly to brain gain seen from the part of the suppliers in Sweden. 
Assessing the brain drain versus brain gain question 
The Axis Shield takeover of Nycomed Diagnostics undoubtedly represents a 
case of major technological upgrading in the wake of a foreign takeover. 
This can be argued both based on the lacking strategic fit with and financial 
commitment by the old Nycomed/Nycomed Amersham system, as well as 
the resulting strong strategic fit with Axis Shield. 
First, by using comparative evidence from corporate governance and 
financial system analyses we can, as argued above, strengthen the 
respondent’s statement that financing of the Afinion programme was 
enabled by contact with and proximity to financial markets of a certain size 
and with certain characteristics. Such markets are positively found in the 
UK; and positively not (both size of issuance markets, as well as the distinct 
financial capital characteristics) in Norway.  
Furthermore, given the transparency of this rather specialised product 
market, both internationally but in particular domestically, we feel that it is 
safe to conclude that neither the level of strategic fit produced by the Axis 
Shield takeover nor in-house financing by a domestic actor can be 
considered a likely counterfactual outcome.  
Second; the launch of Afinion undoubtedly represented both a major 
technological upgrading of the PoC unit, and will possibly open vast new 
markets and hence generate returns that can be fed back to the Axis Shield 
system. Whereas the latter remains to be seen, the share increase in RD 
activities as well as number of employees (even when excluding those 
transferred to Corporate RD) leaves no doubt that brain gain has occurred 
on a significant scale.  
Third, the Axis Shield structure itself is fairly immature. Still, our 
respondents highlight foreign ownership induced linkages to professional 
communities outside Norway (i.e. mainly Universities in Scotland), and that 
these linkages already has led to new Afinion platform products being in the 
development pipeline.  
To this can be added the restructuring towards unit product market focus, 
and the following personal linkages between the Axis and Shield units. 
These are a result of their focus on decentralised and centralised diagnostics 
respectively. Hence, also in this respect we are forced to conclude that brain 
gain is resulting from a foreign takeover, and that initial positive 
experiences with such linkages, within an administrative, supervisory and 
financial context promoting such linkages, is likely to result in them 
deepening. 
Forth, quantitatively speaking synergies within the Axis Shield structure 
remain fairly national, initially related to Axis – PoC linkages and now 
related to PoC – Corporate RD linkages (i.e. the Norwegian part of the 
latter).  Hence the role of foreign ownership as enabler of linkages abroad 
should not be exaggerated.  
Last but not least we conclude by agreeing that the case in question can be 
criticised as empirically being non-representative of a foreign takeover in 
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 general, and a British plc takeover in particular. Both our respondents 
explicitly state this point throughout the interviews, and the case thus serve 
to illustrate the potential variety of foreign owner firms and again the 
difficulties inherent in attempting to make empirical generalisations as to 
the brain drain versus brain gain question. We hence stress the temporary – 
or transitive (Bhaskar 1978, 1979) - character of present outcome of the 
Axis Shield takeover of Nycomed Diagnostics; and have above raised 
questions of both increasing brain gain as a result of increasing cross-unit 
integration, as well as the possible future post-Afinion launch role of British 
corporate governance in defining the prospects and limits to future growth 
and domestic brain-gain.  
 
References 
Amable, Bruno (2000) “Institutional complementarity and diversity of 
social systems of innovation and production” Review of International 
Political Economy 7:4 Winter 2000:645-687 
Attewell, Paul (1996) “Technology diffusion and Organizational Learning”, 
side 203-229 in Cohen, Michael and Sproull, Lee (eds) (1996) 
“Organizational Learning” Sage Pulications, London 
Axis Shield Annual Report and Accounts 2003 
Baygan, Günseli (2003) “Venture capital policy review: Norway”  STI 
Working paper 17/2003, OECD 
Boyer, Robert “New Growth Regimes But Still Institutional Diversity” 
Socio-Economic Review (2) 2004, Oxford University Press 
Campagnac, Elisabeth and Winch, Graham (1998) Civil engineering joint 
ventures: The British and French models of organisation in confrontation” 
in Lundin, R and Midler, C (1998) “Projects as arenas for renewal and 
learning processes” Klüwer Academic Publishers, pp 191-255 
Dore, R., Lazonick W. and O’Sullivan, M (1999) “Varieties of Capitalism 
in the Twentieth Century” Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford 
University Press 15 (1) pp.102-120 
Doremus et al (1998) ”The Myth of the Global Corporation” Princeton 
University Press, New Jersey 
Fukao, Mitsuhiro (1995) “Financial Integration, Corporate Governance 
and the Performance of Multinational Companies” The Brookings 
Institution, Washington D.C 
Forsgren, Mats (1997) "The Advantage Paradox of the Multinational 
Corporation" pages 69-88 in Forsgren, Mats and  Björkman, Ingmar (1997) 
"The Nature of the International Firm - Nordic Contributions to 
International Business Research" Handelshøyskolens Forlag, København 
Hall, Peter and Soskice, David (red) (2001) “Varieties of Capitalism – The 
Institutional foundations of comparative advantage” Oxford University 
Press 
Goergen, Marc and Renneboog, Luc (2001) “United Kingdom” in Gugler 
(red) Corporate Governance and Economic Performance, Oxford 
University Press 
Gugler, Klaus (2001) “Corporate governance and performance: The 
research questions”, in Gugler (red) Corporate Governance and Economic 
Performance, Oxford University Press 
Hildrum, Jarle (fortc) 
Laestadius, S. (1998): Technology level, knowledge formation and 
industrial competence in paper manufacturing”, in Eliasson, G et al. (eds.) 
Microfoundations of economic growth. A Schumpeterian perspective, The 
University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 212-226. 
Lam, Alice (1998) "The Social Embeddedness of Knowledge: Problems of 
Knowledge Sharing and Organisational Learning in International High-
Technology Ventures"  DRUID WP 98-7, Aalborg 
Lam, Alice (2001) "Managing global R&D networks and transnational 
organisational learning: Japanse and US multinationals in the ICT and 
pharmaceuticals industries" Conference paper, ESRC Conference on 
Multinationals 
Lam, Alice (2002) “Alternative models of learning and innovation in the 
knowledge economy” International social science journal No. 171, 
February 2002 
Lazonick, William (2001) "The Theory of Innovative Enterprise: 
Organization of Innovation in the "Learning Economy" paper, Innovation 
Studies Network Conference in Rosendal, Norway 
Lazonick, William and O’Sullivan, Mary (2000) “Maximizing shareholder 
value: A new ideology for corporate governance” Economy and Society 
Volume 29 number 1,  February 2000:13-35 
Lazonic, William og O`Sullivan, Mary (1998) "Corporate Governance and 
the Innovative Economy: Policy Implications"  STEP-report R-03, Oslo 
Morgan, Glenn (2002) “The Multinational Firm: Organizing Across 
Institutional and National Divides” in Morgan, Hull Kristensen and Whitley 
(2001) The Multinational Firm, Oxford University Press 
Nooteboom, Bart (2002) “Learning and innovation in organizations and 
economies” Oxford University Press 
Owen, Geoffrey (2001) “Corporate governance in Britain: Is incremental 
reform enough?” report  from TSER programme  “Corporate Governance 
and Economic Performance in the EU”, INSEAD 
72 
 O’Sullivan (1998) “Contests for Corporate Control” Oxford University 
Press 
O’Sullivan (2004) “Finance and innovation” forthcoming. 
Porter, Michael E (red) (1994) “Capital Choices” Council on 
Competitiveness/Harvard Business School, Boston 
Ruigrok, Winfreid og Van Tulder, Rob (1995) "The Logic of International 
Restructuring"  Routheldge, London 
Seifert, Werner et al (2000) “European Capital Markets” MacMillan 
Business, London 
Soskice, David (1999) " Divergenct Production Regimes: Uncoordinated 
and Coordinated Market Economies in the 1980´s and 1990´s", in Kitchelt 
et al (eds) "Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism"  
Cambridge University Press 1999 
Tylecote, Andrew (1994) “Financial systems and Innovation” in Dodgson, 
Mark and  Rothwell, Roy (1994) “The Handbook of Industrial Innovation” 
Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 
von Krogh, Georg, Ichijo, Kazuo og Nonaka, Ikurjiro (2000) “Enabling 
Knowledge Creation – How to Unlock the Mysteries of Tacit Knowledge ” 
Oxford University Press 
Whitley, Richard (2001) “How and why are international firms different? 
The consequences of cross-border managerial coordination for firm 
characteristics and behaviour” in Morgan, Hull Kristensen and Whitley 
(2001) The Multinational Firm, Oxford University Press 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Company cases Sweden 
The Swedish software case: Internet AB 
By Hans De Geer, Tommy Borglund and Magnus Frostenson 
Introduction and methodology  
The question about innovation and knowledge in multinational firms can be 
highlighted in different ways. This case study focuses on the consequences 
of the cross-border acquisition of the Swedish firm Internet AB by 
Deutschnet GmbH, a German competitor . The purpose is to illustrate the 
problem of innovation and knowledge development, accumulation and 
maintenance in a cross-border acquisition. The empirical material has been 
collected mainly through semi-structured interviews, but also through 
documents and observations on a longitudinal basis. The research is 
qualitative rather than quantitative. In particular, cultural aspects have been 
of interest since these are likely to have consequences for the milieu of 
innovation and learning. The internationalized context is also highlighted 
since it provides a key to understanding the fate of Internet AB.  
Background 
German acquisitions in Sweden 
Out of the many foreign acquisitions of Swedish companies in recent years, 
German buyers are among the most common ones. Hence, German 
companies play an increasingly important role as owners of Swedish 
companies. In 2002 15 percent of the foreign investments in Sweden were 
made by German companies, making German firms the second largest 
investors in Sweden after American companies.  About 39 800 Swedes 
worked in 770 German owned companies in Sweden 2002, compared to 
1990 when 11 900 Swedes worked in 220 German owned companies.   
When it comes to foreign owned IT companies, the pattern is somewhat 
different. Foreign owned IT companies have played a less important role in 
Sweden the latest years. Between 2002 and 2003 about 10 000 jobs were 
lost in foreign owned IT companies.  About 2000 of those jobs were lost in 
German owned IT companies in Sweden. However, the percentage of 
employees in foreign owned IT companies in the IT industry has been pretty 
stable, close to 30 percent. Hence, the jobs lost are probably due to the 
problems in the industry, not so much that foreign investors have lost their 
interest in Swedish IT-companies. 
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 Nature of the firm 
Internet AB was founded in Stockholm in 1994 by two private 
entrepreneurs. The firm’s main focus was on Internet consulting, a direction 
that the firm took in the mid-1990ies after starting its business as a 
developer of various multimedia products. As times passed, its business was 
expanded to include technical engineering and IT-solutions and more 
general consultancy services within management and strategy. As many 
other Internet consultants, the firm had special competence within general 
web design. But new market demands forced the firm to acquire new skill in 
order to satisfy customers’ needs. Offering back-office solutions, 
middleware, web showrooms and interfaces became necessary. The 
customer base was a mix between well-known, mainly Swedish, 
multinationals and newly established e-trade firms.   
Internet AB was acquired by a Deutschnet GmbH in late 1999. At the time, 
Deutschnet GmbH had about three times as many employees as Internet AB 
and was highly valued on the German stock market. The purchase was 
followed up a few months later when Deutschnet GmbH bought another 
Swedish IT consultancy firm, Tech AB, which had a more explicit technical 
focus, and integrated it into the local organisation.  
Development since takeover 
Internet AB was small seen in a wider perspective. Around 70 people 
worked within the organisation at the time of the takeover. Sales had been 
surging for a few years and the firm had experienced a substantial increase 
in its turnover, which was now approaching a level of around 50 million 
SEK a year.  
After the acquisition took place, there was a substantial focus on growth and 
expansion. A new business unit was established in a town in the western 
part of Sweden, and the number of Swedish employees rose by around 50% 
when Tech AB was purchased a few months after the takeover. Great plans 
were made  for expansion via new business units around Scandinavia. More 
people were hired and the number of Swedish employees approached 150 in 
the middle of 2000.  
But after the burst of the Internet bubble in 2000, business conditions got 
worse. Cut-downs and rationalizations became a reality in late 2000 and 
early 2001. The office in western Sweden was shut down without having 
attracted any customers at all, and the number of staff was reduced by 
almost 40% through different measures during these months. Things got 
even worse in 2001 when both Deutschnet GmbH and Internet AB suffered 
heavy losses.  
Of course, one reason for this was the general downturn in the industry. For 
the Internet consultants, one major cause of the worsened business 
conditions was the demise of the e-trade firms, which constituted a very 
important group of customers that no longer were able to place orders or pay 
their bills. To a certain extent this was a reality for Internet AB too. But 
since many customers were established and sound multinationals, this 
wasn’t decisive. Other factors contributed. Costs were high, as was price 
competition in order to attract customers. Another reason was that 
customers developed their own competence and were able to carry out tasks 
using their own staff rather than assigning them to consultants. In sum, 
Internet AB faced a severe crisis. Especially its liquidity was bad, and 
Deutschnet GmbH had to support it financially until the bitter end. 
The sound part of the Swedish business was Tech AB, the firm that was 
acquired in the second phase. In the summer of 2001, the mother-company 
Deutschnet GmbH went bankrupt, followed by the financial collapse of 
Internet AB a few days afterwards. As the Swedish business was 
reconstructed after the bankruptcy, the technicians and IT specialists of 
Tech AB, who were organized as an own unit within the Swedish group, 
continued their business by establishing a new firm. A few of the old 
Internet consultants in the collapsed Internet AB also started up anew, 
handpicking old colleagues to go on in a new setting, although with less 
emphasis on the Internet. They also retook the old name of the firm, 
removing the prefix “Deutsch”, which had been imposed on all firms that 
were integrated into the German group.  
Overlap and reasons for the takeover 
In 1999 there was a distinct trend among Internet companies to take part in 
the structural changes in the Internet industry. There were several mergers 
and acquisitions between different actors in the industry, both national and 
international. It was almost a race among many Internet companies to reach 
a substantial size since that was considered to be a competitive advantage 
and something that was rewarded by the stock market. 
Internet AB also had an interest in growth and the company wanted to 
become a big player in the European Internet industry. This was reflected in 
the Swedish founder’s eagerness to be a part of something bigger. ”We 
could have bought several smaller companies but it would have taken to 
long time. We would like to grow in one step since it is a hurry to build a 
network”, he said in an interview in a newspaper.  
However, since Internet AB lacked financial resources enough to buy other 
companies, its owners chose to be acquired by Deutschnet GmbH. The 
shareholders of Internet AB, mainly the founder and an investment 
company, decided to merge with Deutschnet GmbH by switching shares, 
thereby becoming minority owners in the new company. In the short run this 
was very successful for the shareholders since the share price of the new 
company rose sharply shortly after the acquisition.  
Less than a year before the acquisition another competing Swedish Internet 
Company was negotiating to buy Deutschnet GmbH. That deal broke down 
since the parties could not agree on the terms. The Swedish competitor 
started to look for other companies to buy instead. Deutschnet GmbH was 
listed on the stock market, which gave the company a high market value and 
a higher potential to acquire companies by switching shares. Deutschnet 
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 GmbH wanted to grow by buying other firms. Since the company had made 
an IPO over the stock market they had financial resources and a high market 
value to make acquisitions. They wanted to buy medium sized companies 
with good product quality on new markets. Internet AB complemented them 
geographically and since its shareholders were willing to trade their shares 
for shares in Deutschnet GmbH the two parties reached an agreement. 
Internet AB and Deutschnet GmbH were essentially in the same line of 
business, with core competence within communication and web design. The 
basic rationale of the deal was to unite a firm from one of Europe’s most 
developed markets with one from the biggest market of the continent, the 
German one. Deutschnet GmbH communicated a long-term engagement and 
an interest in product and service quality, management competence and in 
entering new markets.  
The target firm was not allowed to be too big to handle. As the protagonists 
of the two firms asserted, they had a common interest in expanding their 
businesses both geographically and substantially, through developing or 
going into areas such as management consulting, customer relationship 
management and technical assistance. This meant that a wholesale concept 
was introduced, replacing the old focus on communication and design. 
Structurally, this would be achieved through acquisitions and organic 
growth, the latter of which was emphasised. Within the group, separate 
firms should be established, specializing in their distinct competence areas. 
Impacts of takeover within the acquired firm 
Initial changes  
Initially there were some smaller changes for Internet AB stemming from 
the acquisition. Primarily, new systems were introduced for control and 
planning. There was a change of business system to SAP which was used by 
Deutschnet GmbH. SAP is a business system made for use in big companies 
and integrates several functions such as accounting and planning of projects.  
Internet AB now had to work with that kind of big system which included 
new ways of measuring the number of orders received, as well as new 
systems for documenting the time used for different projects. It was a way 
of measuring productivity which had not been done before. Through these 
systems there was a higher focus on planning and what was to happen in the 
nearest future. The planning had to be realistic since it was used to make 
prognoses that were to be communicated to the stock market.  
This resulted in a bigger workload of administration for project leaders and 
others who were to gather and send information through these new systems. 
People felt that things took a little longer time to do because of to this extra 
administration. There was also a change in the branding of the company. 
The name of Internet AB was not to be used anymore and the Deutschnet 
GmbH brand was introduced in the Swedish organisation. The new logotype 
was printed on for example business cards, pencils and brochures.   
Internet AB had a fairly weak position within the new company. The 
founder of Internet AB had a place in the board of directors. He was made a 
senior executive with responsibility of a big geographical market where 
Sweden was one part. Internet AB did not have much influence on the 
general international operations. It represented about 10-15 percent of the 
overall size of the Deutschnet GmbH. The new owners were almost 
invisible for Swedish employees. There were some formal contacts with 
headquarters through the sending of information and reports in the new IT-
systems but there was not much informal contact. The CEO of Deutschnet 
GmbH visited Sweden a couple of times to meet the employees, but the 
general impression was that he was on a big distance from them, 
communicating visions of small concern to them. 
In the beginning Deutschnet GmbH invested resources in Internet AB, 
especially in new IT systems and in the new corporate brand. Efforts to 
increase quality and stability were made, resulting in higher costs for 
administrative routines. New offices were opened, one in a better and more 
expensive address in Stockholm and one in the western part of Sweden. But 
over time there were smaller and smaller resources available for the 
Swedish part of Deutschnet GmbH. That was mostly due to the worsening 
business conditions with lower demand for Internet consultancy services 
and the falling share prices on Internet stocks. Big cutbacks in budgets and 
personnel were enforced on the organisation by the new owners.  
Knowledge transfer and role of own R&D 
Being a small firm with a very strong focus on growth, research and 
development activities were not undertaken in isolation from customer 
related projects. Rather, these relationships were tightly linked to innovation 
and creativity, which was spurred by working actively in close co-operation 
with customers in order to find solutions to their problems. This means that 
innovation in general could be seen as strongly linked to what the firm 
perceived to be the needs of its customers.  
Just like many other Internet firms, Internet AB benefited from the 
knowledge advantage they had in comparison to many of its customers, a 
competitive advantage that seems to have diminished as time went by. 
Being an edge player, ahead of the customers’ own learning processes and 
increased possibilities to resolve their own problems, required ongoing 
knowledge accumulation, which was difficult to attain within the prevailing 
structures of the firm. In practice, transfer of knowledge from Internet AB to 
its customers took place and little was received in return. 
Work was organised loosely in projects, and this also had a bearing on how 
and in what way development of the firm’s products and services took 
place. Much was done on an ad hoc basis. Knowledge development was 
essentially tied to individual participation in different projects, and this 
participation was not evenly distributed. Some persons were engaged in 
more projects than others, often due to good relations to the management of 
the firm. Being active and taking initiatives were prerequisites for working 
in prestige projects.  
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 The steady growth in the number of employees, which lasted until the 
summer of 2000, caused problems. Assertedly, lots of people joined the firm 
without having the requisite competencies for doing high-quality work. The 
growth focus fuelled an aggressive hiring policy. Certain people were 
employed without their references being checked at all. Lots of people were 
in their early twenties, and most of the management just under thirty years 
of age. All this meant that the firm was filled with enthusiastic employees, 
but also that it lacked experienced staff. 
After the purchase the need for more advanced technology made itself 
known. This was in line with a broader business concept including more all-
embracing solutions to customers in order to qualify as a full-service 
provider. However, Internet AB’s competence within this area was rather 
low, and Deutschnet GmbH did not add much to it. To many Swedes, it 
seemed evident that Deutschnet did not possess these technical skills at all. 
And even if they did, knowledge transfer was so scarce that Internet AB 
couldn’t benefit from it anyway.  
Because of the need for technical knowledge, and in line with a growth 
strategy and an idea about local presence, Tech AB was bought in early 
2000. Integration was tough, however, and some the newly purchased firm’s 
senior consultants left immediately. When the business conditions 
worsened, the technicians were to a great extent spared when 
rationalizations were made. As Deutschnet GmbH went bankrupt, the 
founders of Tech AB started up a new business, handpicking a few of the 
old colleagues to join them. 
From the Swedish perspective, there were strong hopes about knowledge 
interaction and transfer when the purchase was made official. However, 
much of this came to nought. Deutschnet GmbH was seen as passive and the 
Swedes’ business went on more or less as before. No new business model 
emanating from Deutschnet GmbH was introduced, contrary to what 
Internet AB had hoped for. Knowledge transfer didn’t occur in any 
direction, at least not in a formalized way.  Top management interaction was 
scarce. And although middle management took part in meetings in Sweden, 
relatively little came out of it. Knowledge exchange was more up to 
individual initiatives rather than a strategical choice.  
One senior manager of Internet AB typically remarked that the knowledge 
transfer from the mature Swedish market to the big German market did not 
consist of more than passing on a few logotypes of Swedish customers to 
Deutschnet GmbH. Some Swedes were engaged in projects initiated by the 
Germans, but this was mostly in order to make use of Swedish competence 
in international projects. 
Co-operation model of acquired firm prior to and after takeover 
A basic feature of the business that Internet AB ran was ad hoc projects 
combined with a customer oriented organisational structure. When 
Deutschnet GmbH entered the scene, project groups tended to become much 
larger, and each member got a more specialized function than before. A new 
divisional organisation was also introduced, and competence groups were 
initiated, consisting of people with the same type of knowledge and tasks. 
Within the Swedish organisation, designers, sales people, key account 
managers and technical developers formed such groups that were meant to 
contribute to knowledge diffusion based on experiences. Art directors, 
copywriters and others welcomed this change, since they had a special need 
for working together to achieve a creative climate. These groups, however, 
were established at a rather late stage when things were already getting 
worse financially, meaning that they never were able to make much 
difference from a business point of view. 
In the nature of Internet consultancy lays a rather close relationship to the 
customer. But this, however, was not necessarily a characteristic that was 
explicitly appreciated by employees of the firm. Having fun, working late 
nights and making use of creative potential were in many eyes the lodestars 
of the business rather than adhering strictly to customer specifications and 
needs. A characteristic that can be seen as an expression of this was the fact 
that the work that Internet AB performed was undertaken in its own 
Stockholm offices. That is, physical presence at customers’ premises was 
not deemed necessary.  
To some extent this changed as the financial realities made themselves 
known after the takeover. Work processes were shaped up and became 
subject to control and harder scrutiny. The new profitability focus reduced 
the room for creativity. Going from being a small firm to an 
internationalized and bigger one affected the work climate. Not only 
Deutschnet GmbH had to tackle integration issues when they bought the 
Swedish firm. Internet AB too had to deal with a local situation of growth 
and integration of the newly bought Tech AB. More space was needed. A 
physical separation of the units became reality, with one office that 
constituted the public showroom and where the management sat, and 
another one on a somewhat less fancy address, where much of the 
production took place.  
In the beginning many people in Internet AB had a feeling of being left 
alone, a fact that many employees didn’t regret. The CEO of Deutschnet 
GmbH came to Sweden two or three times but never spent more than a 
couple of hours here each time. The short visits mainly consisted of 
discussions with the Swedish senior management and press conferences. 
German middle management came over more often, but co-operation in its 
real essence only took place in certain project groups that were put together 
across borders. 
Factors hampering innovation activity in the acquired firm  
In an Internet consultancy firm at the turn of the Millennium, innovation 
was strongly linked to creativity rather than profitability. The atmosphere 
was marked by entrepreneurial enthusiasm and the common go-ahead-spirit 
that characterized the so called “new economy”. Basically, this cultural 
phenomenon was borne by the in-group of the firm, consisting of people 
who had been involved in founding it or that enjoyed status for some other 
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 reason. Due to the rapid expansion of the number of employees, other 
categories came into the firm without immediate access to the cultural 
bearers’ inner circle.  
As the firm grew, the division between these groups became more evident. 
The “playground” atmosphere that prevailed before the takeover was to a 
great extent the product of the preferences and attitudes of the cultural 
bearers. This resulted in innovative, although not necessarily profitable, 
solutions. However, the “playground” epoch came to an end when 
Deutschnet GmbH entered the scene. This was mainly due to a stronger 
profitability focus and the need for control, which the new SAP system 
facilitated. The aim was to steer processes and to pave the way for growth. 
The introduction of the system was, however, a severe blow to creativity, 
according to the interviewed co-workers, since a control focus replaced the 
relative creative freedom that once used to be the hallmark of the business.  
There were visible signs indicating that the creative and innovative era had 
come to an end. In a sector marked by entrepreneurs and creative solutions, 
competitions like “the Web Campaign of the Month” played an important 
role. Internet AB had won several awards for their innovative solutions, but 
after the purchase this was no longer the case. Even though it wasn’t 
intended, idea generation seems to have been curtailed within the new 
structure. Deutschnet GmbH was not directly blamed for this. Increased size 
and more routines were mentioned as the problem, but more in a general 
sense than as something that Deutschnet GmbH could be accused of. 
Whatever the cause, efficiency and fervour faded, with lower quality as a 
consequence.  
There was a new rigour in the business, which was ambiguously perceived. 
To some, it was equated with stability and safety while others saw it as the 
cause of lost of creativity, entrepreneurial spirit and family feeling. 
Financial facts also spoke for themselves. The profit-and-loss-account 
suggested that there were no possibilities to keep employees that were not 
pulling their weight. A strong business focus took over due to the economic 
realities, which was to some extent detrimental to the “hype factor”. 
Key personnel’s commitment to acquired firm after the takeover 
Commitment was to some extent structurally assumed in the financial 
arrangements following the purchase. The protagonist among the founders 
of the firm received shares in Deutschnet GmbH as the main compensation 
for selling his part of the firm. Others, belonging to the same circle as the 
remaining founder, were tied up by a stock option plan, which contained a 
lock-in paragraph hindering key personnel from capitalizing their options 
before a certain date. This program, however, existed before Deutschnet 
GmbH came in and caused irritation, since the new owners did not make use 
of this kind of motivational instruments. 
In general, the old management team of Internet AB pulled out, not 
immediately, but in the process following the purchase. The entrepreneurs 
that personified the firm, both internally and externally, left or lowered their 
ambitions. A sense of lost identity took over, removing the earlier 
enthusiasm of the in-group of the firm. A new management came in, 
replacing the old one. But there were clouds in the sky. Many old managers 
left, reportedly in protest against the new direction that the business took. 
Out of those who stayed, many went back to positions related to sales and 
project managing, which signified a confusion of roles. These people were 
still bearers of culture, but with less formal power than before. A vacuum 
could be felt.  
Connections to local innovation environment and resource 
base  
There was only a small significance of the local and national resource base 
for Internet AB. It did not receive any direct incentives or support from the 
local community. Regarding the approach to national R&D and innovation 
policy measures, there was little such interest from the company. The 
development of the company was very much driven by the market for 
Internet services. On the other hand, it had the advantage of being in an 
Internet cluster in Stockholm together with other Internet companies. It also 
had the advantage of good infrastructure when it comes to IT- and telecom 
systems, which is crucial for the Internet industry.  
The magazine Newsweek wrote about the emergence of an IT and Internet 
cluster in Stockholm and mentioned several factors which can be said to 
have contributed to a good innovation environment.  In Stockholm there 
was the technical campus in Kista with many smaller high tech IT 
companies and the presence of Ericsson and their development of wireless 
Internet services. Other factors were the availability of telecommunications 
at a low cost and that the universities had made early investments in Internet 
connections. IT consultancy firms had a tradition of being in the Stockholm 
area since the 1980-ies and many Swedes had personal computers in their 
homes since purchases of computers to employees were tax deductible for 
companies (Fölster 2000).  This made Stockholm to an important test 
market for products and services relating to the Internet and a good 
environment for start up businesses.  
The takeover resulted in negative consequences for Internet AB and for the 
surrounding innovation environment, at least in the sense that the company 
went out of business in the end. The weak finances of Deutschnet GmbH 
brought down also Internet AB, which, however, would probably have gone 
bankrupt anyway, even if it had not been acquired. Internet AB was affected 
of the general slowdown in the industry in Stockholm, Sweden and Europe. 
This was a slowdown that eventually turned out to be much more than a 
slowdown. It was more or less a downright collapse of the entire Internet 
industry, where values of the companies fell sharply on the stock market and 
where many of the stars in the industry went out of business. The corollary 
of this was a general distrust of the whole sector.  
The failure described in this case study was a consequence of the collapse of 
the industry. In a way it contributed to a development that made Stockholm 
lose its leading position as a cluster for Internet companies. By 
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 understanding this case you can also understand the failure of the whole 
industry and its effects on the innovation environment. Even though in the 
beginning there was no big importance of national R&D and innovation 
policy measures, the question is if such measures could have had a role to 
play when things got out of hand in the company and in the industry. Was 
there anything that could have been done in form of innovation policy and 
support to keep the competence and the innovations to survive? This is a 
topic for discussion, in particular as we bear in mind that other Internet 
related companies like Yahoo and Google survived the crisis and became 
international giants. 
However, the innovations and knowledge coming from this venture were 
not totally destroyed by the collapse. They survived in areas such as web 
design, technical platforms, strategy concepts and business models. One 
start-up under the name Internet AB emerged after the bankruptcy using 
personnel from the former Internet AB and their knowledge about web 
design. In addition, Tech AB started up again using the knowledge about the 
technical platforms.  
In general, many of the customers in the industry started to do their own in-
house web design, building on the basis of knowledge they had obtained 
from working together with Internet consultancy firms. Some former 
customers hired people from Internet consultancy firms. Traditional IT-
companies integrated Internet solutions in their management consultancy 
services, as did management consultancy firms. Hence, innovations from 
Internet AB to some extent survived and where transferred to customers, 
competitors and to new start ups. 
In connection to the Internet industry and to the concept of the “New 
Economy” innovations in the form of new ways of organising emerged. 
Speed, individualism, risk, change and the search for new possibilities 
became new norms in organisations (Holmberg & Strannegård 2002).  
People were described as being flexible, working in networks where the 
individual had made a business of himself, the Me Inc. Organisations were 
supposed to be connected in alliances and networks in a market of self-
organising individuals. There was a discussion of the revival of the 
entrepreneur and a higher status for people starting to build their own 
company (Fölster 2000). This way of looking at the world belongs to the 
discourse of the “New Economy” which Internet AB also was a part of.  It is 
a way of thinking which in one interpretation can be seen as innovative and 
as something which probably to some extent have survived the crash of the 
Internet industry. Signs of that are that entrepreneurs from crashed Internet 
companies have been reported in media to work in other start-ups building 
on network organising. 
Conclusions 
The takeover initially introduced new planning systems and new 
administrative routines in an attempt to boost quality and professionalism. 
Some perceived this as causing stability and safety while others saw it as 
damaging to the creativity, entrepreneurial spirit and family feeling of the 
firm. There was a change of power when insiders and early employees over 
time left the company without the emergence of any new bearers of culture 
and identity. The takeover did not bring very much of technical or design 
innovations to the Internet AB and the new owners were on a distance from 
the Swedish organisation due to a lack of integration processes. As times got 
worse not much was done to live up to initial visions of expanding the 
markets and developing new products. Soon the survival of the firm became 
the number one priority when demand fell and stock markets crashed. Big 
cutbacks were made in budgets and personnel.  
The weaknesses in the firm were the lack of order and routines, the 
dependence on the founder and the inner circle around him, later resulting in 
a leadership vacuum together with a too rapid expansion and too much 
optimism about the own capacities and the market potential. What is 
striking is the fragile nature of Internet AB. It lacked any systems of 
building and accumulating knowledge inside the company, systems that 
would have made the company stronger in difficult times. This case study 
shows the importance of having an internal organisation for fostering 
knowledge and learning which can build quality over time.  
The merger between the organisations became very hard to handle for the 
inexperienced organisation, especially without these systems of keeping 
knowledge in the organisation. There was a lack of integration processes 
and efforts to make the organisations work together. Instead many of the 
most experienced left the company complaining over a lack of creativity. 
Those were the people that would have been needed to transform the 
company in difficult times.  
In addition, the “hype” of the “New Economy” seems to have made it 
difficult for management and others to have a realistic view of the future. 
There were collective misjudgements made in the name of the “New 
Economy”. The rationalities constructed within this discourse might be seen 
as a knowledge bubble with unrealistic expectations building on false 
theories. The “hype” in itself blindfolded the entrepreneurs. 
The strength was the local network of customers that the firm worked with 
and the creativity and innovation that the company developed in co-
operation with the customers. Unfortunately the difficulties in the market 
became too much to handle. The company was too small and weak to cope 
with the difficulties itself. It needed strong support from a mother company 
that wasn’t able to uphold it for a longer time.  
The “hype factor” was a major characteristic of the work climate for a long 
time. But when the advantage of newness disappeared and the march from 
small and personal to big and impersonal was on its way, the glamour of the 
firm faded away. But in the end some of its achievements lived on, since 
some of its innovations were transferred to the surrounding environment in 
the form of new start-ups and knowledge transfer to customers and others.  
In general, innovations in the industry as for example new ways of 
organising lived on as a part of a mindset of a new generation of co-workers 
and entrepreneurs. Although emanating from a financial failure, seeds of 
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 innovation coming from Internet AB can be said to have lived on in the 
surrounding business environment. The seeds of innovation were spread to 
customers, competitors and to new start-ups. 
Policy perspectives 
When it comes to policy recommendations from this case study, you can ask 
if anything could have been done to prevent Internet AB from going 
bankrupt as a part of the bankruptcy of Deutschnet. You can also ask what 
anyone should do if an important cluster is on the way of going under due to 
bad business conditions.  
Should governmental or any other bodies try to interfere to keep the cluster 
alive or help to save innovations from the cluster to survive in other forms?  
Maybe this can be done together with venture capitalists, where companies 
in a threatened cluster are restructured, building a new business on their 
technical innovation? Many would answer no to these questions, referring to 
a history of failed industrial policy of supporting, for example, industries 
like shipbuilding. However, this should be a topic for discussion. 
 
The Swedish pharmaceutical case: The merger between 
Astra and Zeneca. Impacts on R&D activities in Sweden 
By Katarina Arbin 
The Swedish Pharmaceutical Industry 
According to Swedish statistics, enterprises have increased their global 
presence in the 1990’s and early 2000’s. The value of takeovers in Sweden 
reached a unique high level in 1999, which can mainly be explained by two 
big mergers and acquisitions (AstraZeneca and Volvo Cars).64 The year 
2003 about 235 000 were employed in the manufacturing industry, 
predominately in the manufacturing of vehicles and chemicals, for foreign 
controlled enterprises in Sweden.65 In the pharmaceutical industry, 88 per 
cent were employed in foreign controlled enterprises.66
The market size for pharmaceuticals has increased continuously over the 
years. Comparing pharmaceutical sales in 1980, 1998 and 2003, there has 
been an increase in sales. The total pharmaceutical sales for Sweden in 1980 
was 2 445 MSEK, compared with, 16 572 MSEK in 1998, and 23 689 
MSEK in 2003. In 2004 the total pharmaceutical sales in Sweden amount to 
23 761 MSEK67.68  
Sweden’s export of pharmaceuticals in 2003 was 49 382 MSEK, total 
export to EU was 25 013 MSEK. Sweden’s import of pharmaceuticals 2003 
was 11 550 MSEK. The majority of this import came from the following 
countries; Denmark (16,6%), Germany (11,3%), Belgium (10,4%), 
Switzerland (10,3%) and Great Britain (9,5%).  
Even though sales are increasing, the pharmaceutical sector is experiencing 
increased pricing pressure and a more competitive business environment. In 
order to come up with new pharmaceuticals, large investments over time in 
research and development are needed, resulting in, compared to before, very 
large investment costs in order to develop and improve pharmaceuticals.69 
The research and development cost for a new medicine has increased from 
1677 MSEK70 1991 to 5825 MSEK71 2001.72
                                                 
64 UNCTAD, World Investment Report based on data from Financial Corporation and compiled by ITPS. 
65 ITPS, International Business. 
66 ITPS, International Business. 
67 The figure for 2004 is moving annual total (July-June). 
68 The Swedish Association of the Pharmaceutical Industry, the trade association for the pharmaceutical 
industry in Sweden. 
69 Interview with project manager at AstraZeneca Södertälje, December 2003. 
70 The figures are converted from USD into SEK. 1 USD = 7,26 SEK. 
71 The figures are converted from USD into SEK. 1 USD = 7,26 SEK. 
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 Looking at figures regarding current costs and capital investments for R&D 
in certain Swedish industries of manufacturing, pharmaceuticals can be 
compared to other industries. For pharmaceuticals, current costs are 
estimated to 11 932 MSEK and investment expenditures to 662 MSEK, 
summing up to a total of 12 594 MSEK. For telecommunication equipment 
current costs are estimated to 15 628 MSEK and investment expenditures to 
844 MSEK, reaching a total of 16 472 MSEK. Pulp and paper products have 
current costs at 949 MSEK, and investment expenditures at 55 MSEK.73
When comparing research and development intensity in certain Swedish 
industries of manufacturing for 2001, R&D expenditures in % of total 
turnover was 26,7% for pharmaceuticals, which is much higher than, 
compared to telecommunication equipment (10,8 %), paper products (1,0%) 
and food products (0,3%).74
In order to give insights into the significance of the pharmaceutical industry, 
from a national point of view a presentation of figures regarding health care 
costs are given. Health care costs in Sweden as percentage of GDP, is 8,2% 
(199 Billions SEK). Pharmaceutical sales accounts for 14% of those 8,2%, 
as percentage of health care costs.75
Sales in Sweden by the10 largest pharmaceutical companies in 2004 can be 
seen in figure 1 below. The figures in figure 1, are moving annual total 
(MAT), September (2003) to August (2004). 
Table 9 Sales in Sweden by the 10 largest pharmaceutical groups of companies 
2004.76  
 
Pharmaceutical group  MAT77, MSEK, 2004  % of total MAT, 2004  
PFIZER    3 344   14,0 
ASTRAZENECA  2 106   8,8 
GLAXOSMITHKLINE  1 303   4,4 
NOVARTIS   1 018   4,3 
ORIFARM   990   4,1 
WYETH LEDERLE  912   3,8 
MSD    861   3,6 
AVENTIS PHARMA  842   3,5 
ROCHE    760   3,2 
SCHERING-PLOUGH  672   2,8 
 
                                                                                                                                               
72 EFPIA (The European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations) (represents the 
research-based pharmaceutical industry operating in Europe). 
73 The Swedish Association of the Pharmaceutical Industry and Statistics Sweden. 
74 The Swedish Association of the Pharmaceutical Industry and Statistics Sweden. 
75 Statistics Sweden and the Swedish pharmacy chain Apoteket AB.
76 The Swedish Association of the Pharmaceutical Industry, the trade association for the pharmaceutical 
industry in Sweden.  
77 Moving Annual Total, From September 2003 to August 2004. 
As can be seen in the figure above Pfizer is the pharmaceutical group that 
has the largest sales on the Swedish market, second is AstraZeneca with 
sales on 2 106 MSEK. 
Below in figure 2, large mergers and acquisitions within the international 
pharmaceutical industry are presented.  
Table 10 Large mergers and acquisitions within the pharmaceutical industry since 
1990.78
 
Year Companies     New name 
2004  Sanofi-Synthélabo + Aventis   Sanofi-Aventis 
2003 Pfizer + Pharmacia    Pfizer 
2001 BASF Pharma/Knoll + Abbott   Abbott 
2001 Glaxo Wellcome + SmithKline Beecham  GlaxoSmithKline 
2000 Pfizer + Warner Lambert    Pfizer 
2000 Pharmacia & Upjohn + Searle   Pharmacia 
1999 Hoechst Marion Roussel + Rhone-Poulenc   Rorer Aventis 
1999 Astra + Zeneca     AstraZeneca 
1997 Nycomed + Amersham    Nycomed Amersham 
1996 Ciba Geigy + Sandoz    Novartis 
1995 Glaxo Borroughs + Wellcome   Glaxo Wellcome 
1995 Hoechst Roussel + Marion Merrell Dow  Hoechst Marion Roussel 
1995 Pharmacia + Upjohn    Pharmacia & Upjohn 
1994 Janssen + Cilag     Janssen-Cilag 
1991 SmithKline + Beecham    SmithKline Beechman 
1990 Rhone-Poulenc + Rorer    Rhone-Poulenc Rorer 
 
One of the motives to mergers and merger talk between major 
pharmaceutical companies, is the rapidly rising costs and risks associated 
with researching and developing new drugs. Due to the complexity of 
biomedical research, costs are rising in inverse proportion to the number of 
novel medicines to emerge from this research. Some companies will win 
and others will lose.79  
When looking at the Swedish market, there has been consolidation among 
the large companies and the large players are continuing to grow. This has 
created space on the market for so called specialty farmer companies, for 
example the company Meda, which is taking over products on a license 
basis that are too small for the large organisations. These specialty farmer 
companies have no research and development of their own.  
A couple of years ago these kind of companies (specialty farmer companies) 
were popular and viewed as important (for Sweden and for the industry) and 
they were offering high wages and interesting compensations to their 
                                                 
78 EFPIA (The European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations) (represents the 
research-based pharmaceutical industry operating in Europe).
79 Astra Annual Report, 1997.  
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 employees. Researchers at AstraZeneca were also interested in these biotech 
companies and several of AstraZenecas employees left the company for a 
smaller biotech companies that offered better employment terms. Besides 
competitive salaries, these companies could also offer options. But today 
(October, 2004) the situation has changed, the biotech companies are down 
on their knees and the researchers are coming back to AstraZeneca and other 
large companies. The small companies have an insecure existence and are 
struggling. Large companies are also having a hard time. It is difficult for all 
players at the pharmaceutical market right now.80
AstraZeneca 
In December 1998, Astra’s board of directors approved an agreement to 
merge with the British company Zeneca. Together the companies would 
form one of the world’s largest pharmaceutical companies – AstraZeneca.81  
In April 1999, Astra AB and Zeneca Group PLC merged to form 
AstraZeneca, one of the world’s leading pharmaceutical and agrochemical 
companies. Its healthcare business was strategically focused on seven major 
therapeutic areas: gastrointestinal, oncology, pain control and anaesthesia, 
cardiovascular, central nervous system, respiratory and infection.82  
In order to give a picture of business and product groups before and after the 
merger, products by Astra 1998 and by AstraZeneca 2003 are presented 
below. 
Main product groups at Astra 1998 were: Gastrointestinal, Cardiovascular, 
Respiratory and Pain control.  
 
 Main product within Gastrointestinal (acid-related disorders): Losec.  
 Main products within Cardiovascular (high blood pressure, 
atherosclerosis, angina pectoris, myocardial infarction, congestive heart 
failure and cardiac arrhythmias): Seloken, Plendil, Imadur, Ramace, 
Canef and Atacand.  
 Main products within Respiratory: Pulmicort, Bricanyl, Rhinocort and 
Oxis.  
 Main products within Pain Control: Xylocaine, Marcaine, EMLA, 
Naropin, Carbocaine and Citanest. 
 
When looking at main product groups at AstraZeneca 2003, we find the 
product groups similar but stronger: Cardiovascular, Gastrointestinal, 
Oncology, Respiratory and Inflammation, Neuroscience and Infection. 
                                                 
80 Interview with global manager for information and PR, October 2004. 
81 Astra Annual Report, 1998. 
82 AstraZeneca Annual Report, 1999. 
 Main products within Cardiovascular: Atacand, Crestor, Exanta, Plendil, 
Seloken and Zestril.  
 Main products within Gastrointestinal: Losec/Prilosec (proton pump 
inhibitor for acid related diseases), Losec MUPS (in tablet form) and 
Nexium.  
 Main products within Oncology: Arimides (breast cancer), Casodex 
(prostate cancer), Faslodex, Iressa, Nolvadex and Zoladex. Main 
products within Respiratory and Inflammation: Accolate (for control of 
asthma), Oxis, Pulmicort, Rhinocort och Symbicort.  
 Main products within Neuroscience: Diprivan, Naropin, Seroquel 
(atypical anti-psychotic for schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders), 
Xylocaine (local anaesthetic for use in surgery and dentistry) and Zomig 
(migraine).  
 Main product within Infection: Merrem (ultra broad spectrum injectable 
antibiotic for serious bacterial). 
 
In 1998, before the merger, Astra’s turnover increased by 25% from the 
year before (1997) to 57,187 MSEK. Sales outside Sweden accounted for 96 
percent of total group sales.83 The number of R&D employees had risen 
from approximately 3500 in 1994 to 6 400 in 1998. Most of the research and 
development work was conducted at five major research units: four in 
Sweden and one in the UK. In addition, exploratory research was conducted 
at a number of smaller units in the US, Canada, India and Australia.  
Astra also collaborated with academic research centers and research 
companies in the biomedical field. The number of employees in the Astra 
Group was 24 958 and number of employees in Sweden were 8 060. 
Approximately 6 400 people worked within research and development. 
Research expenditures were 10,600 MSEK and capital expenditures were 
16,668 MSEK.84
Like Astra, Zeneca was a research-driven organisation. The company’s 
ability to develop novel, advanced drugs was the core of its business. Above 
all, in cancer treatment Zeneca had built up a very strong position. Astra’s 
firmly rooted management philosophy and view of the pharmaceutical 
business also had a counterpart in Zeneca.85
Regarding the ownership structure prior to and after the merger, Astra’s 
largest shareholders 1998 were: Investor (176,572,497 number of shares), 
Swedish National Pension Insurance Fund (77,471,466 number of shares), 
Robur mutual funds (49,525,266 number of shares) and SPP (47,134,260 
number of shares). 86 AstraZeneca’s largest shareholders 2003 were: The 
Capital Group Com anies Inc (254,143,676 number of shares), Investor AB p
                                                 
83 Astra Annual Report, 1998. 
84 Astra Annual Report, 1998. 
85 Astra Annual Report, 1998. 
86 Number of A-shares, from Astra Annual Report 1998.  
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 (91,545,308 number of shares), Putnam Investment Management LLC and 
the Putnam Advisory Company LLC (52,643,484 number of shares) and 
Legal & General Investment Management Limited (52,518,020 number o
shares).
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Before the m
merging with Zeneca these 61%, corresponded to 30,5%. In 2003, the 
Swedish ownership of AstraZeneca amount to 22%.88 The Swedish 
ownership has decreased after the merger (compare 30,5% to 22%), 
Swedish ownership is still relatively high considering that AstraZeneca i
international company. 
Today (October, 2004) A
pharmaceutical companies, providing medicines designed to fight 
areas of medical need: oncology, cardiovascular, gastrointestinal, infection, 
neuroscience and respiratory. They are active worldwide with sales in over 
100 countries, manufacturing in 20 and major research centres in seven 
countries. The company has 60 000 employees worldwide, including 
approximately 13 000 in Sweden. Corporate HQ is located in London 
and R&D HQ in Södertälje, Sweden. Sales in 2003 totalled $18.8 billion 
and total R&D spend in 2003 was $3.5 billion.89  
As mentioned above R&D HQ is situated in Sweden, with divisions in 
Lund, Mölndal and Södertälje. R&D Södertälje runs a research and 
development centre mainly within the fields of therapy for the central 
nervous system and pain control. There are 1 500 employees working w
R&D in Södertälje and approximately 1 200 co workers in Lund, working 
with research and development of new medicines and medical aids used in 
the battle against respiratory disorders. One of AstraZeneca’s larger 
research units is located in Mölndal. Some 2 500 people are working 
Mölndal, with research and development of medicines within the 
cardiovascular and gastrointestinal areas.90
Below reasons for the merger are presented.  
Since the late 1980’s to about 1997, several pharm
been acquired or had merged with others in the pharmaceutical industry. 
Astra had observed that the industry was consolidating and that merged o
acquired companies were successful. The larger companies were performin
well in the pharmaceutical market. 
 
87 AstraZeneca Annual Report, 2003. 
88 Interview with global manager information and PR, AstraZeneca, October 2004. 
89 AstraZeneca webpage. 
90 AstraZeneca webpage. 
Astra wanted to increase its turnover and grow and needed to investigate 
possible solutions. It was difficult to be a medium-sized company in the 
pharmaceutical market and there was a threat of other larger companies 
buying Astra and this would have resulted in a loss of their independence. 
The size was important for two main reasons.  
First, was that to be able to market new products on the global market, large 
marketing investments (costs) where needed. In the US market for example, 
there was a need for a large sales force and investment in consumer 
advertising in order to sell pharmaceuticals.  
Second, when it came to research and development, large investments were 
needed in a new technology base. There was a new technology base on the 
market, enabling technologies that was crucial to have when conducting 
research and development for new pharmaceuticals. This enabling 
technology was much cost demanding and Astra realized that in order to be 
successful they had to be large, the small- and midsize companies would not 
be able to afford the investments needed.  
Perfect product- and research fit according to AstraZeneca 
The overlap between businesses at the time of merger is presented below. 
At the time of the merger, both Astra and Zeneca had one product group 
each, where they were number one in the world. For Astra it was 
Gastrointestinal with Losec and for Zeneca it was Oncology with products 
for breast- and prostate cancer. 
In the area of Cardiovascular, the largest research area for Astra and for 
Zeneca (and still is for AstraZeneca) there was a perfect fit. Both companies 
were strong in this area, but there was only one product group that directly 
overlapped. Otherwise the products within Cardiovascular fit perfectly.  
Astra had certain gaps that were filled with the products by Zeneca and vice 
versa. There was however, one product category were they both had a 
product (beta-blocker). They had to choose one of the products according to 
the European competition authority and Astra’s product was chosen. 
When it came to Respiratory the situation regarding product fit was similar 
to the product fit of Cardiovascular. Astra was among the world leading 
companies on steroids with Pulmicort, but was missing product categories 
that Zeneca had.  
Regarding the area Pain Control, Astra was number one in the world on 
local anaesthesia with Xylocain, and Zeneca was number one in the world 
on anaesthetics. This was also a perfect fit, with product categories and 
products complementing each other.  
Finally, when it came to Neuroscience, Astra had research in this field, but 
few products, while Zeneca had one successful product already out in the 
market. Both regarding products and research this was a good fit.  
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 Concluding regarding research- and product fit; both companies were 
research driven organizations and it can be seen from above that the overlap 
between the companies businesses at the time of the merger was very good, 
complementing each other well. Both companies had one area in which they 
were number one (for Astra it was Gastrointestinal and for Zeneca it was 
Oncology). Regarding Cardiovascular, Respiratory, Pain Control and 
Neuroscience both companies were strong, but on different products, which 
complemented each other.  
Astra looked for an equal (same size) partner for a merger and Zeneca was a 
medium-sized company, facing the same challenges as Astra. In addition to 
a complementary product group (oncology) and complementary products in 
other areas, there was also a strategic and cultural fit between the companies 
and no restructuring was needed. Zeneca also added a strong position in the 
US and a complementary position in Europe (Zeneca was strong in the 
southern parts of Europe).  
Zeneca’s reason to merge with Astra 
The reasons for Zeneca to merge with Astra were similar to the reasons for 
Astra (as can be seen above). In order to sell pharmaceuticals globally, a 
large investment in marketing was needed. Large investments in enabling 
technology were also needed, in order to conduct competitive research and 
development. Zeneca was also (more than Astra) under acquisition threats 
and there was at a large risk of being acquired, which would mean loosing 
their independence.  
Strengths within Astra influencing the merger process 
Astra had large possibilities in influencing the merger process due to that 
this was a merger of equal. Astra took the initiative to discuss a merger with 
Zeneca, resulting in among other things that headquarter for research and 
development was situated in Sweden. Astra was a successful company that 
had been increasing its turnover and profit continuously. Zeneca was facing 
acquisition threats and risking loosing its independence. 
Impacts of merger within the Swedish firm 
Corporate culture 
As mentioned before (above) this was a merger of equals and regarding 
culture Astra and Zeneca had a common belief about competence and 
individuals. The corporate cultures did however have their differences and 
the Swedish (Astra) decentralized culture is now seen within the research 
and development organization, while the more British centralized Zeneca 
culture is found in the administrative organization.  The two highest global 
research managers are originally from Astra (Swedish) and highest global 
managers for marketing and finance, origin from Zeneca (British). 
Another difference between the Astra and Zeneca culture that is viewed as a 
problem by the external consultant91 is the different view on career paths 
within AstraZeneca.   
In Astra, people stayed at the same department for many years. If they were 
successful in their work, they were promoted through an expansion of their 
area. At Zeneca, people who wanted to conduct a career within Zeneca 
changed jobs (and department) every second year, moving up the 
hierarchical ladder. A problem for people from Astra (as perceived by 
highest global management) is that they have problems to maintain their 
position because they are not used to climbing the hierarchical ladder.  
However, when it comes to AstraZeneca subsidiaries around the world, 
most managers origin from Astra not Zeneca. An explanation is that the 
Zeneca people that are changing positions and geographical sites more 
often, lack the skills needed to run a subsidiary successfully. Interesting to 
note, is that all key personnel, except two (one from Astra and one from 
Zeneca -- Zeneca’s research director) stayed on, and are still working at 
AstraZeneca. 
Major impact of merger  
In large, AstraZeneca kept the research direction that both Astra and Zeneca 
had previous to the merger, but became much stronger in the different 
product groups, having more complete product group portfolios. 
Headquarter for research and development was to be situated in Södertälje, 
Sweden and the investment in research and development continued focusing 
on the same product groups as before the merger. Impacts of the merger for 
Astra are mainly positive, investments in enabled technologies in order to 
gain competitive research and development and a strengthening in the field 
of sales and marketing. Through Zeneca, market share and access to the US 
market have increased.  
There has been a vitalization of the research after the merger. AstraZeneca 
has afforded to invest in research and there has been a large inflow of new 
ideas and projects in Södertälje (Sweden). The same effects can also be seen 
at the division for research and development in Mölndal (close to 
Gothenburgh, Sweden). 
Role of R&D before and after merger 
AstraZeneca continues to invest in research and development. And because 
of the nature of its business, a large global pharmaceutical company, its core 
business is to conduct research and development, in order to improve and 
find pharmaceuticals. R&D was important both in Astra and Zeneca before 
the merger, and is now of large importance in AstraZeneca. 
                                                 
91 Inteview with global manager information and PR, October 2004. AstraZeneca has had and are still 
having a cultural expert consultant describing and analysing their culture (AstraZeneca) and cultures 
(Astra and Zeneca). 
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 As said above AstraZeneca continues to invest in research and development. 
Total R&D spend 2003 was $3.5 billion compared to total R&D spend 
1999, $2.4 billion.  
AstraZeneca has since the merger invested large amounts in research and 
development. It can be viewed as in a transitional phase according to 
persons interviewed. Both Astra and Zeneca had patents expiring at 
approximately the same time (for Astra it was the patents for Losec and 
Plendil and for Zeneca the patents for Nolvadex and Zestril). Therefore it 
has been and still is important for AstraZeneca to invest in research and 
development, in order to improve current pharmaceuticals and to find new 
ones.  
The largest product group in Astra, cardiovascular, is now after the merger 
the largest product group within AstraZeneca. The division responsible for 
cardiovascular is situated in Mölndal (Sweden). 
Knowledge interaction, transfer within AstraZeneca 
AstraZeneca has a global research organisation, with research and 
development in Sweden, Britain, Japan and the US.  There is continuously 
collaboration and co-operation between research teams from different 
divisions at AstraZeneca. 
Research teams are often situated geographical at the same site, but there are 
almost always international experts connected to the team. Researchers in 
AstraZeneca are working in small teams, where the researchers are working 
independently but are sharing their knowledge with other researchers within 
AstraZeneca on international- and global meetings and through 
documentation. This sharing of knowledge contributes to more ideas. It is 
also common with projects over the national boarders, where researchers 
from example Britain and Sweden work together.  
Impacts of merger in local/national environment 
Impacts of merger in local/national innovation environment have been 
positive. After the merger investments in research and development have 
been made by AstraZeneca in Sweden. As presented above the Swedish 
organization has increased with approximately 4 000 employees since the 
merger and several billion SEK have been invested into laboratories.  
Investments have been made mostly in Mölndal (within the Cardiovascular 
product group) and in Södertälje (within the Neuroscience product group). 
Approximately 1 000 new researchers have been employed in Mölndal since 
the merger and 300 new researchers in Södertälje.  
Impacts of merger in surrounding innovation environment 
Both prior and after the merger the company is working together with 
academic institutions and biotechnology companies.  
After the merger, AstraZeneca (former Astra) had problems with their 
academic relations. According to one person interviewed, the academic 
institutions thought that Astra (like Pharmacia when acquired by UpJohn) 
would move their research from Sweden, not investing in research and 
development in Sweden.  
AstraZeneca (Astra) has been trying to build up the relations with academia 
again, traveling around Sweden talking about collaboration between the 
industry and academia, resulting in improved relations and collaborations. 
The dependence on the Swedish academia though, becomes continuosly less 
important. According to AstraZeneca the research frontier is global today 
and they are collaborating with universities around the world. Today 
(October 2004) they have approximately 1 700 research collaborations 
running globally, of which approximately 500 in Sweden (both small and 
large projects). 
Today (October, 2004) there is a more two-way flow of people between 
AstraZeneca and the academia than prior the merger, AstraZeneca both 
employ people from academia and employees at AstraZeneca goes back to 
academia to become associated researchers. Prior the merger AstraZeneca 
did not see this two-way flow to the same extent.   
Use of national technology- and innovation policy 
programmes and measures 
After the merger, integration projects started up, with the purpose to look 
over the business and with the purpose to coordinate the business in the best 
way.  
On the research side the systems for processes, documentation and so on 
previously used by Astra, continued to being used by AstraZeneca. In 
finance and administration it was the British (Zeneca) systems that took 
over, which were frustrating for the Swedes because they had more 
advanced systems than Zeneca prior the merger.  
Astra had for example come further than Zeneca with electronic invoices, 
but the view was that it was easier for Astra, that had more advanced 
systems, to take a step back, than for Zeneca that had less sophisticated 
systems to take immediately steps forward.92  
Current and emerging challenges for AstraZeneca 
• AstraZeneca is worried over the providing of researchers from academia 
in the long run. They claim that it is important to support basic research 
and improve conditions for Swedish doctoral candidates. Today there are 
many foreign doctoral candidates in Sweden, who leave Sweden after 
receiving their doctoral (At KS for example there are many doctoral 
candidates from China and when they have received their doctoral they 
                                                 
92 Interview with global manager for information and PR, October 2004. 
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 go back to China). AstraZeneca also thinks that it is important to support 
post docs abroad for Swedish doctoral candidates.  
• It is important with continued intellectual property protection. There is a 
tendency today not to respect patents. 
• There is also a tendency that we no longer can afford new 
pharmaceuticals. The county council has to cut costs and is cutting costs 
for medicine, focusing more on price than quality. Generic substitution 
and therapeutic substitution do not lead to innovative projects, on the 
contrary. If Europe does not want to pay for the added value that comes 
with new and improved medicine, it will result in reduced research 
activities in Europe. 
• Pharmaceutical research in Europe is looking at the US and towards the 
dynamic that is surrounding universities and companies there. 
AstraZeneca is also drawn to the entrepreneur spirit in the US.  
Pharmaceuticals, AstraZeneca and the Swedish debate 
The merger between Astra and Zeneca raised a great amount of public 
discussion in Sweden. In a number of articles the issue was argued as if 
Astra’s shareholders had lost out in the merger, due to the fact that Astra 
was a better performing company than Zeneca and that Astra’s share price 
was at a low point at the time of the merger (Hellgren et al., 2002). Hellgren 
et al (2002) argue, though, that a more rigorous analysis by the media would 
have worked in favour of the Swedish Astra. 
In the Swedish press, the decision to locate the headquarters in London was 
percieved as a visible sign of losing in the merger. There was at the time a 
Swedish concern for loosing as a nation. There was a wider debate in 
Sweden at the time of the AstraZeneca merger, a debate triggered by the 
relocation of a number of large Swedish firms’ headquarters (Hellgren et al., 
2002). 
As described above, the headquarters of the main research and development 
operations of AstraZeneca was decided to be located in Södertälje, Sweden. 
The Swedish press reported it as a rational choice to locate research and 
development there (Hellgren et al., 2002). 
For a couple of years the merger was viewed as relatively successful in the 
media. Recently (2004) however there has been an increased attention on 
the merger and the issues that the company is facing today. 
In a radio program from July 2004, the Swedish pharmaceutical industry 
and AstraZeneca are discussed by different actors.93 The discussion 
originated from a statement made by AstraZeneca, saying that they might 
reduce their activities in Sweden and move research and development 
abroad, this due to the fact that the county councils are choosing cheaper 
medicine copies instead of the more expensive originals, and that the rules 
regarding contact between doctors and the industry are becoming more 
                                                 
93 Radio program called Studio Ett, 20th of July, 2004. 
strict. Another issue that recently (September, 2004) has been raised in the 
media is shareholder value origin from the merger. The Swedish 
Shareholders’ Association conducted a report in September 2004, in which 
they criticized the merger from a shareholder perspective, this leading to a 
short debate in the media.  
Conclusion & Remarks 
All in all, the merger between Astra and Zeneca 1999 can be viewed as a 
successful merger, leading to cost reductions due to synergies and resulting 
in increased investments in R&D in Sweden. It is difficult if not impossible, 
to claim what would have happen if Astra had not merged with Zeneca. The 
market for pharmaceuticals and its conditions have changed since 1998, 
resulting in larger investments in order to conduct research and development 
and larger costs for marketing and sales activities. 
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 Appendix 1 FOTON Module 2: Interview guideline 
Case-studies - impacts of foreign takeovers on local innovation capabilities 
 
Background information (based on public material available + interviews) 
- nature of markets in which the firm is active (number of various size of 
players/few large global players)? Acquiring firm's market position and success 
on this field? 
- ownership structure prior to and after the takeover 
- were there overlap between business activities of the acquired and the acquiring 
companies at the moment of takeover? 
- new owner's strategic commitment to the area of business of the acquired 
company? 
- is the acquired firm foot loose or very much connected to a local resource base 
or local labour market? 
Reasons for takeover 
- why the firm was sold-off by former owners? 
- why the firm was acquired by foreign corporation? 
- in which country the headquarters of the MNC locates? 
- is the acquired firm first of all acquired because of competences in production, 
market contacts or development capabilities?  
- how about the firm's innovativeness — whether it had effect for the takeover 
decision? 
Impacts of takeover within acquired firm 
- changes in corporate governance and management culture? (compatibility of 
'old' and 'new' cultures) 
- position vis-à-vis to the parent company's headquarters and within the new 
corporate structure? (including position in the in-house competition) 
- changes in resources available (financial/human 
resources/competences/marketing channels...)? 
- does "transfer pricing" play a role in intra-corporate interaction? (this needs to 
be defined more clearly...) 
- role of own R&D functions before and after takeover? 
- are there some "knowledge interaction/transfer" between subsidiaries within the 
MNC, and between subsidiary in question and central corporate R&D facilities? 
If yes, how this interaction takes place? (i.e. on a scale from superficial 
exchanges of documents/patents to the establishment of large-scale project 
groups/mutual visits between the communities that are to interface) 
- possible effects of takeover on the way innovation is made in the company? (for 
instance, no longer outsourcing locally but relying more on intra-corporate 
resources) 
- did your enterprise have any co-operation arrangements on innovation activities 
with other enterprises or institutions prior to the takeover? Has co-operation 
models or partners changed since the takeover? OR has the firm changed its 
network and collaboration habits? 
- has there had changes in the main sources of information needed for suggesting 
new innovation projects or contributing to the implementation of existing 
projects? 
- have there been any factors hampering innovation activity (economic factors, 
internal factors, external factors etc)? Has the been changes in distribution and 
weight of factors after the takeover? 
- did the acquired company make use of any methods to protect inventions or 
innovations developed in the firm? Has there been changes in use of different 
protection methods after the takeover?  
- market orientation before and after takeover? (domestic, international...) 
- does the foreign ownership help the firm to enter global markets? 
- does the firm has own product(s) and how the markets are divided within the 
corporate? 
- did the key personnel stay in the acquired company after the takeover? 
Impacts of takeover in surrounding innovation environment 
- nationally within the relevant industrial cluster? 
- locally in the immediate (geographical) surroundings of the acquired firm? 
- Use of national technology- and innovation policy programmes and measures 
before and after of the takeover? 
- how does the parent company view participation in national programmes? 
- ( Did available national technology and innovation policy support schemes 
increase attractiveness to takeover a firm in a specific country?) 
Other 
- how the acquiring company has operated during and after the takeover from 
local perspective? 
- local /national strengths and weaknesses which may have had effect on takeover 
process and utilisation of new opportunities? 
- How does the acquired company/the MNC see/value government functions in 
development of national innovation systems (including education, promotion of 
R&D, competence development etc. 
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 Appendix 2: Theoretical perspectives on MNE 
organisation, strategy and subsidiary implications 
 
By Sverre J. Herstad 
 
Introduction  
Attempting to identify implications of foreign takeovers, be it as the brain 
drain versus gain question posed here, as productivity impacts or as e.g. 
employment changes, one inevitably ends up with some puzzling dilemmas. 
The main problem arises out of the question itself – one is by definition 
looking for impacts that are specific to foreign takeovers, and hence changes 
in performance indicators must be both validated against a supposed 
counterfactual state (e.g. no takeover) and distinguished from effects arising 
out of other aspects of the overtaking firm (e.g. takeover by a large firm, 
mature firm, domestic multinational firm, etc.).  
The latter point emphasise the need to focus on effects arising out the ‘as 
such’ element of foreign takeovers. It can be argued (Herstad, fortc) that 
existing research on FDI implications is characterised by a lacking ability to 
make these distinctions, and consequently a lacking ability to make general 
conclusions concerning FDI impacts.   
To a certain extent this is explainable with reference to a strange and 
enduring (Kogut 1993:136, Herstad, fortc) separation of FDI research, 
conducted mainly by “traditional” economist, from theories of the MNE as 
an organizational entity.  
The former focus exclusively on the “national vs. foreign” distinction in 
both intensive and extensive analysis. It is to some extent based on 
arguments that are solely macro economic, such as national capital stock 
increases following from FDI. Alternatively it is bordering on organisational 
and strategic issues in seeking to identify implications of consequent 
substitution effects within the national system of industrial ownership. This 
perspective is this based on the notion that foreign takeovers are ‘freeing’ 
national owners, enabling the latter to focus on early-stage investment 
projects where country specific knowledge is more critical.  
Furthermore, these approaches investigate knowledge diffusion effects 
resulting from the perspective of technology gaps (Kvinge 2004) between 
the host economy and, implicitly in the distinction between national and 
foreign owners as groups, the world economic system as such. The problem, 
however, emerges when these approaches are trying to identify firm level 
implications of intra-developed world FDI; implications that are inherently 
organisational and strategic and thus neither reducible to the disaggregate of 
macro-economic implications nor plausibly seen as resulting from 
technology gaps as such.  
Against this ‘traditional’ approach we may contrast theories of and 
empirical evidence on the MNE; that from the influential work of Ruigrok 
and van Tulder (1995) and through the impressive Doremus et al (1998) has 
established itself as a research agenda focusing on how the organisational 
specificities of MNEs must be understood as developed within the context 
set by their respective national business (Fukao 1995, Whitley 1999, 
Morgan et al 2001) and innovation (Doremus et al 1998) systems.   
From this perspective, ‘...home-based institutions provide the basis for the 
development of MNEs transnational social spaces, and thus their strategic 
behaviour and organisational forms will continue to diverge’ (Lam 2003) 
accordingly.  
Given that the objective of FOTON is to identify implications that are 
directly strategic and organizational and only by implication macro-
economic, it inevitably follows that the general theoretical framework 
applied in interpreting both quantitative and qualitative evidence should be 
informed by theories of the organizational and strategic specificities of 
different MNEs.  
The problem with these approaches, however, is a lacking willingness to 
explicitly focus on those innovation and competitiveness implications that 
may follow from the different behavioural tendencies identified. Hence, the 
following will drawn on existing theoretical and empirical work on MNE 
distinctiveness, as well as empirical evidence from Norway (Herstad, fortc), 
synthesise this and sketch a theoretical framework enabling brain gain/drain 
implications of foreign takeovers to be drawn.  
The MNE can be defined as an organisational entity with operations in more 
than one country, and hence an organisational entity interacting with and 
potentially linking different systems of economic organization, research and 
development. MNEs has to ‘...organise its operations across institutional 
divides’ (Morgan et al. 2001), and preferably link operations in such a 
manner that subsidiary and context specific knowledges can be harnessed as 
‘synergies’ appropriated by the MNE.  
The latter both represent (home base) and interact with (host economy) 
different national or regional business systems94 (Whitley 1999), and hence 
different logics of collective action, economic organisation and industrial 
specialisation that raise questions as to parent-subsidiary strategic and 
organisational fit. Further, by having operations located in different business 
systems the MNE may function as an organisational innovation system in its 
own right, and through their subsidiaries contribute to linking different 
national or regional innovation systems. Based on this line of reasoning we 
                                                 
94 The concepts of ‘business systems’ (Whitley 1999), ‘social systems of innovation and production’ 
(Amable 2000) or  ‘production regimes’ (Soskice 1999) all refer to how how the societal institutions of in 
particular labour, finance, education and the role of the state represent distinct incentives and constraints 
concerning collective action, and hence are reflected in economic organisation and industrial 
specialisation both at national and firms levels.  
102 
 can identify the two main sources of firm level – organisational and 
strategic – foreign takeover implications: 
a) The business system effect: The ‘strategic fit’ between parent corporate 
governance characteristics and human resource management practices, 
and subsidiary institutional embeddedness, organisational set-up and 
product market. 
b) The innovation system effect: Ownership initiated linkages, established 
and maintained within the incentives and constraints set by a), between 
subsidiaries and i) research and development units contained within the 
MNE, and b) their respective external business system linkages 
This is a specification of the reasoning originally presented in Doremus et al 
(1998:144), who, based on their large scale MNE study, conclude that MNE 
activity  
“…describe a process through which still-national corporations, and the 
innovation and investment systems in which they remain embedded, are 
inserted into one another’s home markets. Those corporations then adapt 
themselves at the edges. But at their cores, our research underlies the 
durability of such factors as German systems of corporate control, the 
historical drive behind Japanese technology and investment strategies as 
well as corporate organizational forms, and the persistence of 
institutional disincentives to long-term planning inside American 
corporations”.  
Having this as our starting point for answering the brain gain or drain 
question, we will further need to account for factors such as subsidiary and 
parent company maturity and size, subsidiary product market specificities, 
the nature of knowledge involved as well as the, revealed by our case 
studies, non-generalisable importance of key persons in generating a certain 
brain gain or drain outcome.  
International industrial variety, national specialisation and 
strategic fit 
It is an established notion that national industrial development is a path-
dependent evolutionary process. Moreover,  the Nordic countries are small, 
open economies. Based on this we may as a general argument highlight the 
fact that the business and innovation system specialisation of these 
economies in themselves imply that a high degree of foreign ownership may 
be a general prerequisite for strategic fit between parent and subsidiary 
companies, and in particular a prerequisite for sustaining a certain degree of 
industrial variety and renewal.  
The national systems of finance and ownership in the Nordic countries are 
by necessity both qualitatively specialised and quantitatively limited, and 
when accounting for revealed national specialisations such as the natural 
resource focus of the Norwegian economy it is hardly controversial to argue 
that firms such as our Norwegian cases may have to look abroad in order for 
competent and financially strong enough owner firms to be identified (cf. 
the Axis Shield case). 
Hence, a possible effect of foreign ownership per se may be linked to the 
international availability of certain owner specific advantages (Dunning 
1980, Narula 1996) resulting both from the mere amount of owners 
available abroad as compared to domestically, hence implying that it makes 
some sense to distinguish between domestic and foreign owners as groups, 
but more specifically from the variety of business and innovation systems 
that constitute the international economic system.  
The latter point again highlight that the concept of ‘foreign ownership’ must 
be specified beyond itself; we need to grasp what economic systems 
‘foreign’ owner firms emerge out of in order for structure, strategy and 
hence subsidiary brain gain or drain implications to be drawn. 
The business system effect:  Corporate governance and the 
multinational corporation 
The first step in such a specification will be to follow Doremus et al (1998) 
in seeing the investing firm as an agent for certain corporate governance 
systems. These systems of creditor, owner, management and employee 
relationships constitute “...the locus of social evaluation of economic 
activity” (Aglietta and Breton 2001:436), and thus both define what is 
considered success for a capitalist organisation and how management of that 
same organisation should go about achieving it.  
There is a vast and growing literature that explains differences in firm 
structure and strategic behaviour with reference to differences between such 
systems (Porter 1992, Fukao 1995, Doremus et al 1998, Dore, Lazonick and 
O’Sullivan 1999, Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000, Hall and Soskice 2001), as 
well as empirical evidence continuing to highlight their enduring national 
character (Gugler et al 2001, Seifert et al 2000).  
Hence such national differences can be found in the availability of capital 
with certain characteristics, notably risk-willing but generic financial capital 
versus industry-specific, knowledge-intensive and often conservative 
industrial capital (Perez 2001). These differences also influence the 
resulting firm organisation, innovation and economic performance (Aglietta 
and Breton 2001). An understanding of this variation is necessary in order 
for systematic differences in MNE structure, strategy and thus different 
takeover implications to be grasped and understood (Herstad 2004,  Herstad 
and Asheim 2004, Doremus et al 1998).  
The perhaps most analytically clear-cut model of “national systems of 
corporate governance” is found in Porter (red) (1992). Porter argues that 
characteristics of the external capital market in which a firm is embedded 
exert strong influence on the internal capital allocation and monitoring 
system of that same firm, including its strategic objectives and 
organizational principles. In Porters framework a main emphasis is put on 
the different logics of communication and co-ordination, both internally and 
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 towards owners and creditors, following from differences in external 
ownership structure (see table below).  
This highlights a fundamental aspect of the MNE, as the definitional 
characteristic of business system variety contained within a common 
ownership structure indicate a vast potential for information gaps  (Tylecote 
1994) to be created within it.  
A fundamental difference in this respect is between what has later been 
labelled insider or outsider systems of ownership and corporate control (Ali-
Yrkkö and Ylä-Anttila 2001), and the different degrees of strategic 
integration95  (Lazonick and O’Sullivan 1998) that follows.  
In the first case ownership is concentrated and strategy contingent on the 
knowledge and preferences of large owners in inside positions within the 
firm, where they have first-hand information about what is going on, in turn 
enabling the industry and firm specific knowledge accumulation that 
characterises industrial capital. According to Porter (1992), a main point in 
this is that short-term market valuation of the firm does not affect buy-sell 
choices of main owners, and consequently not management behaviour.   
Such “tight” insider systems are found in Continental Europe and Japan, 
with the German system often portrayed as the archetypical one and the 
Swedish case a nice example by its dominance of business groups centred 
on the “Wallenberg sphere” and Handelsbanken AB (Collin 1998)96. Co-
ordination of information, knowledge and technology within the MNE here 
tend to be based on investments in socialisation (Bartlett and Ghoshal 1998) 
of key personnel and thus a technology and knowledge transfer policy 
backed by ‘...coherence in vision, goals and strategies’ (Granstrand and 
Sjölander 1994). 
                                                 
95 I.e. to what extent strategic decicion makers are integrated into, and hence have first-hand knowledge 
of, the learning and innovation processes their allocation decicions are influencing.  
96 In 1995 these two directly or indrectly represented some 52% of the stock value of all the corporations 
listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange (Collin 1998:726). The ‘Wallenberg Sphere’ alone controlled 
some 39%. 
 Table 1 
Concentration of voting power97  
Source: Ekeland (2002)/Bøhren and Ødegaard (2000) 
 Percentage of voting power  
 Largest owner Second largest Third largest 
Anglo-Saxon    
US (average 1992-1997) 3 1 1 
UK  (1996) 14 7 6 
    
European    
Belgium (1995) 56 7 5 
France  (1996) 52 10 4 
Italy  (1996) 48 10 4 
Germany  (1996) 50 3 1 
Austria (1996) 54 8 3 
    
Nordic    
Norway  (1997) 29 11 7 
Sweden  (1998) 38 11 6 
 
 
As an opposite we find the outsider systems of the Anglo-Saxon economies 
(Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000). These are first and foremost characterised 
by a highly fragmented and stock-exchange driven system of corporate 
control, where primacy is given to the interests of minor non-committed 
investors and their short-term desire for company reporting initiated value 
appreciation on their holdings (see table 1).  
Important in this is the lacking willingness and ability of these same 
fragmented owners to exert direct strategic control through insider positions, 
which consequently limit the role of company and industry specific in-depth 
knowledge in strategic decision making98 and is complemented by a 
structure of inefficient company boards representing mainly judicial and 
generic competencies (Porter 1992, Fukao 1992, Owens 2001, Goergen and 
Renneboog 2001).  
This in turn create a strong focus on generic financial indicators as measures 
of success (company) and consequent stock market pricing of the firm, as a 
basis for buy/sell decisions (owners/investors) and thus as the main strategic 
driver (management, normally with stock option plans as important 
incentives).  
                                                 
97 Average share of quoted stock held, controlled for preference shares.  
98 Inside positions inhibit anonymous entry-exit in the stock. Further, a main motive  for exposure to such 
positions is a wish to directly influence management, the costs of which are carried by the individual 
agent while the possible benefits are spread out on all shareholders. Hence, avoiding this free rider 
problem would entail larger shareholding in individual companies, in turn severly limiting the exit option 
and thus contradicting the internal logic of the system as a whole. See Porter (1992) for a brilliant analysis 
of this collective action game. 
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 Furthermore, those same outside owners are often merely representatives 
(‘institutional agents’) of other owners (private investors)99, hence creating a 
stratified ownership structure where ownership itself is ‘dissolved’, highly 
anonymous and highly driven by buy-sell decisions based on ‘valuation by 
proxies’.   
From our point of view it is particularly important to note that these 
systems, through their internal capital monitoring and evaluation system 
reflections, reinforce the mentioned information gap inherent in the 
relationship owners/MNE/subsidiary, thus, by co-ordinating mainly through 
centralisation or formalisation (Ghoshal and Bartlett 1998) possibly creating 
a distinct logic of internal communication by generic performance (results) 
or expectancy (R&D, rate of patenting etc) indicators. 
 
Table 2  
Equity market activity 
Source: Megginson and Boutchkova (2000) 
 Market capitalisation  
1998 
Percentage of GDP 
Trade volume  
1998 
Percentage of GDP 
Anglo-Saxon    
US 142 166 
UK 158 92 
   
Continental 
European 
  
France 46 39 
Germany 39 65 
Italy 30 41 
Sweden 120 89 
 
Hence these systems, and MNEs acting as agent for them, contain certain 
distinct incentives and constraints that translate into different investment 
behaviour and organisational set-ups, and thus competitive strengths and 
weaknesses.  
According to both Porter (1992) and Soskice (1998) the insider model has a 
distinct strength in its ability to support those complex sets of 
complementary investments in machinery, skills and R&D that support 
continuous incremental process and product innovations in industries such 
as e.g. car production or machine tool production100.  
The outsider model, on the other hand, tend to be biased against such 
investments while favouring “...stand, alone investment strategies” that 
represent a “...clear technological discontinuity” and thus generates leaps in 
                                                 
99 An institutional agent is an investment company that invest on behalf of customers rather than itself, 
and hence is subjected to competition from other institutional agents.   
100 Those activities that are referred to by Streeck 1992 as “diversified quality production”, or by many 
simply as post-fordism, where competitive strength is build and maintained by continous incremental 
product and process innovations. 
position vis a vis competitors (e.g. the so-called ‘new economy’) (Porter 
1992) (cf. the Axis Shield case).  
_____________________________________________________________ 
 Table 3  
Sources of debt capital 
Source: (Ehrman et al 2001) 
 EURO 
Countries 
France Germany US 
 
Bank loans to industry 
Percentage of GDP 
 
45 
 
37 
 
40 
 
13 
 
Bond issuances 
Percentage of GDP 
 
4 
 
8 
 
1 
 
26 
  
 
The bias against such investmenst has to do with the lacking transparency of 
those complex investment, skill-building and R&D programmes needed to 
continuously build capabilities in these industries, while the bias in favour 
of such investments has to do with the highly transparent prospect of large 
leaps in stock market prizing and dividend payments that follow from 
radical research aimed at patentable product innovations.  
It is also possible to argue that outsider system, by way of the investor 
portfolio diversification that characterise these systems, is superior in 
dealing with the fundamental uncertainty101 that is inherent in radical 
technological change.  
In this the relative importance of banks as sources of debt capital is 
important (table 3); both as these may have access to inside private 
information on clients (Aglietta and Breton 2001) and as these operate under 
incentive structures that diverge from those of outside investors.  
A known characteristic of the German system of corporate control is the 
long-term and stable banking relations of corporate enterprises (see table), 
supported by bank representation at company boards and reinforced by the 
system of ‘proxy voting’ that enable banks to vote on behalf of customers 
who deposit stock. Tight long-term relationships between banks and 
industry are also found in Japan and the Nordic countries (Tranøy 2001) and 
has e.g. constituted a defining characteristic of the mentioned ‘business 
groups’ in Sweden (see Ehrman et al 2000, Collin 1998).  
According to Collin (1998), strategic influence over industry by long-term 
banking partners generates conservatism and long-termism in investment 
strategies. This is as bank earnings from corporate credit is set a priori as 
interest rates, total earnings thus becoming linked to duration of the 
relationship, and not determined as residuals ex post. Thus, whereas banks 
                                                 
101 Uncertainty here distinquished from risk, which is calculatable given sufficient information. 
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 will be exposed to the risk of customer bankruptcy following from high-risk 
or high-uncertainty corporate strategies, they will not directly – apart from 
potential risk premiums set a priori on debt capital – receive those high 
residual earnings that invite equity investors to engage in high risk or 
uncertain ventures. Rather, given strategic influence over the corporation, 
the bank will seek to ensure its long-term survival through medium-risk 
investment programmes.  
 
Hence the main strategic driver within outsider systems is secondary stock 
market evaluation of reported information- as reactions to confirmed 
financial results or generated expectations, a logic supported by debt capital 
sourcing through bond issuance and short-term bank loans (Scott 1997). 
Consequently corporate managers are shown to focus on strategies enabling 
quarter-to-quarter and year-to-year positive reports, sensitive those 
indicators defined by outside investors as signs of “health”, as well 
nurturing investor such expectations by e.g. a strong emphasis on R&D 
aimed at radical, patentable innovations.  
From Norway (Herstad, fortc) there is clear evidence that this translates into 
a distinct bias towards such activities in subsidiaries of Anglo-Saxon MNEs, 
and a bias against innovative activities involving distributed knowledge 
bases that hence cannot be easily distinguished from production costs. There 
is also evidence (ibid) that this desire to build secondary market 
expectations by reporting R&D may influence on organisational and 
accounting principles, hence raising the question of whether R&D 
investments, as proxies for investments in innovation, are comparable across 
countries. 
This leads us to the larger picture of human resource management 
principles. A main finding of Wever (1995) and later Lam (2000) was 
divergence in the degree of individualism vs. collectivism supported by 
management principles through in particular applied reward schemes and 
responsibility structures. This corresponds perfectly to the findings in 
Herstad (fortc), where respondents in US and UK MNE subsidiaries in 
Norway all highlight both the individualism revealed in the HRM practice 
preferences of the owner and a preferred ‘variable cost’ approach to labour 
through  ‘hire and fire’ according to short-term qualitative or quantitative 
needs.  
This must be understood in light of how the different national industrial 
relations systems that foreign owner firms have emerged out of influence 
the general role of labour (Wever 1995) and thus who is expected to 
contribute to firm specific learning (Blair 1997).  
The unionised countries of Continental Europe, with strong 
institutional/judicial barriers to numeric flexibility in the labour force and 
co-determination rights by employee representation at local boards, 
represent a clear opposition to the Anglo-Saxon systems of flexible labour 
and minimal institutional protection of workers that distinctively reflect in 
both expectations and preferences of owner firms emerging out of these 
respective systems, and – importantly – what learning and knowledge 
accumulation processes that are either indirectly nurtured or directly 
considered ‘legitimate’ (von Krogh and Grand 2000).  
This, in turn, leads us to follow the business system literature in concluding 
that organisational and strategic diversity characterise the international 
economic system, and hence both parent MNEs and their subsidiaries. In 
particular we again highlight how the definitional character or the MNE in 
and by itself reinforce the information gap inherent in the relationship. This 
applies to outside investors and bankers, through corporate management and 
into the professional communities of subsidiaries in which complex 
technologies are developed – and their contact with respective product 
markets – translating into a need for the corporate administrative hierarchy 
to deal with organisational variety, based on accumulated experiences and 
routines while necessarily lacking  first-hand knowledge of all the different 
organisational logics contained within its umbrella.  
The resulting “how” question of governance is in turn a question of internal 
characteristics of the MNE and those incentives and constraints that emerge 
out of the corporate governance system. The information gap problem can 
simply be neglected by the application of generic corporate best practices 
and routines, normally preferred by Anglo-Saxon MNEs as strong 
reflections of parent company home base business system (‘formalisation’, 
Bartlett and Ghoshal 1998). 
Alternatively it may be avoided in two complementary ways. First the MNE 
may seek to integrate top-level strategic decision makers into the actual 
learning and innovation processes contained within its ownership structure. 
This, of course, presupposes a certain composition of both management 
teams and company boards,  a limited range of technologies contained 
within this structure, and a limited size of the structure itself. In the Axis 
Shield case, we find that both apply.  
Secondly, strategic decision making authority may be decentralised to actors 
functionally and hierarchically already integrated into actual learning and 
innovation processes (Nooteboom 2000b: 286). This, in turn, presupposes a 
corporate governance structure allowing for such organisational principles 
in general to be applied, and in particular for such formal lack of financial 
control to be acceptable within the incentive structure that arise out of the 
top management-owner relationship. The latter is enabled by insider 
systems of corporate control, but contradict the logic of monitoring, 
evaluation and financial control shown to emerge out of outsider systems 
(Porter 1992, Geppert, Williams and Matten 2003, Herstad fortc) 
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Table 4 
Business system effects and the MNE 
 US MNEs German MNEs Japaneese MNEs 
    
Home-base 
corporate 
governance 
and 
internationalis
ation of 
finance 
Short-term 
shareholder value, 
highly constrained 
by capital markets, 
financially centred 
strategies. Only 
group displaying 
genuine ‘global’ 
sourcing of finance 
Managerial 
autonomy except 
during crises, little 
takeover risk, 
conservative and 
long-term strategies 
Tightly linked to 
domestic owners and 
key creditors 
Stable shareholders, 
network-constrained 
management, and 
aggressive long-term 
market share 
oriented strategies. 
Tightly linked to 
domestic owners and 
key creditors 
    
Defined 
legitimate 
stakeholders 
Judicial primacy to 
shareholders, 
thorough minority 
protection. No 
employee 
representation rights 
at company boards 
Inside owners, 
creditors, suppliers 
and employees.  
Inside owners, 
creditors, suppliers 
and employees. 
    
Principle for 
subsidiary 
control and co-
ordination 
 
Formalisation or 
centralisation. Tight 
individual subsidiary 
financial control. 
Threat of sell-out. 
Socialisation. Fairly 
decentralised 
administrative 
control, technology 
and market share 
oriented.  
Centralisation and 
socialisation. Tight 
subsidiary 
administrative 
control.  
    
Competence 
structures 
expected by 
corporate 
routines 
 
Individual experts at 
higher hierarchical 
levels, professional 
communities (Lam 
2003) enabling 
strong linkages to 
external research 
Distributed 
throughout distinct 
hierarchical levels 
Distributed and 
collective. Internally 
integrated 
organisational 
communities with 
few, selective 
external linkages. 
    
Home-base 
industrial 
relations  
‘Variable cost 
approach’ to labour. 
Harsh industrial 
relations, limited 
overall role of labour 
in organisational 
learning.  
‘Semi-fixed cost 
approach’ to labour. 
Thorough 
employment 
protection, 
significant role of 
labour in 
organisational 
learning. 
‘Fixed cost 
approach’ to labour. 
Long-term, 
bordering on 
lifetime, 
commitment of 
company to 
employees given full 
employee 
commitment to 
company 
    
MNE inter-
nationalisation 
and acquisition 
strategy 
Rapid entry and exit 
based on perceived 
individual company 
potential, high 
turnover of 
subsidiaries, 
aggressive 
Entry and exit based 
on long-term 
implications for 
company or division 
activity portfolio 
Selective and 
reluctant inter-
nationalisation 
strategies, based on 
long-term 
implications for 
company activity 
internationalisation 
strategy enabled by 
weak linkages to 
home-base 
portfolio. Preference 
for greenfield 
investments to build 
new organisations in 
“own image”. 
    
    
 
The innovation system effect: MNE organisational principles 
and knowledge diffusion 
Whereas the business system effect of MNE takeovers highlight how 
subsidiaries are governed individually as learning organisations, the 
innovation system effect of such takeovers highlight brain gain resulting 
from linkages between the variety of organisations and learning processes 
that potentially co-exist within the MNE – including their respective 
linkages to national or regional innovation systems.  
This effect is in turn highly flavoured by the ‘communicative skills’ and 
organisational set-up of the owner firm (Forsgren 1997:72), and hence again 
the business system effect, and contain an inherent paradox (Forsgren 
1997): The more technological variety contained within the MNE ownership 
structure, the higher the potential for technological novelty resulting from 
synergies.  
Hence, more subsidiaries located in diverse business systems, and a higher 
turnover of subsidiaries (in particular if initiated by an aggressive 
acquisition and divestment strategy aiming at internalising new technologies 
and disposing of mature ones) increases corporate technological variety and 
hence the scope for novelty.  
But, on the other hand, realisation of such synergies may require deep and 
long-term co-operative arrangements, or ‘learning interfaces’ between 
subsidiaries which as we will see are not easily formed within a corporate 
structure characterised by individual subsidiary monitoring and evaluation, 
high subsidiary turnover and low inter-subsidiary trust. 
MNE organisational principles 
Morgan (2001) argue, with reference to the increasing presence of foreign 
institutional investors in the Finish economy, that the current preference of 
Anglo-Saxon investors and owner firms are so-called focused corporate 
structures that can easily be subjected to outside estimation of value. This in 
contrast to the risk-diversifying conglomerates identified by Porter (1992) 
that grew out of a wish to secure a predictable flow of earnings and reduce 
dependence on individual product markets.  
Recent evidence from Norway (Herstad, fortc) support both Morgan’s 
claims for an institutional investor driven drive towards leaner Anglo-Saxon 
MNE structures (i.e. revealed by de-mergers of British and US owner 
firms), while still identifying a remaining tendency towards both unrelated 
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 diversification but most importantly segmented subsidiaries in those same 
US and UK MNEs (as argued by e.g. Fukao (1995) and Doremus et al 
(1998) and a high turnover in the latter.  
This view is supported by Morgan (2001:17), who continue by arguing that 
the drive towards leaner and seemingly more integrated British and US 
MNEs is still “...less likely to be based on a limited set of technological 
competencies”, and is “driven by the search for shareholder value and the 
opportunities that exist for both divestment and acquisition”.  
Against this may be contrasted e.g. Japanese MNEs, who tend to be less 
diversified and better integrated into a structure where “...the individual 
subsidiary is judged not based on its own merits (as individual profit-
making entities) but in terms of its contribution to the industrial system of 
the company as a whole” (ibid). German MNEs are also found to focus 
more on a limited range of skills and competencies (ibid: 18), while more 
diverse than their Japanese counterparts as to internationalisation strategies.  
More important than seeming relatedness is to what extent the MNE focus 
on, and invest in, building internal learning interfaces and hence on 
establishing a ‘corporate industrial system’ where the knowledge may be 
shared and technological synergies harnessed.  
Understanding the existence or non-existence of such interfaces, as well as 
their actual workings, requires an understanding of the financial cost and 
commitment aspects of these (i.e. the costs, investments and asset/relation 
specificities involved), as well as their social aspects.  
The latter ranges from arms-length exchanges of documents and patents, 
hence transferring only knowledge codified in fairly universal codes, to 
large-scale project groups able to both exchange and develop tacit, 
collective knowledge (se below). The former overlap with the latter.  
The costs, investments and asset/relation specificity of document exchanges 
are all low. Large-scale project groups, on the other hand, both bind up 
personnel and require an often long-term process of building mutual trust 
and understanding (Wenger 1998, Lam 1998, Granstrand and Sjölander 
1994) both on the individual level and on the subsidiary level. This requires 
commitment to creating the interface on the part of the subsidiaries and the 
MNE, and commitment over time in order for the initial investment to 
generate returns as ‘knowledge transfers’ and ‘interactive learning’. 
The latter point is important. The cost/investment aspect of learning 
interfaces concern investments in relations specific assets and subsidiary co-
specific skills (Blair 1997), that as such commit resources not only to 
individual subsidiaries, but to the relationship between individual 
subsidiaries – hence committing the parent company to two or more 
subsidiaries simultaneously.  
Experience from MNEs present in Norway (Herstad, fortc.) clearly indicate 
how e.g. German, Swedish or Finish insider system governed MNEs have 
no problem exposing themselves to such commitments, of course given that 
the technological rationale is defined as sufficient, British and US MNEs 
consciously avoid these in order to reduce commitments vis a vis 
subsidiaries and hence secure their freedom to sell out and renew corporate 
capabilities through acquisitions rather than in-house synergies.  
Hence, in the latter group, the MNE ownership may serve as an innovation 
system by the mere variety of technologies, and hence ‘cognitive diversity’ 
(Nooteboom 2000), that result from an aggressive high subsidiary turnover 
acquisition and divestment strategy. On the other hand weak inter-
subsidiary linkages and parent company commitment limit knowledge 
transfer processes to that of documents and access to patents. Here variety is 
achieved at the expense of depth.  
Similarly, the lesser variety of technologies within e.g. German or Swedish 
MNEs, combined with a lower subsidiary turnover, imply that these to a 
more limited extent may serve as an innovation system by supplying 
subsidiaries with radical new technologies continuously internalised 
elsewhere in the corporate structure – but to a much higher degree develop 
those ‘communicative skills’ that enable them to function as vehicle for 
long-term co-operative inter-subsidiary integration. This of course illustrates 
both “the strength of weak ties” (Granovetter 1973) and the “weakness of 
strong ties” (Grabher 1993). 
Yet another aspect concerning internal learning interfaces has to do with 
competition – direct or indirect – within the MNE and the extent to which 
subsidiaries are monitored and evaluated as individual profit-making entities 
rather than in terms of their contribution to the industrial system of the 
company as a whole’ (Morgan 2001), Herstad fortc.). Extending the work 
by von Krogh, Ichijo and Nonaka (2000), and building on Lundvalls 
emphasis on trustful relations (Lundvall and Johnson 1994), we can 
introduce a simple distinction between degree of subunit competition versus 
co-operation, and between degrees of individual unit versus systematic 
corporate monitoring and evaluation of performance.  
Subunit competition can exist either directly, when units compete on the 
same product markets, as expected by some MNEs to enhance individual 
unit performance. Competition can further exist indirectly and thus linked to 
the second dimension; when units are evaluated as individual profit making 
entities this may induce a perceived competitive relation towards other 
units. This particularly applies when this monitoring and evaluation is based 
on standardised value proxies and combine with pre-determined corporate 
requirements as to e.g. returns on invested capital and lacking financial 
commitment on the part of the owner (Herstad fortc).  
The point in this context is that competition – perceived or real – between 
subunits may effectively hamper the formation of learning interfaces and 
hence realisation of technological synergies (Granstrand and Sjölander 
1994). The mere cost and benefit uncertainty – as well as uncertainty 
concerning consequent distribution of actual costs and benefits – inherent in 
cumulative and collective learning must be resolved within a context where 
individual units share a common understanding of the de facto corporate 
incentives towards opportunism that their transactions must occur within.  
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 Evidence from Norway suggest that while direct competition eliminate 
subsidiary initiated internal learning interfaces altogether by creating 
distrust and protectionist attitudes between them, indirect competition has 
an almost equally disabling function in reducing learning interfaces to mere 
buy-and-sell transactions where the scope for opportunistic behaviour can 
be eliminated a priori through contractual arrangements (i.e. uncertainty and 
complexity has to be low)  (Herstad, 2004). When potential complexity and 
uncertainty rise, the learning interface is not established.  
Readers familiar with transaction cost theory should now see how 
ownership integration may produce the opposite outcome of what is 
predicted – i.e. ownership integration increases opportunism and hence 
transaction costs, leading here not to integration but isolation. Further, as 
what must first be constructed cooperatively cannot be controlled 
hierarchically, centralisation is not sufficient to overcome this problem.  
Brain gain and the nature of knowledge 
The nature of knowledge itself, as defined by past organisational learning 
and product market interplay, not only the organisational and administrative 
context around it, will to a significant degree influence on what learning 
interfaces that may form (Lam 1998, 2000). It is generally far too often 
assumed (Attewell 1996) that a formal or perceived existence of potential 
synergies is necessarily realised as such, or merely a question of 
establishing suitable formal organisational structures or having a formal 
‘technology transfer policy’ (Granstrand and Sjölander 1994). The mere 
variety of knowledge, learning processes and organisational forms, resulting 
in part from business system variety, are neglected, and hence their 
influence on inter-organisational co-operation (see in particular Lam (1998), 
Campagnac and Winch 1998) and knowledge transfers.  
Building on contemporary work on the sociology of knowledge we can 
make important distinctions between  
a) signals that relevant knowledge exist within the corporate network, and 
the absorption and interpretation of these signals;  
b) diffusion of a given piece of knowledge from unit x to unit y, and again 
the absorption and interpretation of this knowledge, and last but not least  
c) the establishment of an interactive learning relationship between the units 
– directly or in through mediating functions – where, as opposite from the 
cases a) and b) -  what is communicated from unit x is based on a thorough 
understanding of technology contained within unit y, and vice versa.  
The Anglo-Saxon style MNE innovation systems portrayed above are 
strongly biased against a) or b), while c) both requires an ‘integrative’ 
approach to corporate organisation and rests on the ‘communicativeness’ 
and ‘absorptiveness’ of knowledge itself. 
In particular, divergences in experiences, routines and frames of reference 
will influence on what interfaces that are formed.  For instance, Nooteboom 
(2000) highlight how brain-gain resulting from a relationship between units 
rest on cognitive complementarity between their respective core 
competencies; this as brain gain  “...requires on the one hand sufficient 
cognitive distance to yield novelty, and on the other hand sufficient 
proximity to enable understanding” (ibid: 290). It follows that given a 
cognitive distance beyond a certain point actors may find themselves either 
unable to communicate efficiently, or generating unsustainable costs in trial-
and-error attempts to bridge this distance (Herstad 2003). The definition of 
sustainable and unsustainable costs is of course in turn a question of 
corporate governance in general and corporate financial commitment to the 
respective interfaces, and thus often two or more subsidiaries, in particular.  
Complementary to this approach Laestadius (1998) introduces a distinction 
between analytical and synthetical knowledge – or the degree to which 
organisational learning processes follow development paths pre-determined 
externally by academic professions, based on language and subject matter 
borders defined by the latter, or are synthetical in the sense of being 
interdisciplinary and defining its own language and subject matter borders 
as a result of the interplay between idiosyncratic organisational learning and 
product market requirements.  
Similarly, Lam (1998, 2000) distinguishes between degree of ‘tacitness’ and 
‘explicitness’ as well as ‘individualism’ versus ‘collectivism’ in 
organisational knowledge bases and organisational learning.  
Both approaches converge towards the insights of Wenger (1998), who 
argue that knowledge transfer processes between professional communities 
generally rest on a common, experience-based ‘interpretative’ framework, a 
common language and mutual access to the often fairly tacit ‘routines’ of 
the organisations involved. Given analytical knowledge, this language is 
generic, the experience-based frame of reference easily accessible and 
knowledge easily exchanges as patents or other documents; and given 
individualism in organisational knowledge bases knowledge can easily be 
moved by moving individuals. Hence, knowledge transfer processes are 
easy and cost-effective to achieve. 
Given the other opposite of collective knowledge bases characterised by a 
high degree of tacitness and synthetic knowledge, the latter is not easily 
transmitted and the scope for misinterpretations, failing co-operative 
ventures and escalating costs is high102. In answering the brain gain question 
it is thus important to note that the focus on absorptive capacity initiated by 
Cohen and Levinthal (1990) should incorporate perspectives on the 
‘communicativeness’ as well as ‘absorptiveness’ of different forms of 
knowledge. The Axis Shield case illustrates this point well. 
Embeddedness in innovation systems 
A major point in the “business system literature” is that different 
corporations/MNEs, originating in different institutional systems, differ in 
                                                 
102 See Lam 1998 for an in-depth case study of a UK-Japaneese strategic alliance illustrating this point 
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 their ability and willingness to collaborate with business partners (Whitley 
2001:41), and what kind of partners they preferably collaborate with  
According to the transaction cost school line of reasoning this could be 
interpreted as differences in the willingness to expose the corporate 
structure to knowledge intensive/uncertain external transactions - i.e. high 
asset specificity, transaction frequency and uncertainty will, according to 
this school, given a low-trust environment, create high transaction costs and 
hence lead to vertical integration of these functions, and leave remaining 
external linkages governed by arms-length contractual arrangements.  
The key in this argument is ‘low trust’, either actual or merely expected by 
the MNE, and hence differences in the preferences towards internalising 
such risks and hence controlling the transactions administratively. Anglo-
Saxon economies in general, and US in particular, are shown to contain 
‘harsh’ transaction environments that favour vertical integration (Storper 
1997, Soskice 1998), while the Continental European economies as well as 
Japan are shown to display significantly more competitive intercompany 
relations (ibid, Fukao 1995, Ruigrok and van Tulder 1995). This, reinforced 
by the corporate governance system, is of course reflected in corporate 
routines, expectations and strategies towards partners abroad.  
Consequently the literature emphasise the unwillingness of US and UK 
MNEs to establish long-term co-operative relations with parties outside the 
innovation system narrowly defined (see below). This in particular applies 
to their relationship towards suppliers. Experience from Norway clearly 
indicate that US MNEs tend to favour a transaction-cost informed vertical 
integration of, by them defined, key functions, while putting out the 
remaining up-stream activities of the value chain for open cut-throat 
bidding. Contracts are then offered based on prize and for a very limited 
period of time.  
Against this the literature (Fukao 1995, Soskice 1999, Whitley 1999) 
usually contrast the stable user-producer relationships initiated within the 
institutional systems of e.g. Germany, Sweden or Japan – and consequently 
the experiences with such relationships carried by MNEs when they go 
abroad. All this has of course important implications as to the role of MNEs 
in national clusters and national value chains, in that the scope for 
technological externalities to emerge is reduced dramatically when 
functions are either conducted internally by the MNE, or exposed to cut-
throat and short-term price competition that inevitably hamper the ability of 
suppliers to innovate and upgrade, and sooner or later result in contracts 
being given to suppliers in low-cost countries - the defined knowledge 
intensive parts of the value chain being internalised somewhere in the MNE 
anyway.  
Again, evidence from Norway (Herstad, fortc) include several examples of 
local knowledge-intensive sourcing within regional clusters becoming 
substituted with international (in one case internet-based) bids, all with 
explicit reference to the need for meeting US or UK MNE quarter-to-quarter 
cost cut requirements – but also of (German, Finnish or Swedish) MNEs 
stating that local or national supplier linkages are vital learning interfaces 
that should be governed as such.  
Another important difference in the outsider-insider governed firm 
dimension argued in Herstad (fortc) is the fact that the latter group of 
subsidiaries (i.e. again German, Finnish or Swedish) have both the 
formal/administrative freedom to themselves chose the mode of governance 
of supplier relations that they find suitable – given their first-hand 
knowledge about how things work – as well as the financial leverage needed 
to expose themselves towards seemingly uncertain user-producer 
relationships.  
Recent evidence (Lam 2000, 2003) however highlights the superiority of 
US-style organisations and thus MNEs when it comes to establishing and 
utilising contacts with research institutions, both domestically but also 
abroad. Similar observations are made by Doremus et al (1998) and 
explained with reference to the national innovation and education systems 
from which they have evolved (i.e. the strong research/education/industry 
linkages found in the US, cf. table), as opposite to e.g. Japanese MNEs with 
far less experience with such linkages from home.  
Lam (2003) however poses a complementary explanation in highlighting 
business system initiated differences in organisational set-ups and thus 
logics of learning: US style firms focus heavily on the role of the individual 
expert, hence managing to create ‘external, internal labour markets’ (Lam 
2000) where the labour market for individual experts in the corporate 
organisation overlap with research institutions and hence contribute to a 
strong linkage between the two – thus enabling knowledge exchange 
through either co-evolution of synthetic knowledge or a strong mutual 
emphasis on analytical knowledge.  
Similarly, the ‘pure’, and far broader in the sense of incorporating a larger 
part of the employee base, internal labour markets for experts found in 
German or Japaneese style organisations imply a higher degree of 
‘collectiveness’ and firm-specific synthetical knowledge – which in turn 
imply both that linkages to outside R&D are more limited – and that those 
linkages that are formed will be characterised by problems of 
communication as a result of the nature of knowledge itself.  
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Table 5 
The innovation system effect and the MNE 
  US MNEs German MNEs Japaneese MNEs 
    
Home-base 
national 
innovation 
system 
Originating in 
mission-oriented 
policy environment, 
strong linkages to 
higher education, 
focus on science-
intensive high-tech 
industries 
Diffusion-oriented, 
strong inter-industry 
linkages, national 
focus on specialized 
suppliers and scale-
intensive medium 
tech industries 
(‘diversified quality 
production’) 
Strong inter-industry 
linkages, weak 
linkages between 
industry and ‘outside 
industry’ R&D 
    
MNE 
organisational 
set-up 
From financial 
system driven 
unfocused risk 
diversification to 
financial system 
driven focus on ‘lean 
structures’. Low 
degrees of inter-
subsidiary 
integration 
Varying degrees of 
focus, but 
divisionalised 
according to 
technology/product 
market 
considerations, 
integrated within 
divisions 
Focused and 
integrated.  
    
MNE 
preferred 
supplier 
relations 
Arms-length, 
contractual and 
short-term.  
Stable, selective and 
long-term 
Stable, extremely 
selective and long-
term 
    
    
 
Implications for subsidiaries 
Now, given the theoretical arguments and empirical findings presented 
above we could portray the ‘archetypical’, mature MNE from the distinct 
business systems of the US, Germany and Japan as in table 6 below. For the 
purpose here these can be seen as, admittedly crude, proxies for the broader 
Anglo-American group (US MNEs) or Continental European and Nordic 
group (German and Japaneese MNEs). 
 
_____________________________________________________________ 
Table 6 
MNE organisation and strategy  
 
 US MNEs German MNEs Japaneese MNEs 
    
Revealed 
strengths 
Generating or 
seeking out and 
internalising radical 
new technologies, 
forcing 
commercialisation of 
science based 
knowledge, product 
innovations and 
patenting. 
 
 
Enabling complex 
problem solving and 
incremental 
innovations, firm 
specific knowledge 
accumulation. 
Knowledge transfers 
and in-house 
synergies.  
Enabling complex 
problem solving and 
incremental 
innovations, firm 
specific knowledge 
accumulation. 
Knowledge transfers 
and in-house 
synergies. 
    
Revealed 
weaknesses 
In enabling 
incremental 
innovations and 
(long-term) 
programmes of 
complementary 
(R&D and non-
R&D) investments 
that depresses 
present returns 
without promising 
radical new 
technology.  
 
Knowledge transfers 
and in-house 
synergies.  
In enabling 
commercialisation of 
science-based 
knowledge and 
radical product 
innovations. 
Conservative, 
uncertainty-averse.  
In shifting 
technological 
development paths. 
Conservative and 
path-dependent 
through emphasis on 
firm specific 
learning and 
inability to feed on 
external research.  
    
Parent 
commitment 
and subsidiary 
role 
Commitment to 
subsidiaries 
contingent on 
prospects of 
emerging product or 
technology, ability 
of subsidiary to 
defend/increase 
earning by 
continuous cost cuts 
and/or market for 
sell-out. 
Commitment to 
subsidiary 
contingent on 
defined role in long-
term company 
technology and 
market strategy.  
Commitment to 
subsidiary 
contingent on 
defined role in long-
term company 
technology and 
market strategy. 
    
Linkages to 
host 
innovation 
systems 
Revealed ability to 
and focus on linking 
up with host system 
research institutions. 
Weaker linkages to 
other business 
partners 
Mixed picture. 
Weaker linkages to 
host research than 
US counterparts, but 
stronger linkages to 
other business 
partners.  
Very weak linkages 
to host contexts, 
known to even move 
suppliers with them 
when establishing 
activities abroad. 
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Note that this mainly applies to mature firms of a certain size; i.e. firms 
which through institutionalisation processes  (Scott 1997) have become rule 
and routine governed, and thus reflecting the rules of the societies in which 
they have developed and to which they remain linked through ownership. 
These are the firms that constitute the main bulk of the existing MNE 
population.  
Before proceeding to draw general brain gain or drain implications we also 
stress that actual firms may vary quite a lot from the picture portrayed 
above. First, this an inevitable result of not all MNEs investing in the Nordic 
countries being ‘typical’ in the sense of large and mature – rather, our case 
studies contain at least one example of how age, size and the concrete 
history of the firm have produced a UK MNE contradicting the Anglo-
Saxon governance styles and organisational set-ups associated with these as 
a group (i.e. the Axis Shield case).  
Hence, actual owner firms may – and will, of course - display characteristics 
that are solely theirs as firms, and not reflections of their home bases. 
Examples in Herstad (fortc) include family controlled and union-friendly 
US MNEs, as well as extremely shareholder value oriented European ones.  
No structural determinism should thus be read into the following, as it 
focuses on incentives, constraints, experiences and resulting tendencies in 
themselves rather than presupposing these to always emerge as their 
seemingly logic outcome (Bhaskar 1978).  
Having said this, contemporary in-depth MNE research (Lam 2003, 
Geppert, Williams and Matten 2003, Morgan et al 2002, Herstad, fortc) as 
well as the broader agenda of research on national business systems show 
no evidence of the structural revolution in either the world economy or in 
MNE behaviour that would force us to reject the conclusion by Doremus et 
al (1998) and Whitley (2002): That  
a) the internationalisation strategy of MNEs reflect incentives and 
constraints in their respective home business and innovation systems 
(Ruigrok and van Tulder 1995), and  
b) that these same systems causes them to govern subsidiaries in accordance 
to experiences and routines developed within them – i.e. as they would 
domestically.  
According to Whitley (2002), the perceived uncertainty stemming from 
operating in different business environments would actually cause this 
tendency to be reinforced – this as uncertainty strengthen routines – rather 
than eliminated. 
 Table 7 
Subsidiary implications 
 US MNEs German MNEs Japaneese MNEs 
    
Subsidiary 
internal brain 
gain 
Strong corporate 
focus on reportable 
R&D and 
(patentable) product 
innovation may 
boost subsidiary 
formal research.   
 
 
Patient capital and 
industry specific 
ownership 
advantages may 
enable long-term 
investment 
programmes and 
incremental 
innovations that do 
not necessarily result 
in radical new 
technologies 
Patient capital and 
industry specific 
ownership 
advantages may 
enable long-term 
incremental 
investment 
programmes that do 
not necessarily result 
in radical new 
technologies 
    
Subsidiary 
internal brain 
‘paralysis’ 
Short-term non-
R&D investment 
strategies and 
governance 
approach inhibit 
long-term 
organisational 
learning. Bias 
towards nurturing 
defined experts may 
alienate other 
groups, and bias 
towards nurturing 
individual 
performance may 
inhibit broader 
organisational 
learning. 
Parent companies 
shown to be 
hierarchical and 
conservative, and 
while ‘thorough’ in 
decision making 
processes radical 
subsidiary 
technology renewal 
processes may be 
negatively 
discriminated 
(uncertainty-averse). 
Tight administrative 
control and focus on 
‘Japaneese practices’ 
may inhibit level of 
local leverage 
necessary to renew 
organisational 
learning processes. 
Strong path 
dependencies.  
    
Implications of 
parent 
commitment 
Commitment 
contingent on 
prospects of radical 
innovations may 
boost R&D, while 
creating strong bias 
against long-term 
non-R&D 
investments focused 
on incremental 
innovations.  
Commitment to 
subsidiary 
contingent on 
defined role in long-
term company 
technology and 
market strategy; 
enable long-term 
development 
strategies in 
subsidiaries but may 
reinforce negative 
path dependencies  
Commitment to 
subsidiary 
contingent on 
defined role in long-
term company 
technology and 
market strategy. 
    
Subsidiary 
post-takeover 
innovation 
system 
linkages 
Strong/increasing 
linkages to R&D 
institutions through 
parent company 
focus on such. Weak 
linkages to other 
Stronger emphasis 
on enabling and 
nurturing selective 
linkages to 
specialised suppliers, 
less emphasis on 
Strong emphasis on 
internal 
organisational 
learning and 
extremely selective 
supplier linkages.  
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 subsidiaries in 
corporation, and 
non-R&D business 
partners (e.g. 
suppliers) 
  
High turnover of 
subsidiaries imply 
availability of 
technological 
capabilities at the 
expense of deeper, 
selective linkages 
(cf. Granovetter and 
‘the strength of weak 
ties’) 
 
linkages to external 
research nurture 
path-dependent 
incremental 
innovations  
 
Lower turnover of 
better integrated 
subsidiaries imply 
lesser technological 
variety but deeper 
linkages (cf. ‘the 
strength and 
weakness of strong 
ties’) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extremely reluctant 
and selective 
internationalisation 
imply less 
internalised 
technological 
variety, low turnover 
of subsidiaries imply 
strong path-
dependency in 
renewal of this 
variety. 
    
 
 
It is traditionally argued (Narula 1996) that a main reason to internationalise 
is the prospect of utilising owner specific advantages, developed 
domestically as a result of national industrial specialisation, on a larger 
scale. In the case of Anglo-Saxon MNEs in general and US MNEs in 
particular we may argue that such ownership advantages to a large extent lie 
in the ability of these companies to achieve technological renewal through a 
combination of aggressive acquisition and divestment strategies, strong 
linkages to external research institutions abroad and domestically – and a 
high level of internal R&D – all driven by the necessity of continuously 
creating shareholder value by reporting improving results and creating 
increasing expectations, and enabled by their domestic experiences and 
organisational set-ups focused on the same.  
Seen from the viewpoint of the subsidiary, the flip side of the coin is lacking 
parent commitment and what some subsidiaries report as perverted 
requirements as to non-R&D operational predictability and short-term 
operational efficiency improvements that inhibits the incremental 
innovations enabling the latter to be sustainable in the long run (Herstad, 
fortc). Hence, US and UK MNEs are distinct agents of financial capital, 
with those distinct logics of R&D, organisational learning and innovation 
that follow. 
Similarly we may argue that the ownership advantages of e.g. German, 
Swede or Japaneese MNEs these seek to exploit abroad carry all the 
hallmarks of conservative and patient industrial capital; and hence both 
corporate organisational principles and investments in research and 
development more broadly defined flavoured less by a need to build 
expectations externally, and allow for external estimation of corporate 
value, than the monitoring and evaluation of organisational learning and 
product market prospects continuously carried out by those insiders that 
define corporate structure and strategy (and who, as highly exposed to 
individual firms, are more risk and not least uncertainty averse than their 
portfolio diversifier counterparts in the UK and US).  
These general subsidiary implications should however in turn be interpreted 
against the known specificities of the Nordic business and innovation 
systems as well as revealed industrial specialisations in order for the 
positive or negative contributions to subsidiaries as well as regional or 
national innovation systems to be identified.   
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